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Editors’	Introduction		We	are	pleased	to	present	these	selected	papers	from	the	proceedings	of	the	3rd	Crime,	




























Abstract	Online	 fraud	 is	 a	 global	 problem.	 Millions	 of	 individuals	 worldwide	 are	 losing	 money	 and	experiencing	 the	 devastation	 associated	 with	 becoming	 a	 victim	 of	 online	 fraud.	 In	 2014,	Australians	 reported	 losses	 of	 $82	 million	 to	 the	 Australian	 Competition	 and	 Consumer	Commission	(ACCC)	as	a	result	of	online	fraud.	Given	that	the	ACCC	is	one	of	many	agencies	that	receive	victim	complaints,	and	the	extent	of	underreporting	of	online	fraud,	this	figure	is	likely	 to	 represent	 only	 a	 fraction	 of	 the	 actual	 monetary	 losses	 incurred.	 The	 successful	policing	of	online	fraud	is	hampered	by	its	transnational	nature,	the	prevalence	of	false/stolen	identities	 used	 by	 offenders,	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 resources	 available	 to	 investigate	 offences.	 In	addition,	police	are	restricted	by	the	geographical	boundaries	of	their	own	jurisdictions	which	conflicts	with	the	lack	of	boundaries	afforded	to	offenders	by	the	virtual	world.			In	 response	 to	 this,	 Australia	 is	 witnessing	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 victim-oriented	 policing	approach	 to	 counter	 online	 fraud	 victimisation.	 This	 incorporates	 the	 use	 of	 financial	intelligence	as	a	tool	to	proactively	notify	potential	victims	of	online	fraud.	Using	a	variety	of	Australian	 examples,	 this	 paper	documents	 the	history	 to	 this	 new	approach	 and	 considers	the	significance	that	such	a	shift	represents	to	policing	in	a	broader	context.	It	also	details	the	value	that	this	approach	can	have	to	both	victims	and	law	enforcement	agencies.	Overall,	this	paper	 argues	 that	 a	 victim-oriented	 approach	 to	 policing	 online	 fraud	 can	 have	 substantial	benefits	for	both	police	and	victims.				




Background	and	context	to	online	fraud	Online	fraud	can	be	defined	as	‘the	experience	of	an	individual	who	has	responded	through	the	use	of	the	Internet	 to	 a	 dishonest	 invitation,	 request,	 notification	 or	 offer	 by	 providing	 personal	 information	 or	money	which	has	led	to	the	suffering	of	a	financial	or	non-financial	loss	of	some	kind’	(Cross,	Smith	and	Richards	 2014:	 1).	 Online	 fraud	 is	 not	 a	 new	 crime;	 rather,	 the	 internet	 has	 enabled	 fraud	 to	 be	perpetrated	 in	 different	 ways,	 and	 on	 a	 much	 larger	 scale	 than	 previously	 (Yar	 2013).	 The	 internet	provides	an	easy	mechanism	for	offenders	to	contact	potential	victims	on	a	very	cost	effective	basis,	and	it	offers	 a	 layer	 of	 protection	 for	 offenders	 through	 increased	 anonymity	 compared	 to	 face-to-face	interactions	(Yar	2013).	This	has	had	a	significant	 impact	on	how	fraud	has	been	perpetrated	 in	recent	decades.			Offenders	can	use	an	endless	number	of	approaches	to	target	potential	victims.	However,	there	are	two	categories	of	online	fraud	that	dominate	victim	statistics:	advance	fee	fraud	and	romance	fraud.	Advance	fee	fraud	(AFF)	is	when	a	victim	is	asked	to	send	a	small	amount	of	money	in	return	for	a	larger	amount	of	money	promised	in	the	future	(Ross	and	Smith	2011).	Typically,	 if	 the	victim	complies,	the	requests	for	money	continue	and	may	escalate	in	amount.	It	 is	commonplace	for	victims	to	lose	tens	of	thousands,	 if	not	 hundreds	 of	 thousands,	 of	 dollars	 as	 a	 result.	 AFF	 can	 disguise	 itself	 as	 business	 and	 investment	opportunities,	unexpected	lottery	wins,	inheritance	notifications	and/or	employment	schemes.			A	 derivative	 of	 AFF	 is	 romance	 fraud,	 though	 this	 is	 now	 an	 established	 category	 in	 its	 own	 right.	Romance	 fraud	uses	 the	premise	of	a	 legitimate	relationship	 to	extract	 (often	 large)	amounts	of	money	from	a	victim	(Rege	2009).	The	use	of	online	dating	and	social	media	 sites	 for	people	 to	establish	new	relationships	has	proliferated	and	this	has	seen	an	emergence	of	romance	fraud	as	a	dominant	method	of	defrauding	unsuspecting	victims.	Offenders	develop	 trust	 and	 rapport	 to	mirror	a	 genuine	 relationship	and	then	target	 the	vulnerabilities	of	 individuals	 through	this	relationship	to	 financially	exploit	victims.	This	 type	of	 fraud	 is	one	of	 the	most	devastating	 for	victims,	as	 they	not	only	 lose	money	but	 they	also	grieve	the	loss	of	the	relationship	(Whitty	and	Buchanan	2012).			While	 these	categories	of	 fraud	tend	to	originate	 in	an	online	environment,	 it	 is	 important	 to	recognise	that	offenders	will	use	all	mediums	of	communication.	Fraud	still	occurs	in	face-to-face	situations,	as	well	as	 traditional	mail	 and	 telephone	 scenarios.	Highly	 skilled	 offenders	will	 now	use	 a	 combination	 of	 all	communication	methods	to	establish	and	maintain	a	connection	with	victims.	This	includes	email,	online	messaging	services,	webcams,	text	messages,	telephone	calls	and	face-to-face	interactions	to	perpetuate	their	lies	and	extract	the	largest	amount	of	money	possible	out	of	individual	victims.	Offenders	will	use	a	range	of	 social	 engineering	 techniques	designed	 to	persuade	 victims	 into	 compliance	with	 any	 request	(Drew	and	Cross	2013).			




reporting	 rates	across	all	 crime	 types	 (Button,	McNaugton-Nicolls,	Kerr	et	 al.	 2014).	 Studies	across	 the	UK,	US	and	Canada	estimate	that	less	than	one-third	of	all	victims	report	fraud	to	authorities	(Schoepfer	and	Piquero	2009).	This	is	also	consistent	with	Australian	research	(Smith	2007,	2008).	Further,	there	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	fraud	experienced	in	an	online	context	is	less	likely	to	be	reported	compared	to	fraud	 perpetrated	 offline	 (Smith	 2007,	 2008).	 There	 are	 several	 established	 reasons	 for	 victims	 not	reporting	online	fraud,	which	include	the	shame	and	stigma	associated	with	this	particular	type	of	crime	(Cross	 2015),	 not	 knowing	who	 to	 report	 to	 (Button,	 Tapley	 and	Lewis	 2012)	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 consistent	definitions	 of	what	 constitutes	 an	 offence	 (Button,	 Tapley	 and	 Lewis	 2012).	 Added	 to	 this,	 are	 several	unique	characteristics	of	online	 fraud	that	present	as	barriers	 to	police	taking	action	(see	Button	2012;	Cross	and	Blackshaw	2015).	The	 first	 is	 the	 transnational	nature	of	 the	offence.	 In	most	circumstances,	offenders,	victims	and	the	money	are	in	separate	countries.	While	the	internet	can	be	understood	as	one	global	 jurisdiction,	 police	 agencies	 are	 still	 founded	 upon	 geographical	 boundaries	 for	 their	 authority.	Therefore,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 ascertain	which	police	agency	 is	 responsible	 for	 investigating	 the	 complaint.	The	 second	 challenge	 focuses	 on	 identity	 crime,	 where	 offenders	 take	 on	 the	 identity	 of	 a	 legitimate	person	or	 company,	 or	may	 create	 a	 completely	 false	 and	 fictitious	 identity	 to	perpetrate	 their	 crimes.	The	third	is	the	technological	aspects	of	online	offences,	whereby	police	may	not	have	the	required	skills	or	expertise	to	understand	or	investigate	an	offence	which	has	been	perpetrated	in	a	virtual	environment.	Lastly,	legislation	is	inadequate	to	address	the	problem	of	online	fraud,	due	to	the	lack	of	consistency	in	definitions	and	the	multiple	jurisdictions	involved.	Overall,	this	compounds	the	investigative	challenges.	Online	 fraud	poses	serious	challenges	 for	police	 investigation,	even	 if	prioritised	 (Cross	and	Blackshaw	2015).			Given	 the	 severity	 of	 these	 challenges,	 the	 need	 for	 an	 alternative	 approach	 is	 clear.	 The	 reactive,	investigative	policing	model	 is	neither	suitable	nor	effective	 for	 this	crime	type.	On	 this	basis,	a	victim-oriented	approach	using	 financial	 intelligence	 to	proactively	 identify	potential	 online	 fraud	victims	has	emerged.	This	approach	acknowledges	that	it	is	of	greater	benefit	to	target	a	reduction	in	the	amount	of	money	 being	 transferred	 as	 the	 result	 of	 fraud	 and	 consequently	 decrease	 victimisation,	 rather	 than	attempt	to	investigate	and	prosecute	after	victimisation	has	occurred.	The	following	section	examines	the	emergence	of	this	approach	in	Australia.			
The	emergence	of	a	victim-oriented	approach	using	financial	intelligence	As	 established,	 online	 fraud	 poses	 distinct	 challenges	 to	 law	 enforcement.	 Therefore,	 Australian	authorities	have	turned	to	the	use	of	financial	intelligence	in	a	victim-oriented	approach	to	reducing	the	losses	 and	 harm	 sustained	 to	 victims	 experiencing	 online	 fraud.	 Financial	 intelligence	 refers	 to	 the	documented	financial	transactions	that	take	place	between	Australia	and	overseas.	There	is	no	monetary	limit	 to	 the	 transaction;	 instead	 identification	 is	 based	 purely	 on	 the	 geographical	 location	 of	 the	transaction.	 The	 following	 presents	 a	 chronological	 account	 of	 a	 victim-oriented	 approach	 to	 policing	online	 fraud	 through	 the	use	of	 financial	 intelligence	 and	 focuses	 on	 each	of	 the	 relevant	 agencies	 and	jurisdictions	 (Queensland,	 Western	 Australia,	 South	 Australia	 and,	 federally,	 the	 ACCC)	 that	 have	implemented	this	approach.			




Track,	where	they	used	financial	intelligence	to	identify	139	individuals	sending	money	to	Nigeria.	Police	called	these	people	to	ask	the	reasons	surrounding	the	transactions	and	134	individuals	were	found	to	be	victims	of	fraud	who	had	lost	$18.2	million	collectively	(Collins	2015:	4).	Three	years	later,	QPS	initiated	Operation	Hotel	 Fortress,	which	 identified	200	people	 sending	money	 to	Nigeria	 and	 again	questioned	them	on	the	circumstances	surrounding	the	money	transfers.	In	this	group,	186	were	identified	as	victims	of	online	fraud,	who	had	lost	in	excess	of	$21.5	million	(Collins	2015:	5).	In	combination,	the	results	from	both	Echo	Track	and	Hotel	Fortress	indicate	the	substantial	losses	incurred	through	online	fraud	and	also	illustrate	 the	 pervasive	 nature	 of	 victimisation.	 In	most	 cases,	 victims	 did	 not	 realise	 they	were	 being	defrauded,	 had	 not	 reported	 it	 to	 the	 police,	 and	 sadly,	 in	 some	 cases,	 continued	 to	 send	money	 after	police	intervention.	Since	this	time,	QPS	has	 ‘intermittently	undertaken	approaches	to	potential	victims,	advising	them	of	the	scam	and	warning	them	against	continuing	to	send	money’	(Queensland	Organised	Crime	 Commission	 of	 Inquiry	 2015:	 401).	 Currently,	 QPS	 have	 no	 specific	 project	 identifying	 potential	advance	 fee	 fraud	 victims	 (Queensland	 Organised	 Crime	 Commission	 of	 Inquiry	 2015:	 402).	 However,	this	 proactive	 approach	 initiated	 by	 the	 QPS	 to	 contact	 potential	 victims	 through	 the	 use	 of	 financial	intelligence	can	be	seen	as	a	turning	point	for	the	policing	of	online	fraud	in	Australia.			
Western	Australia	Taking	their	lead	from	Queensland,	the	West	Australian	Police	(WAPOL)	established	Operation	Sunbird	in	2012	 to	 target	 AFF	 victimisation	 in	Western	 Australia.	 This	was	 later	 renamed	 Project	 Sunbird,	 and	 a	formal	 partnership	 was	 entered	 between	 WAPOL	 and	 the	 West	 Australian	 Department	 of	 Commerce	(Commerce),	who	were	also	concerned	about	the	victimisation	of	individuals	(Department	of	Commerce	nd).			Project	 Sunbird	 targets	 financial	 transactions	 sent	 between	 West	 Australia	 and	 five	 West	 African	countries:	 Nigeria,	 Ghana,	 Togo,	 Sierra	 Leone,	 and	 Benin	 (Department	 of	 Commerce	 2014).	 It	 is	 a	 five	stage	process,	with	the	stages	shared	between	both	agencies.	The	first	is	identification,	whereby	WAPOL	access	financial	intelligence.	They	screen	this	list	for	likely	legitimate	transactions	and	then	forward	the	remaining	details	 to	Commerce.	The	second	stage	 is	 intervention,	whereby	Commerce	sends	a	 letter	 to	the	 households	 on	 the	 list,	 which	 acknowledges	 that	 the	 person	 is	 sending	 money	 to	 one	 of	 the	 five	identified	 countries	 and	 outlines	 the	 reasons	 why	 WAPOL/Commerce	 believe	 the	 recipient	 may	 be	 a	victim	 of	 fraud.	 The	 letter	 encourages	 the	 cessation	 of	 financial	 transactions	 and	 provides	 a	 point	 of	contact	to	discuss	the	matter	 further.	 If	 the	 individual	continues	to	send	money	three	months	after	this	initial	 letter,	 a	 second	 letter	 is	 sent,	 outlining	 the	 belief	 that	 the	 person	 could	 be	 a	 fraud	 victim	 and	encouraging	the	termination	of	transactions.	In	addition,	a	fact	sheet	developed	specifically	for	victims	of	fraud	is	enclosed	with	this	second	letter.			The	 third	 stage	 is	 interruption,	whereby	 Commerce	 liaises	with	 banks,	 remittance	 agencies,	 and	 other	relevant	organisations,	to	block	accounts	of	identified	offenders	and	potential	victims.	This	also	includes	education	 campaigns	 and	media	 releases	 to	 increase	 the	 overall	 awareness.	 The	 fourth	 stage	 revolves	around	 intelligence,	 where	WAPOL	 and	 Commerce	 collect	 information	 from	 the	 letter	 recipients	 who	make	contact.	This	then	leads	into	the	last	stage,	investigation,	whereby	WAPOL	focus	on	local	offenders	if	 relevant	 or	 makes	 appropriate	 referrals	 of	 intelligence	 to	 other	 national	 and	 international	 police	agencies	(see	Cross	and	Blackshaw	2015	for	further	details	about	Project	Sunbird).	Project	Sunbird	is	an	ongoing	part	of	the	work	undertaken	by	WAPOL	and	Commerce.			




difference	being	 that	SAPOL	are	not	working	 in	partnership	with	a	consumer	protection	agency,	 rather	they	undertake	 the	 five	stages	 themselves.	To	 this	day,	Operation	Disrepair	continues	 to	alert	potential	victims	in	South	Australia.			
Australian	Competition	and	Consumer	Commission	(ACCC)	In	 August	 2014,	 the	 ACCC	 launched	 their	 National	 Scams	 Disruption	 Project,	 which	 adopted	 the	 same	model	 of	 Project	 Sunbird	 and	 Operation	 Disrepair.	 The	 most	 notable	 difference	 is	 that	 the	 ACCC	 is	 a	consumer	 protection	 body	 and	 not	 law	 enforcement.	 The	 National	 Scams	 Disruption	 Project	 initially	targeted	citizens	across	New	South	Wales	and	the	Australian	Capital	Territory	who	were	sending	money	to	 either	 Nigeria	 or	 Ghana.	 In	 2015,	 this	 has	 been	 expanded	 to	 include	 Victoria,	 Tasmania,	 and	 the	Northern	Territory	(ACCC	2015:	2)	and	is	ongoing	across	each	of	these	jurisdictions.	Similar	to	Sunbird	and	Disrepair,	the	ACCC	access	financial	intelligence	to	send	letters	to	individuals	considered	likely	fraud	victims	 and	 encourage	 them	 to	 desist	 their	money	 transfers	 (Bainbridge	 2014).	While	 the	 ACCC	 is	 an	enforcement	 body	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 it	 has	 different	 law	 enforcement	 powers	 and,	 therefore,	 works	 in	collaboration	with	local	police	as	required.			
































Abstract		Legislation	was	passed	in	Australia	in	2015	to	require	telecommunications	service	providers	to	 retain	 their	 ‘metadata’	 for	 two	 years.	 But	 there	 are	 problems	 associated	 with	 the	 plan,	including	the	threat	to	privacy,	and	the	threat	that	the	retention	system	can	be	circumvented	entirely.	 All	 the	while,	 there	 is	 doubt	 that	 the	 expensive	 legislative	 scheme	will	 actually	 do	what	it	is	designed	to	do:	forestall	terrorism.	This	paper	will	outline	some	appropriate	legal,	political	 and	 technological	 questions	 that	will	 need	 to	be	 asked	 (and	answered)	 in	order	 to	help	 Australian	 policy-makers	 and	 citizens	 generally	 to	 work	 through	 the	 issues	 and	 to	resolve	the	contradictions.		
 






Metadata	and	its	retention	The	gathering	of	 information	about	communications	between	people	 is	not	a	new	phenomenon.	We	have	been	foreshadowing	 ‘total’	surveillance	and	the	death	of	privacy	 in	the	modern	age	for	at	 least	two	 decades	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Garfinkel	 2001;	 Whitaker	 1999).	 What	 is	 changing	 is	 the	 bulk	collection,	aggregation,	and	analysis	capabilities	of	modern	cloud	computing	(Macropoulos	and	Martin	2015:	15),	and	the	speed	with	which	the	level	of	intrusiveness	can	move.		 From	time	immemorial,	detailed	records	have	been	accumulated	on	the	health,	morality,	cognitive	 development,	 motivations,	 sexualities,	 incomes,	 work	 activities	 and	whereabouts	of	certain	populations	…	[what	has	changed	is	the]	significant	intensification	and	 diversification	 of	 technologically	 facilitated	 surveillance	mechanisms.	 (Smith	 2012:	1)		Governments	 legislating	 new	 requirements	 relating	 to	metadata	 retention	 is	 one	more	 step	 along	 that	same	path.		In	 the	past,	Australians	have	exhibited	great	respect	 for	 the	 limits	we	have	placed	upon	government	 to	interfere	with	civil	 liberties.	There	are	two	famous	Australian	 legal	cases	 that	highlight	our	wariness	of	government	intervention	into	daily	life	for	security-related	purposes.	The	first	case	is	Adelaide	Company	




laws	 in	 the	 courts.	 Academics	 have	 not	 been	 so	 silent.	 The	 modern	 zeal	 of	 governments	 has	 been	described	 by	 one	 commentator	 as	 ‘hyper-legislation’	 (Roach	 2011:	 310).	 Indeed,	 Lynch,	McGarrity	 and	Williams	note	that		 Australia	 is	 the	 only	 democratic	 nation	without	 a	 national	 human	 rights	 law	 such	 as	 a	human	rights	act	of	bill	of	rights.	The	absence	of	this	check	upon	government	power	has	had	 a	 major	 impact	 on	 the	 making	 and	 operation	 of	 Australia’s	 anti-terrorism	 laws.	(Lynch,	McGarrity	and	Williams	2015:	211)		
Legislation	The	first	tranche	of	legislation	came	in	the	form	of	amendments	to	Telecommunications	(Interception	and	
Access)	 Act	 1979	 (Cth)	 and	 the	 Australian	 Security	 Intelligence	 Organisation	 Legislation	 Amendment	
(Terrorism)	 Act	 2003	 (Cth)	 (Rodrick	 2009).	 The	 provisions	 found	 in	 these	 two	 Acts	 now	 combine	 to	permit	 Australian	 Security	 Intelligence	 Organisation	 (ASIO)	 operatives	 to	 access	 metadata	 without	 a	warrant	if	they	are	satisfied	that	accessing	the	information	is	‘in	connection	with	the	performance	by	the	Organisation	of	its	functions’.			For	 example,	 section	 136	 of	 the	Telecommunications	 (Interception	 and	Access)	 Act	 1979	 (Cth)	 states	 as	follows:		 (1)	 A	 person	 may,	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 performance	 by	 the	 Organisation	 of	 its	functions,	 or	 otherwise	 for	 purposes	 of	 security,	 communicate	 to	 another	 person,	make	use	of,	or	make	a	record	of	the	following:		(a)			lawfully	accessed	information	other	than	foreign	intelligence	information;		(aa)	preservation	notice	information;		(b)			stored	communications	warrant	information.			Moreover,	by	virtue	of	the	National	Security	Legislation	Amendment	Act	(No	1)	2014	(Cth),	ASIO	officers	and	others	involved	in	undercover	operations	are	given	an	easier	ride	in	relation	to	operations.	They	can	now	 be	 authorised	 by	 the	 Attorney-General	 to	 engage	 in	what	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 ‘Special	 Intelligence	Operation’	(SIO)	in	which	case	they	have	a	general	immunity	from	civil	and	criminal	liability.			The	third	aspect	of	the	new	laws	is	the	one	under	particular	focus	here:	metadata	retention.	A	few	words	are	needed	by	way	of	background.	On	24	June	2013,	the	report	of	the	Joint	Committee	on	Intelligence	and	Security	 was	 released.	 The	 Committee	 made	 43	 recommendations.	 It	 paid	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	mooted	 idea	 that	 telecommunications	 data	 be	 stored	 for	 up	 to	 two	 years	 in	 case	 it	 is	 required	 by	 law	enforcement	or	security	agencies.	The	Committee	noted	that,	while	a	data	retention	scheme	would	be	of	‘significant	utility’	to	national	security	agencies,	 it	also	raised,	 it	said,	fundamental	privacy	issues.	In	the	end,	 the	 committee	 did	 not	 make	 a	 recommendation	 on	 the	 subject.	 It	 formed	 the	 view	 that	 a	 data	retention	policy	must	be	a	decision	of	government,	and	it	was	not	for	the	committee	to	determine	what	the	government	should	do.		The	 (former)	 Abbott	 government	 did	 indeed,	 however,	 move	 on	 this	 matter,	 and	 introduced	 the	




Access	 to	 private	 communications	 records	 is	 already	 out	 of	 control	 in	 Australia,	 with	telecommunications	 regulator	 the	 ACMA	 [the	 Australian	 Communications	 and	 Media	Authority]	reporting	580	000	warrantless	demands	in	the	last	financial	year.	Mandatory	data	 retention	 simply	 adds	 warehouses	 full	 of	 new	 private	 information	 to	 this	 broken	access	regime.	I	am	not	one	who	believes	that	if	this	bill	passes	into	law,	we	will	wake	up	on	the	following	day	in	an	authoritarian	dystopia.	Things	are	rarely	that	simple.	But	in	the	few	years	I’ve	been	working	up	close	to	Government,	I’ve	learned	one	important	lesson:	Governments	 cannot	 be	 trusted.	 This	 Government,	 the	 one	 before	 it,	 the	 one	 that	 will	come	after	it.	(Ludlam	2015)		On	 26	 March	 2015,	 the	 bill	 passed	 into	 law	 and	 the	 Act	 became	 operative	 seven	months	 later	 on	 13	October	2015.		
Concerns	about	the	expansion	of	metadata	retention	laws	generally	There	are	a	number	of	concerns	about	the	legislation.	They	are	listed	in	the	following	paragraphs.	The	key	concerns	 are	 that	 the	 legislation	 creates	 a	 surveillance	 regime	 that	 is	 very	 expensive,	 has	 caught	telecommunications	 companies	 unawares,	 jeopardises	 privacy	 in	 an	 unwarranted	 fashion,	 erodes	 civil	liberties,	and	may	even	not	work.	Moreover,	there	may	be	unforeseen	consequences	such	as	the	leakage	of	data	to	other	nations,	and	a	counterproductive	backlash	in	the	communities	most	likely	to	be	targeted.	Let	us	examine	each	of	these	concerns	in	turn.		
Concern	1:	The	high	cost		As	shown	by	the	budget	papers,	data	retention	does	not	come	cheaply.	The	total	cost	of	the	new	measures	is	 estimated	 at	 A$450	 million.	 The	 expenditure	 was	 framed	 by	 the	 former	 treasurer,	 Joe	 Hockey,	 on	budget	 night	 (12	May	 2015)	 as	 an	 appropriate	 response	 to	 terrorism.	 Tony	 Abbott,	 the	 former	 Prime	Minister,	 was	 quoted	 as	 saying:	 ‘To	 help	 combat	 terrorism	 at	 home	 and	 deter	 Australians	 from	committing	 terrorist	 acts	 abroad,	we	need	 to	 ensure	our	 security	 agencies	 are	 resourced	properly	 and	have	the	powers	to	respond	to	evolving	threats	and	technological	change’	(Grattan	2015).	
	The	Australian	budget	(2015-2016)	lists	the	following	items	to	bring	about	the	legislative	intent:		
• A$296	million	for	lifting	government	information	technology	(IT)	capabilities;	
• A$131	 million	 for	 IT	 companies	 to	 upgrade	 their	 hardware	 and	 software	 to	accommodate	the	extra	storage	of	metadata;	
• A$23	 million	 to	 the	 Australian	 Crime	 Commission	 (ACC)	 and	 the	 federal	Attorney-General’s	Department	to	implement	the	plan.			The	 question	 of	whether	 these	 costs	 are	 justified	 is	 a	matter	 for	 Australian	 voters.	 In	 considering	 the	opportunity	 costs,	 one	 might	 ask	 what	 other	 government	 priorities	 cannot	 now	 be	 met	 given	 the	significant	expenditures	on	metadata	retention	implementation	and	on-going	requirements.		




no	actual	requirement	to	consult	with	the	service	provider	that’s	about	to	be	hit	by	this	order	and	there’s	no	apparent	right	of	appeal	against	 these	sorts	of	decisions.	We	think	the	balance	has	been	a	bit	lost	there.	(Australian	Broadcasting	Corporation	[ABC]	2015b)		These	concerns	indicate	that	there	is	more	work	to	be	done	in	shaping	and	moulding	the	public/private	partnerships	required	by	the	new	law.		Moreover,	as	reported	by	the	ABC	on	13	October	2015,	a	survey	sent	to	ISPs	(Internet	Service	Providers)	by	the	Communications	Alliance	revealed	that	two-thirds	of	them	were	still	not	entirely	sure	what	type	of	metadata	the	government	wants	retained,	collected	and	stored.	84	per	cent	were	not	ready	to	retain	and	encrypt	the	data	as	required	by	the	Act.	Almost	two	thirds	of	ISPs	will	request	exemptions	from	various	parts	of	the	legislation,	for	example,	the	requirement	to	encrypt	retained	data.	Mr	Stanton	was	reported	as	 saying	 to	 the	 ABC,	 ‘The	 vast	majority	 [of	 ISPs]	 are	 saying	 “We’re	 trying,	 but	we	 are	 not	 there	 yet”’	(Ockenden	2015).		
Concern	3:	The	threats	to	privacy	There	 is	 little	 doubt	 that	 any	 legislation	 that	 broadens	 the	 capacity	 of	 governments	 to	 increase	 their	surveillance	 of	 the	 population	 threatens	 the	 privacy	 of	 individuals	 (Choo	 2010,	 2014;	 Choo	 and	 Sarre	2015;	Sarre	2008,	2014a;	Wahlstrom,	Roddick,	Sarre	et	al	2009).	To	maintain	one’s	dignity,	one	must	be	able	to	control	access	to	their	sensitive	data	(in	this	case,	metadata)	and	be	protected	against	unwanted	scrutiny	and	judgement	in	private	or	in	public.			 Grounded	 in	 this	 rationale	 is	 the	 entitlement	 to	 anonymity,	 which	 should	 ensure	 that	encounters	with	others	in	public	remain	at	arm’s	length	and	that	a	person	is	subjected	to	only	 fleeting	 and	 impersonal	 appraisal.	 Like	 all	 privacy-related	 claims,	 anonymity	 is	 of	particular	value	in	fending	off	the	controlling	powers	of	the	state.	(Larsen	2011:	185)		Moreover,	 under	 Section	 6(1)	 of	 the	 Privacy	 Act	 1988	 (Cth)	 ‘personal	 information’	 is	 defined	 as	‘information	 or	 an	 opinion	 about	 an	 identified	 individual,	 or	 an	 individual	 who	 is	 reasonably	identifiable…’.	These	words	 limit	 the	scope	of	 the	application	of	privacy	 legislation	with	respect	 to	data	retention	because	the	Act	will	not	apply	to	the	use	of	algorithms	that	assess	anonymous	data	(De	Zwart,	Humphreys	and	Van	Dissel	2014:	718).			




comparable	nations	(Lynch,	McGarrity	and	Williams	2015:	2).	Indeed,	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	has	recently	stated	that	a	citizen’s	right	to	privacy	must	not	be	sacrificed	in	an	attempt	to	prevent	serious	crime	and	terrorism	(European	Court	of	Justice	2014;	Nyst	2015).		These	 concerns	 have	 been	 echoed	 at	 the	 highest	 levels	 in	 Australia,	 too.	 Australian	 Human	 Rights	Commissioner,	Professor	Gillian	Triggs,	was	reported	as	saying	(on	6	June	2015)	that	metadata	retention	laws	 that	 are	 an	 expansion	of	 ‘discretionary,	 often	non-compellable	ministerial	 powers’	 are	 a	 threat	 to	democracy.	Moreover,	Professor	Triggs	added,		 Respective	governments	have	been	remarkably	successful	 in	persuading	parliaments	 to	pass	 laws	 that	 are	 contrary,	 even	 explicitly	 contrary,	 to	 common	 law	 rights	 and	 to	 the	international	human	rights	regime	to	which	Australia	is	a	party.	(ABC	News	2015c)		This	 is	 a	matter	 of	 considerable	 concern.	 Any	 regime,	 such	 as	 a	 data	 retention	 regime,	 is	 amenable	 to	expansion	through	ministerial	discretion	and	regulations	that	do	not	need	to	be	put	up	for	parliamentary	scrutiny.	The	allied	phenomenon	of	‘mission	creep’	(a	phenomenon	where	an	early	success	breeds	more	ambitious	 attempts,	 and	 before	 long	 something	 that	 was	 never	 intended	 becomes	 the	 status	 quo)	immediately	comes	to	mind	(Collins	2014).		
Concern	5:	Metadata	requirements	can	be	side-stepped	or	avoided	Is	metadata	retention	 ‘future	proof’?	That	 is,	will	 the	data	continue	to	be	available	and	useful	given	the	ingenuity	of	wrongdoers	to	defeat	the	system?	There	are	concerns	that	a	person	might	use	a	device	that	cannot	be	traced	to	the	sender,	or	a	virtual	private	network	(VPN)	that	will	allow	encryption	(Berg	2015),	or	 a	 secure	 drop	 system	based	 on	 ‘Tor’	 (Branch	 2015).	 The	 encrypted	messaging	 app	 ‘Wickr’	 likewise	circumvents	 data	 retention,	 as	 it	 is	 a	 United	 States-based	 service	 whose	 metadata	 is	 not	 captured	 by	Australian	telecommunications	companies.	It	also	uses	encryption	it	claims	is	uncrackable	(Grubb	2015).	However,	according	to	the	experts,	it	is	unlikely	that	law	enforcement	agencies	would	tolerate	such	a	gap	in	their	capabilities	and	that	further	legislation	might	be	needed	(Branch	2015).		
	
Concern	6:	Lack	of	control	of	international	use	of	the	data	How	can	we	control	data	that	is	shared	by	us	with	agencies	outside	of	Australia?	The	‘Five	Eyes’	countries	—	 the	USA,	 the	UK,	New	 Zealand,	 Canada	 and	Australia	 all	 share	 their	 collected	 intelligence	 data.	 The	security	concerns	are	heightened	when	one	considers	the	numbers	of	people	who	will	have	access.		 International	 rules	 governing	 the	 trans-border	 gathering	 of	 evidence,	 ‘mutual	 legal	assistance’,	are	poorly	suited	to	cloud-based	processing	activities,	as	with	other	forms	of	computer	 and	 networking	 environments.	 Reforms	 have	 taken	 place	 over	 the	 past	 10	years	 to	 try	 to	 improve	 the	 situation,	 especially	 through	 resort	 to	 more	 informed	interstate	mechanisms,	 based	 on	 harmonized	 legal	 systems	 as	well	 as	 building	 trusted	networks	of	[law	enforcement	access]	experts.	The	primary	concern	with	greater	reliance	upon	 informal	procedures	 is	 that	of	 accountability;	 ensuring	 that	 [law	enforcement]	do	not	 exceed	 their	 powers	 and	 inappropriately	 interfere	 with	 individual	 rights	 (Walden	2015:	310).		




[Indeed]	 aspects	of	Australia’s	 anti-terror	 laws	have	been	almost	 exclusively	 applied	 to	members	 of	 the	Muslim	 community	 and	 their	 organisations.	 For	 example,	 16	 of	 the	 17	organisations	 currently	 proscribed	 by	 the	 Australian	 government	 are	 in	 some	 way	associated	with	Islamic	goals	or	ideology.	(Williams	2011:	1172)1		The	risks	data	retention	poses	to	investigative	journalism	can	also	be	considered	as	counter-productive.	Data	retention	laws	are	particularly	threatening	to	journalists.	Without	the	security	of	one’s	identity	(with	phone	 tracking	 so	 readily	 available),	 sources’	 calls	 will	 soon	 dry	 up.	 No-one	 will	 feel	 confident	 about	calling	 a	 journalist	 with	 information,	 knowing	 that	 their	 phone	 calls	 can	 be	 tracked	 (ABC	 2015a).	Governments	are	best	held	to	account	by	the	zeal	of	a	 free	press.	When	officials	are	confident	that	they	are	 not	 under	 scrutiny,	 it	 is	 not	 unfair	 to	 suspect	 that	 some	will	 exercise	 their	 power	 inappropriately.	When	 that	 occurs	 we	 need	 transparency,	 not	 silence.	 Governmental	 zeal,	 however	 justified	 by	 the	pressures	of	the	day,	must	be	kept	in	check	by	the	curiosity	of	a	free	press	(Sarre	2014b).	
	
Conclusion	Governments	that	introduce	innovations,	such	as	laws	to	retain	metadata,	can	only	be	held	to	account	if	citizens	who	are	subjected	to	them	remain	vigilant	and	vocal.	Citizens	must	continue	to	call	upon	policy-makers	 to	 find	 the	 appropriate	 balance	 between	 required	 levels	 of	 surveillance	 for	 the	 public	 (and	private)	good,	and	the	rights	of	individuals	to	be	free	from	the	prying	‘eyes’	of	governments	at	home	and	abroad.		Governments	must	 legislate	 in	 a	manner	 consistent	with	 expectations	 of	modern	 civil	 society,	with	 its	members	asking	the	following	questions:	Have	we	got	the	balance	right?	Will	the	measures	have	the	effect	of	doing	what	it	is	said	that	they	will	do	(prevent	terrorism)	or	are	there	unintended	consequences?	And	finally,	are	these	measures	worth	the	financial	and	social	costs?		It	 is	worth	 remembering	 that	 on	 7	 September	 1939,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 debates	 regarding	 the	 security	required	to	keep	Australia	safe	following	its	declaration	of	war	on	Germany,	the	then	Prime	Minister	Sir	Robert	Menzies,	addressed	this	very	issue	(Menzies	1939).	Former	Communications	Minister	(now	Prime	Minister)	Malcolm	Turnbull	reflected	in	July	of	2015	upon	Sir	Robert’s	words	as	follows:		Prime	 Minister	 [Menzies]	 was	 leading	 Australia	 into	 a	 war	 against	 Adolf	 Hitler,	 a	 foe	whose	march	across	Europe	must	have	seemed	nearly	irresistible.	This	was	an	existential	threat.	 And	 he	 introduced	 a	 National	 Security	 Bill	 that	 gave	 extensive	 powers	 to	 the	Government	 to	 control	 the	 economy	 and	much	 of	 Australia's	 daily	 life	 in	 what	 was	 to	become	a	total	war	effort.	His	warning	to	the	House	of	Representatives	should	resonate	down	the	years	to	all	of	us,	especially	those	in	the	party	he	founded.	‘The	greatest	tragedy	that	 could	 overcome	 a	 country	 would	 be	 for	 it	 to	 fight	 a	 successful	 war	 in	 defence	 of	liberty	and	to	lose	its	own	liberty	in	the	process.’	(Turnbull	2015)			We,	 too,	 need	 to	 ensure	 that	 we	 do	 not	 sacrifice	 our	 liberty	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 a	 goal	 that	 is	 neither	achievable	nor	affordable.	Indeed,	how	we	address	the	security	threats	we	face	ultimately	will	define	our	society	(Wesley	2015:	22).	Australians	need	to	keep	this	in	mind	as	we	continue	to	review	and	debate	the	implementation	of	the	metadata	retention	policy	brought	into	being	in	2015.	
	
	

































Alistair	 Harkness,	 School	 of	 Arts,	 Humanities	 and	 Social	 Sciences,	 Federation	 University,	Australia		Conference	subtheme:	Policing	diverse	people	and	places.		
	
Abstract	Introduced	 in	 2011,	 Victoria	 Police	 Agricultural	 Liaison	 Officers	 (AGLOs)	 have	 expertise	 in	rural	 crime	 and	 are	 tasked	 with	 providing	 enhanced	 responses	 to	 farm	 victimisation.	 In	addition	to	operating	 in	a	detective	capacity,	AGLOs	perform	educative	and	outreach	duties.	Utilising	a	framework	of	social	capital,	this	paper	investigates	the	roles	which	AGLOs	assume	in	 building	 and	 strengthening	 relationships	 between	 police	 and	 farmers.	 It	 considers	 the	importance	of	strong	police-community	relationships,	community	policing	and	the	problem-orientated	policing	approach	of	the	AGLO	program.	It	is	asserted	that	with	further	resourcing,	AGLOs	could	concentrate	more	directly	on	building	trust	with	local	communities	to	allow	for	awareness	of,	and	better	responses	to,	property	thefts	from	farms.				




thefts	from	farms	in	Victoria	and	added	a	series	of	attitude	survey	questions	pertaining	to	perceptions	of	the	criminal	justice	system	and	its	responses.	Interviews	were	conducted	in	November	2013	with	seven	Victoria	Police	members	serving	as	Agricultural	Liaison	Officers	(AGLOs)	to	obtain	qualitative	data.	This	paper	 considers	 qualitative	 comments	 provided	 by	 survey	 respondents	 and	 from	 the	Head	 of	 Practice	responsible	for	the	oversight	of	AGLOs	(space	limitation	precludes	a	more	exhaustive	analysis	of	survey	results	here),	and	will	assess	the	role	police	in	Victoria	play	in	enhancing	the	police/farmer	relationship	to	encourage	reporting	of	farm	crime.			
Social	capital	‘Social	capital’	has	long,	sustained	historical	and	theoretical	origins,	perhaps	as	early	as	Aristotle.	Whilst	de	Toqueville	pursued	this	concept	in	the	nineteenth	century,	and	Hanifan	in	1916	(Halpern	2005:	3-6),	incorporation	 of	 the	 term	 specifically	 is	 much	 more	 recent.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 rise	 of	 economic	rationalism	in	the	1980s,	Bourdieu	(1986)	argued	that	‘cultural	capital’	and	‘social	capital’	must	be	added	to	 considerations	 of	 ‘economic	 capital’	 (Halpern	 2005:	 6-7).	 Bourdieu	 and	 Wacquant	 defined	 ‘social	capital’	as:		 the	 sum	 of	 the	 resources,	 actual	 or	 virtual,	 that	 accrue	 to	 an	 individual	 or	 a	 group	 by	virtue	of	possessing	a	durable	network	of	more	or	 less	 institutionalised	relationships	of	mutual	 acquaintance	 and	 recognition.	 Acknowledging	 that	 capital	 can	 take	 a	 variety	 of	forms	 is	 indispensable	 to	explain	 the	structure	and	dynamics	of	differentiated	societies.	(1992:	119)		Significant	 in	 this	 field	 is	 Coleman	 (1988:	 96)	 who	 suggests	 that	 ‘[l]ike	 other	 forms	 of	 capital,	 social	capital	 is	productive,	making	possible	 the	achievement	of	certain	ends	that	 in	 its	absence	would	not	be	possible’.	Perhaps	the	most	succinct	definition	is	provided	by	Putnam	who	suggests	that:		 Features	 of	 social	 life	—	 networks,	 norms,	 and	 trust	—	 that	 enable	 participants	 to	 act	together	more	effectively	to	pursue	shared	objectives	…	Social	capital,	in	short,	refers	to	social	connections	and	the	attendant	norms	and	trust.	(1995:	664-665)		There	is	a	growing	body	of	literature	that	relates	social	capital	theories	to	the	study	of	crime	and	policing	(see	Halpern	 2005;	McCarthy,	 Hagan	 and	Martin	 2002;	 Robinson	 2003;	 Rose	 and	 Clear	 1999).	 Shared	norms,	social	habits	and	a	‘sense	of	mutual	trust’	can	have	a	downward	impact	on	rates	of	crime	(Halpern	2005:	129)	and,	it	is	argued	here,	Victoria	Police’s	AGLOs	act	as	builders	of	social	capital.		




An	important	part	of	this	strategy	is	a	network	of	approximately	48	AGLOs,	comprised	mostly	of	general	duty	detectives	 and	 some	uniformed	officers	 located	 strategically	 around	 the	 state,	 coordinated	by	 the	Head	of	Practice	for	the	Livestock	and	Farm	Crime	Specialist	Group,	Superintendent	Craig	Gillard.	Police	members	are	selected	to	be	AGLOs	based	on	their	‘knowledge,	skills	and	expertise	to	deal	with	livestock	theft	and	farm-related	crime’	(Victoria	Police	2012:	45).	A	central	 information	hub	provides	AGLOs	and	other	 police	 members	 with	 access	 to	 information.	 Senior	 officers	 are	 advised	 by	 a	 Strategic	 Advisory	Group	 which	 includes	 representatives	 from	 the	 Victorian	 Farmers	 Federation	 (VFF),	 Department	 of	Primary	 Industries	 and	 the	 Municipal	 Association	 of	 Victoria	 (Victoria	 Police	 2012:	 45).	 The	 AGLOs	themselves	 conference	 bi-annually,	 and	 some	 attend	 conferences	 convened	 by	 interstate	 colleagues	(Gillard	2013a:	1).		Almost	all	AGLOs	are	detectives	at	divisional	 crime	 investigation	units,	 and	 responsibility	 for	 specialist	farm	crime	investigation	is	but	one	of	their	many	portfolios.	Generally,	they	are	police	who	possess	some	industry	 knowledge	 who	 ‘[m]ight	 come	 off	 the	 farm	 …	 might	 have	 a	 small	 farm	 themselves’	 (Gillard	2013b).	AGLOs	self-nominate	for	the	role	and	their	background	is	assessed:	‘If	it’s	good’,	Gillard	notes,	‘we	bring	 them	 on.	We	 try	 to	 get	 a	 pretty	 broad	 cross	 section’.	 He	 also	 observes	 that,	 since	 the	 program	commenced,	there	is	significant	interest	from	the	police	membership	from	those	with	relevant	rural	and	industry	skills.		The	AGLO	program	was	not	modelled	on	any	particular	rural	policing	squad.	Rather,	 it	originated	 from	discussions	within	the	industry	and	with	government	and	police.	Gillard	(2013b)	points	to	an	increase	in	crime	at	 the	 time.	This	 led	 to	 key	 stakeholders	 and	 the	 government	 approaching	Victoria	Police	which	suggested	‘[w]e	need	to	have	a	look	at	how	we	go	about	this,	and	that’s	why	we	refocused	and	structured	up	the	way	we	did.’	This	model	differs	from	comparable	sections	in	other	police	organisations.	New	South	Wales	have	Rural	Crime	Investigators,	rural-based	detectives	whose	almost	exclusive	 focus	 is	 livestock;	Queensland	 has	 a	 Stock	 and	 Rural	 Crime	 Investigating	 Squad	 with	 a	 primary	 focus	 on	 stock	 theft,	although	there	is	growing	attention	to	other	incidents	of	farm	crime,	such	as	firearm	theft,	rural	offending	by	organised	criminal	networks,	and	animal	activism	(Gillard	2013b).			




family	 violence	 and	 ‘urban	 issues’	 occupy	 the	 bulk	 of	 police	 time.	 In	 addition	 to	 a	 reactionary	 law	enforcement	role,	police	engage	 in	proactive	 initiatives	 to	prevent	crime.	Nevertheless,	 this	work	 is	not	always	obvious.	There	exists	here,	too,	a	high	degree	of	cynicism.	Two	farmers’	perspectives	—	that	‘cops	don’t	do	nothing’	and	‘nothing	is	being	done,	but	don’t	expect	it	to	be	either’	—	highlight	this	(Victorian	Farm	Crime	Survey	2014).	Similarly,	32	per	cent	of	the	1251	farmers	surveyed	by	Barclay	(2015)	in	New	South	Wales	and	Queensland	indicated	that	‘[p]olice	can’t	(or	won’t)	do	anything’	was	a	reason	for	non-reporting	of	farm	victimisation.		Mawby’s	 (2004)	 analysis	 of	 perceptions	 of	 police	 in	 Cornwall	 in	 rural	 England	 discovered	 that	 rural	residents	 are	 often	 critical	 of	 the	number,	 and	 inaccessibility,	 of	 police.	 In	 another	 rural	English	 study,	Jackson	and	Sunshine	(2006:	214)	observe	a	link	between	trust	and	confidence	in	police	and	evaluations	of	 ‘the	 values	 and	morals	 that	 underpin	 community	 life’	 (see	 also	 see	Murphy,	Mazerolle	 and	 Bennett	2014;	Nix,	Wolfe,	Rojek	 et	 al	 2015).	 In	Victoria,	 the	need	 for	 a	 stronger,	more	obvious	police	presence	‘rather	than	one	man	stations	that	close	at	5pm’,	‘being	visible	in	the	community’,	and	an	urging	for	police	to	 ‘take	 the	matter	more	 seriously,	 increase	 police	 presence	 in	 area’	 are	 typical	 of	 comments	made	by	farmers	(Victorian	Farm	Crime	Survey	2014).		‘Social	 capital	 is	 interactive’,	 Flora	 and	 Flora	 (2008:	 117)	 declare,	 and	 is	 built	 through	 norms	 being	reinforced	by	communities	 (not	 individuals	 in	 isolation)	 forming	groups,	 collaborating	within	and	with	other	groups,	having	a	shared	 future	vision,	 forming	and	reinforcing	collective	 identity	and	engaging	 in	collective	action.	Social	capital	is	built,	they	argue,	by	relationship	strengthening	and	communication,	and	is	 essential	 if	 small	 communities	 are	 to	 thrive	 (Flora	 and	 Flora	 2008:	 118;	 137).	When	 launching	 the	AGLOs,	Ryan	observed	that	a	collaborative	approach	to	farm	crime	is	critical:			 [l]ivestock	 theft	 is	 a	 unique	 crime	 that	 requires	 investigative	 skills	 and	 a	 good	partnership	 between	 government,	 police	 and	 agricultural	 groups	 to	 catch	 those	responsible.	I	would	say	farm	theft	is	in	the	same	category.	(2011)		Victoria	 Police	 also	 identify	 the	 importance	 of	 partnerships	 and	 relationship	 building.	 The	 2013-14	




organisations	which	 can	break	down	 initial	 barriers.	 Second,	 building	 trust	 between	police	 and	 famers	can,	Gillard	acknowledges,	be	difficult:			 [Farmers	are]	not	the	easiest	group	to	interact	with	about	—	they	don’t	like	talking	about	their	 livelihood	too	much.	They	are	closed	books	until	 something	happens	…	Very	good	people,	great	people,	I	come	from	a	rural	area	myself,	but	they	won’t	tell	you	everything	…	It	does	take	a	while.	They’ve	got	to	know	and	trust	and	all	 that	sort	of	 thing.	 Just	got	to	have	good	strong	relationships	and	that’s	what	the	AGLO	program’s	about	—	for	them	to	have	relationships	within	their	community,	and	over	time	become	known.	Some	of	these	people	 [AGLOs]	 are	 really	 active	 and	 do	 a	 great	 job	 both	 in	 a	 reactive	 sense	 and	 a	proactive	sense.			A	strong	relationship	can	be	beneficial	for	farmers	and	police	alike.	For	the	police,	Gillard	(2013b)	says,	it	can	lead	to	the	provision	of	information	which	they	might	not	otherwise	have	accessed:			 These	 guys	 [two	 particular	 AGLOs]	 are	 in	 the	 farming	 community	 themselves	 and	 are	well	known	and	[a	farmer	will	think]	‘I’ll	give	Jack	a	ring	about	this	—	a	quick	head’s	up’.	That	sort	of	stuff.	That’s	a	real	positive	and	that’s	why	we’re	willing	to	go	with	it.	Just	keep	building	on	that	so	that	they	know	that	the	program	is	working,	that	there’s	some	people	around	with	really	good	industry	knowledge	that	can	help	you.	That’s	the	key.		








AGLOs	as	builders	of	social	capital	Social	capital	is	comprised	of	‘bonding	social	capital’	—	‘connections	among	individuals	and	groups	with	similar	 backgrounds’	 —	 and	 ‘bridging	 social	 capital	 —	 which	 ‘connects	 diverse	 groups	 within	 the	community	 to	 each	 other	 and	 to	 groups	 outside	 the	 community’:	 a	 dichotomy	 similar	 to	 Töennies’s	
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft	 social	 groupings	 (Flora	 and	 Flora	 2005:	 125).	 Jackson	 and	Wade	 (2005:	 51)	argue	that	proactive	policing	techniques	emanating	from	‘tough	on	crime’	(in	an	urban	context,	at	least)	‘perpetuates	and	exacerbates	the	social	distance	rift	between	police	and	their	community’,	and	that	whilst	numerous	explanations	are	offered	for	the	proactive	behaviour	of	police,	social	capital	explanations	are	the	least	developed.		Specialised	liaison	officers	can	potentially	bridge	the	social	capital	between	police	and	rural	communities.	Willis	 (2010:	42),	 in	his	consideration	of	 the	role	and	effectiveness	of	Aboriginal	Liaison	Officers,	notes	the	 core	 functions	 as	 building	 good	 communications	 and	 relations,	 resolving	 disputes,	 improving	comprehension	of	the	role	of	police,	working	together	on	implementing	crime	prevention	solutions,	and	identifying	local	crime	problems.	Victoria	Police’s	AGLOs	can	—	and	do	—	act	as	agents	of	change	and	as	builders	of	social	capital.	AGLOs	have	expertise	in	rural	crime	and	provide	additional	attention	to	crime	on	farms,	which	might	not	otherwise	occur,	by	performing	detective	work	on	farm-related	crime.			AGLOs	 also	 perform	 a	 community-engagement	 and	 educative	 role:	 these	 functions	 provide	 valuable	enhanced	social	capital	for	farming	communities.	Provision	of	additional	resourcing	would	allow	AGLOs	to	 concentrate	 more	 fully	 on	 building	 trust	 with	 local	 communities	 without	 the	 distraction	 of	 other	general	duty	tasks.	Greater	detailed	analysis,	assessment	and	review	of	rural	crime,	and	the	alleviation	of	inequalities	 existent	 between	 policing	 responses	 in	 urban	 compared	with	 rural	 areas,	 are	 also	 critical	developments	which	must	occur	if	thefts	from	farms	are	to	be	tackled	successfully.			
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Abstract	The	release	of	the	2014	Social	Justice	and	Native	Title	Report	by	the	Australian	Aboriginal	and	Torres	 Strait	 Islander	 Social	 Justice	 Commissioner	 again	 emphasised	 the	 significant	 over-representation	 of	 Aboriginal	 and	 Torres	 Strait	 Islander	 people	 in	 prison.	 Shortly	 after,	 the	latest	Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics	data	on	prisoners	in	Australia	showed	there	were	1494	inmates	incarcerated	in	the	Northern	Territory	(NT)	in	2014,	of	which	85.6	per	cent	were	of	Aboriginal	or	Torres	Strait	Islander	origin,	the	highest	proportion	of	all	states	and	territories.	Many	of	these	inmates	are	thought	to	originate	from	small	and	remote	communities	and,	with	significant	 numbers	 of	 Indigenous	men	 and	women	 in	 prison	 in	 the	NT,	 there	 is	 a	 range	 of	potential	 impacts	 for	 individual	 communities	 including	 social,	 economic	 and	 demographic.	This	research	focuses	on	the	demographic	impacts	for	individual	remote	communities	using	a	variety	of	secondary	data	and	applying	statistical	techniques	to	highlight	the	range	of	impacts	at	community	 levels.	The	results	demonstrate	 that	with	up	to	14	per	cent	of	men	and	2	per	cent	of	women	being	away	at	any	given	point	in	time	due	to	incarceration	some	communities	are	significantly	affected	by	the	absence	of	residents	in	jail.				
Introduction		In	December	2014,	 the	Australian	Broadcasting	Corporation	(ABC)	reported	on	the	release	of	 the	 latest	
Social	 Justice	 and	 Native	 Title	 Report	 by	 the	 Aboriginal	 and	 Torres	 Strait	 Islander	 Social	 Justice	Commissioner,	Mick	Gooda.	The	report	emphasised	the	substantial	and	increasing	over-representation	of	Indigenous	people	 in	prisons.	For	example,	 from	2000-2013,	 the	 imprisonment	 rate	 for	Aboriginal	 and	Torres	 Strait	 Islander	 adults	 increased	 by	 57	 per	 cent	 while	 the	 non-Indigenous	 rate	 remained	 fairly	stable	(Kidd	2014).	Gooda	called	this	development	‘one	of	the	most	urgent	human	rights	issues	facing	the	nation	 today’,	 leading	 to	 ‘knock-on	 effects	 in	 Indigenous	 communities’	 and	 having	 become	 ‘an	 inter-generational	problem’	(Kidd	2014).		Moreover,	 Gooda	 referred	 to	 the	 National	 Indigenous	 Reform	 Agreement	 (Council	 of	 Australian	Governments	 (COAG)	 2011),	 remarking,	 ‘We	 have	 a	 whole	 range	 of	 targets	 in	 the	 Closing	 the	 Gap	strategies	 and	 the	 one	 missing,	 in	 my	 view,	 is	 one	 on	 justice’	 (Kidd	 2014).	 In	 December	 2007,	 COAG	signed	a	partnership	agreement	to	work	with	Indigenous	communities	to	achieve	the	target	of	Closing	the	Gap	between	Indigenous	and	non-Indigenous	Australians	(COAG	2011).	The	main	targets	outlined	in	the	
National	Indigenous	Reform	Agreement	(COAG	2011)	comprise	specific	performance	indicators	that	were	last	 reviewed	 in	 2011.	 Targets	 include	 life	 expectancies,	 early	 childhood,	 schooling,	 health,	 economic	participation,	 healthy	 homes,	 safe	 communities,	 and	 governance	 and	 leadership.	 There	 is,	 however,	 no	direct	target	relating	to	social	justice.		






































































With	the	significant	number	of	Indigenous	men	and	women	in	prison	in	the	NT	at	any	given	point	in	time,	there	 is	a	 range	of	potential	 impacts	 for	 individual	 remote	communities	 including	social,	 economic	and	demographic.	 In	 this	 paper	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 latter,	 on	 the	 basis	 the	 imprisonment	 data	 represents	significant	numbers	of	men	and	women	 ‘missing’	 from	individual	communities	at	any	point	 in	time.	We	commence	by	discussing	the	current	body	of	international	knowledge	on	community	and	social	impacts	from	 imprisonment	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 Indigenous	 people	 and	 communities	 before	 applying	 statistical	techniques	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 sorts	 of	 demographic	 effects	 a	 community	 of	 average	 demographic	structure	might	experience.			




• The	circumstance	that,	once	one	person	is	removed	from	the	community	for	criminal	activities,	a	new	participant	will	usually	take	over	the	role.		The	 impacts	 of	 high	 imprisonment	 rates	 on	 communities	were	 also	 investigated	 by	 Clear	 (2008)	who	examined	 several	 studies	 that	 specifically	 dealt	 with	 the	 effects	 of	 incarceration	 on	 communities	 in	general.	 Clear	 found	 opportunity	 costs	 are	 borne	 by	 social	 networks	 in	 places	with	 high	 incarceration	rates.	Young	men	are	supposed	to	be	entering	the	labor	market	meeting	new	people,	thereby	expanding	the	productive	capacity	of	all	the	networks	of	which	they	are	a	part	of,	as	well	as	bridging	their	personal	networks	to	those	of	others.	However,	men	in	prison	cannot	perform	this	role	in	the	free	world;	they	can	only	build	their	networks	within	the	domain	of	the	prison.	In	line	with	Clear’s	findings,	Roberts	notes:		




their	 mentors	 and	 their	 links	 to	 the	 working	 world	 ...	 generating	 employment	discrimination	against	entire	neighbourhoods.	(2004:	1294)		In	 the	 context	 of	 Australian	 Indigenous	 communities,	 Edney	 (2002)	 contests	 that	 social	 capital	 in	Indigenous	 communities	 is	 particularly	 undermined	 through	 imprisonment.	 He	 argues	 the	 effects	 of	imprisonment	 in	conjunction	with	 the	numerous	other	social,	economic	and	health	 indicators	by	which	Indigenous	communities	fare	poorly	ensures	Indigenous	communities	are	continually	fragmented.	Those	effects	are	so	significant	that	imprisonment	for	Indigenous	communities	is	foremost	a	political	issue	and,	therefore,	 central	 to	 the	 content	 of	 self-determination	 in	 the	 post-colonial	 context	 of	 Australia.	 In	 this	respect,	 Cunneen	 (2001)	warns	 the	 accumulative	 effects	 from	 the	 criminalisation	 and	 incarceration	 of	Indigenous	people	in	Australia	lead	to	the	creation	of	a	new	generation	of	Indigenous	people	construed	as	criminal.		The	 literature	 highlights	 the	 potentially	 severe	 effect	 of	 high	 incarceration	 rates	 for	 communities,	Indigenous	 or	 otherwise.	 The	 effects	 discussed	 in	 the	 literature	 may	 be	 magnified	 for	 remote	communities	since	they	are	relatively	small,	concentrated	and	isolated.	Given	the	order	of	magnitude	in	the	 rates	of	 Indigenous	 imprisonment	 in	 the	NT	and	elsewhere	compared	 to	non-Indigenous	 residents,	this	represents	a	worsening	situation	in	Australia.	 In	the	following,	we	focus	on	calculating	the	possible	demographic	effects	for	NT	communities.			
Who’s	missing?	Based	 on	 the	 effects	 from	 imprisonment	 which	 are	 outlined	 in	 international	 literature,	 the	 following	research	questions	were	posed:		
• What	proportions	of	Indigenous	men	and	women	are	away	in	prison	from	remote	communities	in	the	NT	at	any	point	in	time?	and		
• What	 does	 this	 number	 consequently	 mean	 for	 the	 demographic	 fabric	 of	 small	 remote	communities	in	the	NT?			Since	no	Australian	datasets	record	a	reliable	‘home	community’	or	‘pre-prison	address’	these	questions	cannot	be	tackled	directly,	requiring	an	indirect	and	indicative	approach.	For	the	purposes	of	this	analysis	we	use	the	Poisson	distribution,	a	statistical	probability	distribution	describing	the	behaviour	of	simple	random	events.	For	our	analyses	we	have	chosen	to	explore	the	number	of	people	(both	men	and	women)	aged	20	to	39	years	who	might	typically	be	‘missing’	from	communities	at	any	one	time,	since	the	Prison	census	 shows	most	 prisoners	 fall	 into	 this	 age	 category.	We	 then	 relate	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 Poisson	analysis	to	the	types	of	demographic	such	communities	might	experience.			This	 study	 does	 not	 focus	 on	 any	 particular	 community,	 but	 instead	 estimates	 the	 likely	 impacts	 for	 a	‘typical’	community	of	‘average	demographic	structure’.	While	we	understand	communities	are	diverse	in	population	and	other	characteristics,	the	choice	of	method	is	to	illustrate	the	issue	as	one	which	affects	all	communities.	In	the	absence	of	community	level	data,	the	Poisson	method	is	suitable	for	these	aims	and	its	application	is	described	in	the	following	section.			













CI(u)	=	4.9087+1.96*2.2155	=	9.25	CI(l)	=	4.9087-1.96*2.2155	=	0.57		Consequently,	we	can	say	on	average	between	4	per	cent	and	14	per	cent	of	men	aged	20	to	39	years	are	away	from	their	community	and	in	prison	at	any	given	point	in	time.			The	final	formula	for	calculating	the	average	number	of	women	away	from	their	communities	is:			 F	=	(((51/7380)*100)/100)*(343*(17/100))	=	0.40		The	95	per	cent	upper	and	lower	confidence	interval	is	calculated	through	the	same	formula	as	above:		CI(u)	=	0.4029+1.96*0.6347	=	1.65	CI(l)	=	0.4029-1.96*0.6347	=	-0.84		Thus,	 the	approximate	number	of	women	missing	 from	an	averaged	sized	community	 is	between	0	per	cent	and	2	per	cent,	since	the	Poisson	distribution	does	not	allow	a	negative	count.			
Discussion	and	conclusion	We	have	highlighted	the	increasing	rates	of	incarceration	for	Indigenous	people	in	the	Northern	Territory	and	outlined	some	of	 the	potential	 social,	 economic	and	demographic	 impacts	 for	 Indigenous	and	non-Indigenous	 communities.	 The	 research	 focused	 particularly	 on	 the	 demographic	 impacts	 with	 our	analysis	showing	that	up	to	14	per	cent	of	men	and	up	to	2	per	cent	of	women	between	20	to	39	years	from	individual	remote	Indigenous	communities	might	be	in	prison	at	any	given	point	in	time.	Moreover,	the	 results	 for	 men	 indicate	 there	 is	 no	 community	 that	 would	 not	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 increasing	incarceration	rate	since	the	lower	part	of	the	range	is	at	4	per	cent.			The	proportion	of	men	or	women	‘missing’	suggests	impacts	will	be	significant	enough	to	affect	present	and	 future	 population	 growth	 and	 change.	 For	 example,	 the	 absence	 of	males	 is	 likely	 to	 increase	 the	proportion	of	single	parent	families.			The	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	 a	 large	 number	 of	 assumptions	 but,	 if	 it	 were	 possible	 to	 relax	 any	 of	 the	individual	assumptions,	 for	example	 the	 independent	chances	of	going	to	prison	or	 the	common	size	of	communities	and	demographic	structures,	then	the	impact	would	tend	to	make	the	results	of	the	analyses	even	more	dispersed,	resulting	 in	wider	confidence	 intervals.	This	means,	 in	reality,	some	communities	may	be	subject	to	even	higher	proportions	of	people	missing	in	jail	across	all	age	groups.			A	 range	 of	 demographic	 impacts	 might	 be	 anticipated	 given	 the	 worrying	 numbers	 presented	 in	 this	study.	 Besides	 a	 rise	 in	 single	 parent	 households	 and	 a	 reduction	 in	 the	 number	 of	 newborns	 (from	women	 and	men	 in	 their	 prime	 child	 bearing	 years	 being	 in	 prison),	 incarceration	 represents	 another	form	of	temporary	out	 ‘migration’,	with	flow-on	effects	 for	the	community.	 In	the	 light	of	the	 literature,	we	 discovered	 such	 flow-on	 effects	 can	 be	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 nature.	 These	 range	 from	 adverse	health	effects,	to	financial	distress	and	social	dysfunction	(Clear	2008;	Cuneen	2001;	Dawson,	Jackson	and	Nyamthi	2012;	Edney	2002;	Foster	and	Hagan	2013;	Hagan	and	Dinovitzer	1999;	Roberts	2004).			The	 Social	 Justice	 and	 Native	 Title	 Report	 (2014)	 and	 the	 Value	 of	 a	 Justice	 Reinvestment	 Approach	 to	

























Abstract	The	 democratic	 transition	 in	 Brazil	 in	 the	 1980s	 was	 accompanied	 by	 strong	 optimism	 in	relation	 to	 the	 return	of	 civil	 liberties	and	 the	provision	of	 social	 rights.	 In	 spite	of	political	and	 economic	 turbulence,	 this	 democratic	 period	 resulted	 in	 the	 progressive	 adoption	 of	inclusionary	 policies,	 the	 reduction	 of	 inequality	 and	 the	 expansion	 of	 rights	 to	 historically	marginalised	social	groups.	This	atmosphere	of	social	amelioration,	however,	has	been	heavily	shaken	 by	 the	 concomitant	 development	 of	 mass	 incarceration	 within	 the	 criminal	 justice	system.	The	expansion	of	the	Brazilian	prison	system	reached	unprecedented	levels,	keeping	behind	 bars	 more	 than	 half	 a	 million	 prisoners	 in	 recent	 years.	 The	 efforts	 of	 the	 federal	government	to	create	a	more	robust	and	centralised	apparatus	of	crime	control	together	with	public	 outcry	 for	 tougher	measures	 has	 endangered	many	 of	 the	 inclusive	 policies	 enacted	during	this	period.	This	paper	explores	this	current	 incarceration	problem	and	its	roots	 in	a	process	of	recent	modernisation	at	the	hands	of	the	federal	government.			




more	efficient	systems	of	information,	novel	forms	of	policing	and	increased	budgets	has	led	to	a	stronger	repressive	apparatus,	capable	of	better	enforcing	 its	potential	punitive	power,	 in	turn	resulting	 in	mass	imprisonment.		The	contention	here	is	that	reforms	of	criminal	justice	introduced	by	the	federal	government	have	deeply	transformed	the	field	and	established	a	new	mode	of	governance	of	crime	and	punishment.	In	spite	of	a	rhetoric	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 social	 justice,	 embedded	 in	 a	 newly	 created	 democratic	 order,	 this	 new	approach	has	enhanced	managerial	efficiency,	prompting	a	more	punitive	criminal	justice	in	which	police	repression	of	property	crimes	and	drug	trafficking	plays	a	major	role.	As	a	result,	 the	situation	of	mass	imprisonment	 and	 subjugation	of	marginalised	 communities	has	hindered	 the	 socioeconomic	 advances	enabled	 by	 democratic	 transition.	 This	 paper	 aims	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 current	 criminal	 justice	 in	Brazil	consequently	presents	a	perverse	challenge	to	democratic	political	participation.		




















































Crofton’s	Irish	system,1	Brazilian	jurisdiction	also	grants	this	allowance	to	inmates	in	the	later	stages	of	their	prison	term.	However,	the	number	of	special	facilities	geared	towards	accommodating	this	type	of	inmate	 is	 far	 smaller	 than	 required.	 It	 has	become	a	 jurisprudential	practice	 to	 shift	 this	 softer	 regime	into	 a	 domiciliary	 prison	 system,	 in	 which	 prisoners	 must	 stay	 in	 their	 homes	 during	 the	 night	 and	weekends.	 According	 to	 the	 judiciary,	 almost	 150	 000	 individuals	 are	 currently	 in	 this	 situation.	Concomitantly,	the	judiciary	also	revealed	the	number	of	active	arrest	warrants,	totalling	more	than	370	000	open	arrest	orders.	By	revealing	these	numbers,	the	judicial	system	claimed	that	715	655	individuals	are	officially	incarcerated	in	the	country,	but	the	total	should	be	more	than	one	million	inmates.	Thus,	the	shortage	of	places	rose	from	210	436,	based	on	the	figures	from	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	to	an	astounding	732	 427,	 according	 to	 the	 judiciary.	 These	 revised	 figures	 show	 that	 the	 ratio	 of	 pre-trial	 detainees	dropped	 significantly,	 allowing	 the	 judicial	 system	 to	 fend	 off	 some	 of	 the	 criticism	 targeting	 its	inefficiency	(Figure	2).		
 
	
Figure	2:	Review	of	prison	population	(CNJ	2014).		However,	these	figures	still	 fail	to	account	for	the	number	of	 individuals	subject	to	alternative	penalties	and	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 apparatus.	 In	 an	 effort	 to	 divert	 people	 from	 prison,	 the	country	has	enacted	new	types	of	punishment,	 including	community	service	and	restraining	orders,	 for	misdemeanours	and	other	minor	offences.	As	of	2009,	671	078	individuals	were	subject	to	some	sort	of	alternative	to	incarceration	but	still	remained	within	the	reach	of	the	criminal	justice	surveillance	system	(Ministério	da	Justiça	2010).	In	this	sense,	the	expansion	of	custodial	and	non-custodial	sanctions	indicate	the	government	 is	casting	the	net	of	social	control	wider	(Cohen	1985).	These	numbers	greatly	enlarge	the	challenge	of	criminal	justice	and	demonstrate	a	much	larger	reach	of	the	institutions	of	social	control.		
Long	term	modernisation:	Consolidating	the	apparatus	International	 literature	offers	a	number	of	reasons	and	accounts	 for	explaining	 the	expansion	of	prison	populations	 in	other	parts	of	 the	world	(for	an	overview,	see	Garland	2013;	Gottschalk	2012).	Broadly,	large	structural	and	cultural	changes	in	the	last	decades	of	the	past	century,	grouped	under	the	concept	of	late	modernity,	prompted	the	arrival	of	high-crime	societies	and	the	emergence	of	mass	incarceration	in	Western	societies	 (Garland	2001).	Within	 this	new	arrangement,	 the	 retrenchment	of	 the	welfare	state	and	 the	 emergence	 of	 neoliberal	 policies	 (Cavadino	 and	 Dignan	 2006;	 Wacquant	 2009)	 —	 mostly	 in	












regions	with	advanced	 liberal	market	economies	 (Lacey	2008)	—	resulted	 in	 the	 replacement	of	 social	provisions	 with	 penal	 measures.	 The	 effects	 of	 punitive	 electoral	 campaigns	 playing	 upon	 the	 fear	 of	crime	 and	 the	 increasing	media	 focus	 on	 crime	 and	 crime	 control	 helped	 to	 shift	 the	 nature	 of	 penal	policies	 from	rehabilitative	measures	to	more	punitive	and,	hence,	custodial	approaches	(Beckett	1997;	Gottschalk	 2006).	 The	 overrepresentation	 of	 immigrants	 and	 other	 marginalised	 groups	 in	 jails	 and	prisons	 also	 indicates	 the	 emergence	 of	 penal	 policies	 targeting	 vulnerable	 individuals.	 As	 for	 the	 US,	given	 the	 nature	 of	 race	 relations	 in	 the	 country,	mass	 incarceration	 has	 been	 indicated	 as	 a	 backlash	against	 the	 Civil	 Rights	 Movement	 from	 the	 1960s,	 subjecting	 Black	 people	 to	 higher	 rates	 of	incarceration	(Alexander	2010;	Beckett	1997).			This	narrative	also	resonates	with	Brazilian	changes,	even	though	cultural	specificities	require	situating	these	transformations	in	a	specific	framework	for	the	country.	The	prison	expansion	is	certainly	related	to	 the	rise	of	crime	rates	and	the	respective	perception	of	crime	as	a	pressing	social	problem	since	 the	end	of	the	1970s	(Benevides	1983;	Caldeira	2000),2	but	other	factors	also	played	an	important	role.	The	international	narratives	shed	light	on	many	of	the	developments	also	taking	place	in	Latin	America	and	Brazil	 (Fonseca	 2012;	 Iturralde	 2010;	 Sozzo	 2012).	 From	 wide	 structural	 changes	 embedded	 in	 late	modernity	 to	 the	 toughening	 discourse	 of	 political	 rhetoric	 in	 electoral	 campaigns,	 Brazilian	 penal	policies	have	been	subject	to	the	contradictory	and	volatile	pressures	of	these	developments,	resulting	in	a	system	increasingly	prone	to	incarceration	and	penal	control.	For	the	purposes	of	the	argument	here,	it	is	 important	 to	 note	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 state	 apparatus	 as	 a	 relevant	 factor	 for	 the	 current	predicament	of	the	Brazilian	criminal	justice	system.		In	 places	 where	 the	 state	 has	 already	 consolidated	 a	 bureaucratic	 apparatus,	 its	 size	 fluctuates,	sometimes	 expanding	 and	 at	 other	 times	 shrinking.	 Multiple	 factors	 determine	 the	 reach	 of	 the	 state	apparatus,	 such	 as	 the	 degree	 of	 intervention	 in	 social	 life	 and	 the	 amount	 of	 resources	 available	 for	developing	 state	 structures.	 In	 Brazil,	 given	 its	 vast	 territorial	 extent	 and	 its	 complex	 process	 of	development,	 the	 role	of	 the	state	 in	 the	governance	of	 social	 life	has	encountered	moments	of	greater	and	 lesser	 intervention.	 This	 fluctuation	 might	 prove	 helpful	 to	 understand	 historical	 patterns	 of	imprisonment	and	crime	control.	In	fact,	the	establishment	of	this	more	robust	apparatus	has	been	a	long-term	enterprise	 in	which	a	more	distanced	historical	approach	reveals	a	 steady	growth	of	mechanisms	and	 institutions	 of	 crime	 control	 and	 punishment.	 However,	 important	 transformations	 increased	 the	pace	of	expansion	since	the	return	of	democracy.		For	the	purposes	of	the	present	study,	one	interesting	way	to	comprehend	these	changes	is	to	scavenge	the	 available	 data	 and	 establish	 a	 few	 possible	 comparisons	 between	 historically	 different	 sets	 of	information.	For	instance,	when	analysing	the	proportion	of	types	of	offences	among	inmates	behind	bars	in	 different	 historical	 moments,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 follow	 the	 trend	 of	 an	 incremental	 bureaucratic	development	(Figure	3).		From	 the	 available	data,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 in	 the	1930s,	 homicides	were	 the	most	 important	 target	 of	 the	criminal	justice	system.	For	historical	reasons	underlying	the	methods	of	data	gathering,	this	only	refers	to	sentenced	inmates,	which	have	been	through	the	entire	judicial	process	and	received	a	final	conviction.	The	 preeminence	 of	 murderers	 in	 the	 convicted	 prison	 population	 around	 that	 time	 supports	 the	hypothesis	that	other	forms	of	deviance	received	different	treatment	from	the	formal	institutions	of	crime	control.	 In	 an	 environment	 still	 lacking	 a	more	 solid	 state	 presence,	 the	 performance	 of	 crime	 control	would	focus	on	the	most	sensitive	cases	and	types	of	behaviours.	






Ministério	da	Justiça	1937,	2014).		The	gradual	change	of	social	life	and	the	development	of	bureaucratic	structures	have	clearly	contributed	to	a	more	pervasive	state	presence,	incorporating	different	types	and	a	larger	number	of	behaviours	into	the	 purview	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 apparatus.	 The	 increase	 in	 convictions	 for	 property	 crimes,	 the	introduction	of	drug	offences,	and	the	unveiling	of	abuse	and	violence	in	domestic	settings	are	all	part	of	a	recently	 formed	 crime	 complex	 whose	 surveillance	 and	 control	 encompass	 many	 more	 activities	 and	behaviours.	These	transformations	signal	the	emergence	of	a	better	assembled	state	apparatus,	capable	of	better	enforcing	 its	 rules	and	 regulations.	 In	 spite	of	 a	very	pronounced	 increase	 in	homicide	numbers	since	1979,	as	previously	indicated,	the	percentage	of	convicts	for	murder	continues	to	fall	in	the	overall	prison	 population.	 On	 closer	 inspection,	 the	 rise	 of	 imprisoned	 convicts	 for	 property	 crimes	 and	 drug	offences	reveals,	at	 the	same	time,	a	disturbing	 focus	on	the	machinery	of	crime	control	specialising	on	the	delinquency	in	the	lower	echelons	of	the	social	structure.		In	 a	 longer	 historical	 series,	 however,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 notice	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 apparatus	 and	 its	efficiency.	 The	 curve	 of	 convicted	 inmates	 (Figure	 4)	 demonstrates	 how	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	deeply	changed	in	recent	decades,	offering	a	much	more	interventionist	apparatus	of	control.		








The	return	of	democracy:	Federal	government	initiatives	Besides	 these	 long	 terms	 developments,	 the	 period	 after	 democratisation	 has	witnessed	 an	 important	reconfiguration	 of	 punishment	 and	 crime	 control	 in	 the	 country.	 The	 standard	 account	 in	 Brazil	emphasises	the	political	nature	of	 this	shift	as	a	result	of	media	outcry,	 in	which	tougher	penal	policies	are	deemed	responsible	for	the	recent	mass	incarceration.	The	National	Plan	for	Criminal	and	Penitentiary	











charge	 of	 allocating	 budget	 lines,	 managing	 information,	 and	 developing	 nationwide	 policies.	 Most	recently,	it	has	created	a	Federal	Prison	System	and	an	Emergency	Police	Force,	but,	above	all,	it	has	been	issuing	clear	guidelines	and	monitoring	performance	 indicators	on	regional	 levels	 (Soares	2006,	2007).	This	centralisation	process	follows	a	technocratic	pattern,	buffering	the	criminal	justice	system	from	state	and	 local	 pressures.	 It	 seeks	 uniformity	 among	 states,	 reducing	 regional	 disparities,	while	 at	 the	 same	time	producing	a	more	rational	decision-making	process	in	which	managerial	techniques	guide	practice	and	enable	accountability	 through	performance	 indicators.	These	developments	may	form	the	core	of	a	new	mode	of	governance	responsible,	to	a	large	extent,	for	most	of	the	recent	outcomes	in	the	field.		In	regards	to	punishment,	the	federal	government	has	provided	support	for	the	expansion	of	the	prison	system,	 funding	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 establishments	 and	 places	 within	 it	 as	 the	 main	 solution	 to	 the	problem	 of	 overcrowding.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 growing	 numbers	 of	 inmates	 and	 deteriorating	 conditions	 of	incarceration	 have	 prompted	 the	 federal	 government	 to	 provide	 support	 for	 the	 construction	 and	expansion	 of	 prison	 facilities	 (Sapori	 2007).	 Adopting	 these	 measures	 has	 surely	 contributed	 to	 the	consolidation	of	mass	imprisonment,	as	these	reforms	have	revamped	the	prison	system	and	prepared	it	for	a	more	substantial	role.	In	this	sense,	governmental	action	shows	a	high	degree	of	ambivalence	on	this	topic,	as	the	government	seeks	to	enlarge	the	capacity	for	 imprisonment	while	acknowledging	the	need	for	 alternatives	 to	 incarceration.	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 reconcile	 this	 process	 of	 expansion	 with	 the	 ideals	espoused	in	the	new	democratic	order.		












































Abstract	Within	coronial	 investigations,	pathologists	are	called	upon	to	given	evidence	as	 to	cause	of	death.	This	evidence	is	given	great	weight	by	the	coroners;	after	all,	scientific	‘truth’	is	widely	deemed	to	be	far	more	reliable	than	legal	 ‘opinion’.	The	purpose	of	this	paper	 is	to	examine	the	ontological	and	epistemological	status	of	that	evidence,	from	the	perspectives	of	both	the	pathologists	 and	 the	 coroners.	 As	 part	 of	 an	 Australian	 Research	 Council	 Linkage	 Grant,	interviews	 were	 conducted	 with	 seven	 pathologists	 and	 10	 coroners	 from	 within	 the	Queensland	 coronial	 system.	 Contrary	 to	 expectations,	 and	 the	 work	 of	 philosophers	 of	science,	 such	 as	 Feyerabend	 (1975),	 pathologists	 did	 not	 present	 their	 findings	 in	 terms	 of	unequivocal	 facts	or	objective	 truths	 relating	 to	 causes	of	death.	Rather,	 their	evidence	was	largely	presented	as	 ‘educated	opinion’	based	upon	 ‘the	weight	of	 evidence’.	 It	was	actually	the	 coroners	who	 translated	 that	opinion	 into	 ‘medical	 fact’	within	 the	proceedings	of	 their	death	 investigations,	 arguably	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 administrative	 necessity	 to	 reach	 a	clear-cut	 finding	 as	 to	 cause	 of	 death,	 and	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 own	 understanding	 of	 the	ontology	 of	 medical	 knowledge.	 These	 findings	 support	 Latour’s	 (2010)	 claim	 that	 law	requires	a	fundamentally	different	epistemology	to	science,	and	that	science	is	not	entirely	to	blame	for	the	extravagant	truth-claims	made	on	its	behalf.	
	
	




the	next	300	years,	and	it	was	only	completely	resolved	with	the	clarification	of	roles	 in	the	nineteenth	century.			This	has	not	been	the	only	point	of	contestation.	By	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	the	investigative	work	conducted	by	the	coroner	to	provide	evidence	 for	 inquests	was	delegated	to	the	police	 force	who	undertook	 these	 tasks	 under	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 coroner.	 As	 part	 of	 these	 changes,	 the	 long-standing	tradition	of	the	‘coronial	jury’	was	no	longer	mandatory.	Not	only	did	this	discontinue	the	practice	of	the	coroner	summonsing	juries	for	inquests,	but	it	also	established	a	lesser	reliance	on	the	lay	perspectives	of	the	public	that	constituted	these	juries	(Freckelton	and	Ranson	2006).	Burney	(2006)	contends	that	these	changes	signalled	the	start	of	a	long	struggle	over	the	role	of	coroner.	That	is,	medicine	began	a	struggle	for	dominance	against	much	older	forms	of	organisation	and	sets	of	truth-claims	—	largely	those	of	the	wider	 citizenry,	manifest	 in	 the	 forms	 of	 the	 elected	 jury,	 and	 the	 legal	 review	 of	 evidence	within	 the	public	hearing.			It	has	been	argued	elsewhere	that	this	 is	an	example	of	 the	contemporary	dominance	of	medical	 truths	over	other	sets	of	knowledges	(Carpenter	and	Tait	2010).	That	is,	legally	trained	coroners	now	prioritise	medical	cause	over	legal	circumstance	in	coronial	 investigations,	most	notably	through	a	heavy	reliance	on	orders	for	full	internal	autopsy.	Medical	truths	as	to	the	cause	of	death	are	used	as	confirmation	of	any	circumstantial	evidence	gathered	at	the	scene	and,	as	such,	the	objective	scientific	facts	presented	in	the	pathologist’s	report	become	the	final	arbiter	of	the	case.			This	paper	asks	the	question:	are	the	epistemological	issues	that	simple?	Do	doctors	bring	medical	facts	to	 the	 coronial	 investigation,	 facts	 that	 trump	 any	 other	 knowledges	 available	 to	 the	 coroner?	 Is	 the	coroner	 given	 no	 real	 choice,	 other	 than	 to	 accede	 to	 power	 of	 medical	 truth?	 Arguably,	 this	 study	presents	a	significantly	more	complex	picture.	
	




demonstrate	 that	 the	 scientific	method	 has	 any	more	 validity	 than	 do	 the	 standards	 that	 underlie	 the	practice	of	magic	—	given	that	the	‘rigorous’	scientific	method	is,	in	practical	terms,	a	generally	nebulous	collection	 of	 rules	 and	 procedures,	 applied	 unevenly	 and	 pragmatically,	 and	 ‘supplemented	 by	unscientific	methods	and	unscientific	results’	(Feyerabend	1978:	105).			Second,	 Feyerabend	 (1978,	 1981)	 argues	 that	 science	 is	 merely	 an	 ideology	 —	 more	 pervasive	 and	successful	 that	other	existing	 ideologies,	but	an	 ideology	nevertheless.	Analogous	 to	 the	right	 that	once	belonged	 to	 religion,	 science	 now	 exists	 in	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 that	 bestows	 upon	 it	 the	 sole	legitimate	right	to	contemporary	truth-formation.	Furthermore,	the	ideology	of	science	is	compulsory	(all	children	must	 be	 taught	 science),	 exclusory	 (other	 truth-building	 systems	 are	 debarred/ridiculed)	 and	undemocratic	(when	a	scientist	says	it	is	true,	it	must	be	true).			When	 this	 understanding	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 is	 applied	 to	 the	 information	 provided	 by	 the	pathologists	to	the	coroners	as	part	of	death	investigations,	Feyeraband	would	likely	make	the	following	observations:	first,	there	is	nothing	ontologically	absolute	about	the	truths	produced	via	the	autopsy.	The	medical	 methodologies	 that	 organise	 their	 assembly	 are	 shaped	 and	 executed	 within	 social	 contexts;	there	are	no	guarantees	as	to	the	consistency	of	their	application;	and,	during	the	autopsy	itself,	they	are	likely	to	be	supplemented	by	any	number	of	other	‘unscientific’	knowledges	and	practices.			Third,	Feyerabend	would	also	 likely	argue	 that	 the	pathologist’s	 report	often	operates	within	a	context	that	 is	 compulsory,	 exclusory,	 and	 undemocratic:	 it	 is	 compulsory,	 in	 that	 coroners	 often	 feel	epistemologically	 obliged	 to	 order	 autopsies,	 even	where	 the	 cause	 of	 death	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 in	dispute;	 it	 is	exclusory,	 in	 that	medical	knowledges	are	deemed	to	supersede	other	 truth	claims	during	coronial	 inquiries,	 such	 as	 police	 evidence	 collected	 at	 the	 scene,	 when	 there	 is	 any	 disagreement	between	the	two;	and	it	 is	undemocratic,	 in	that	 if	a	pathologist	posits	a	particular	cause	of	death,	 then	that	is	precisely	how	they	died,	all	evidence	to	the	contrary	notwithstanding.			This	paper	will	 test	Feyerabend’s	assessment	of	scientific	knowledge,	via	the	specific	medium	of	expert	testimony	 within	 coronial	 inquiries.	 That	 is,	 the	 paper	 will	 explore	 aspects	 of	 the	 relation	 between	medical	 assessments	 of	 cause	 of	 death	 within	 the	 coronial	 system,	 and	 the	 findings	 reached	 by	 that	system.	Do	pathologists	present	‘facts’	to	coroners,	or	is	something	else	going	on?			




month	 period	 in	 2012,	 taking	 between	 one	 and	 two	 hours	 each	 to	 complete.	 All	 interviews	 were	conducted	 by	 one	 researcher	 for	 consistency	 of	 approach,	 and	 transcribed	 by	 a	 professional	 service	before	 being	 sent	 back	 to	 each	 interviewee	 for	 confirmation.	 Thematic	 analysis	 was	 the	 key	 process	utilised	 in	 this	 research,	 and	an	 inductive	approach	 to	 the	data	was	 favoured.	Thematic	 analysis	of	 the	transcripts	began	with	a	process	of	schematic	coding,	which	required	all	 transcripts	 to	be	read	 in	 their	entirety	 by	 the	 research	 team.	 Themes	 were	 identified	 through	 a	 series	 of	 discussions	 between	 the	research	team	where	both	dominant	and	emergent	themes	were	identified	and	then	reviewed.			At	 this	 point	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 thematic	 analysis	 is	 a	 recursive	 rather	 than	 a	 linear	 process	(Braun	and	Clarke	2006).	Rather	than	simply	moving	from	one	stage	to	the	next,	analysis	moves	back	and	forth	between	the	phases	as	required.	Once	‘expert	testimony’	was	identified	as	a	pertinent	issue	within	the	 transcripts,	 a	 process	 of	 schematic	 coding	began	where	 sub-themes	were	 then	 identified.	 The	 sub-themes	 were	 identified	 as:	 the	 coronial	 status	 of	 pathologists,	 the	 ontological	 status	 of	 medical	statements,	and	the	evidentiary	requirements	of	the	coronial	system.			
Results	
The	ontological	status	of	medical	statements	The	key	 finding	of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 the	 evidence	given	by	pathologists	 is	understood	 in	 very	different	ways	by	the	two	central	players	—	the	pathologists	themselves,	and	the	coroners.	This	research	suggests	that	 the	 evidence	 given	 by	 pathologists	 at	 coronial	 inquiries	 is	 always	 presented	 as	 ‘medical	 opinion’.	That	 is,	 causes	of	death	are	described	 in	 terms	of	 likelihood	and	probability,	 rather	 than	as	 categorical	and	indisputable	truths.			




When	everything’s	 in,	we’ll	 collate	 it	all	 together	and	provide	a	report	 to	 the	coroner	and	
provide	him	with	our	 findings	and	present	him	with	our	opinion	as	 to	 the	cause	of	death.	Pathologist	4		
So	 you	 present	 your	 expert	 opinion	 and	 then	 the	 coroner	 makes	 a	 decision	 on	 that.	Pathologist	3		This	is	not	to	say	that	pathologists	do	not	often	have	very	high	degrees	of	confidence	in	their	opinions,	or	that	 those	opinions	are	not	 founded	upon	a	wealth	of	medical	data;	however,	 this	still	does	not	elevate	their	own	opinions	to	the	status	of	‘objective	truth’:			
When	I	walk	into	a	court	room	or	an	inquest	I	will	be	asked	to	maintain	the	highest	rigorous	
scientific	standards	as	to	what	I	found	and	I	will	be	expected	to	come	up	with	an	argument	
to	establish	why	 I	believe	 this	 is	 the	cause	of	death,	and	to	support	my	opinion	with	 facts.	
Now,	at	the	end	of	the	day	what	I	come	up	with	is	an	opinion,	but	I	have	to	demonstrate	that	





According	 to	 this	 understanding	 of	 medical	 statements,	 autopsies	 do	 not	 simply	 provide	 additional	evidence	 for	 the	 coronial	 inquiry,	 they	 provide	 an	 unequivocal	 cause	 of	 death	 —	 an	 objective	 truth,	around	which	to	frame	a	matrix	of	explanation.		
So	 they’ll	 decide	 (the	 police)	 there’s	 no	 suspicious	 circumstances,	 that	 it	 was	 probably	 a	
natural	death;	but	then	the	autopsy	will	confirm	that.	Coroner	3		
	
Well,	you’ve	got	to	rely	on	the	medicine	of	it.	Coroner	9		Indeed,	the	medical	‘facts’	of	the	autopsy	are	often	understood	as	the	only	truly	indispensable	element	of	the	 investigation.	Other	 truth-claims	—	whether	made	by	witnesses,	 or	 from	police	 at	 the	 scene	of	 the	death	—	are	deemed	to	require	the	‘real’	truth	of	the	medical	autopsy	to	provide	a	solid	foundation	to	the	entire	process.			
So,	any	violent	or	unnatural	deaths,	or	deaths	arising	out	of	a	medical	context,	we	still	most	
often	 have	 to	 have	 autopsies.	 Otherwise,	 if	 there’s	 going	 to	 be	 an	 investigation,	 the	
investigation	tends	not	to	get	anywhere.	Coroner	7		
The	evidentiary	requirements	of	the	coronial	system	The	 second	 central	 finding	 of	 this	 research	 is	 that	 the	 evidence	 (the	medical	 opinion)	 provided	by	 the	pathologist	is	not	only	principally	understood	by	the	coroner	as	‘objective	truth’,	it	is	also	administratively	deployed	by	the	coroner	as	an	objective	truth.	The	detail	of	the	pathologist’s	evidence	is	widely	regarded	as	 irrelevant	by	the	coroner,	with	the	sole	relevant	 issue	being	an	unequivocal	statement	as	to	cause	of	death.			
We	come	from	completely	different	standpoints;	we	simply	want	to	know	the	cause	of	death,	
so	why	do	we	need	the	nth	degree	about	the	weight	of	each	organ	etc.	And	so	there’s	that	
















months	 and	months.	 You	 can’t	 have	 the	 body	waiting	around	 so	 you	 just	 have	 to	make	a	
decision.	Coroner	2		On	those	occasions	where	the	pathologist	was	unwilling	to	allow	their	medical	opinion	to	be	translated	into	medical	 fact	—	at	 least	not	without	 further	autopsy	evidence	—	 the	 coroner’s	 irritation	was	often	clear.			
Electrocution’s	a	classic	one,	because	I’ve	had	cases	where	there	were	witnesses,	the	person’s	
going	 Bzzzzzzzzzz,	 there’s	 burn	marks	 on	 the	 hands	 from	 the	 object	 where	 the	 current’s	
passing	through	...	he	collapsed,	and	was	dead	instantly.	Now	some	pathologists	will	say	we	
still	need	to	do	an	autopsy	because	they	can’t	exclude	heart	attack	—	what's	the	chances	of	
that?	 And	 then	 what	 happens	 is	 that	 they	 refuse	 to	 certify	 that	 it	 was	 an	 electrocution!	Coroner	4		In	 summary,	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 coronial	 court,	 there	 exists	 a	 complex	 historical	 relationship	between	 the	 coroner	 and	 the	 pathologist,	 with	 tensions	 largely	 centering	 upon	 the	 related	 issues	 of	expertise,	 status	 and	 authority.	 Importantly,	while	medical	 information	 from	 autopsies	 is	 presented	 in	terms	 of	 ‘opinion	 and	 probability’	 by	 the	 pathologists,	 this	 evidence	 is	 translated	 by	 the	 coroners	themselves	 into	 ‘scientific	 fact’.	 This	 translation	 occurs	 for	 both	 epistemological	 and	 administrative	reasons.			
Discussion	The	results	of	this	study	suggest	two	areas	of	further	discussion.			




2)	Medicine	and	the	legal	process		A	trial	is	presumed	to	be	a	search	for	truth,	but,	technically,	 it	 is	a	search	for	a	decision.	(Felman	1997:	738)		In	 addition	 to	 both	 the	 historic,	modernity-related	 reasons	 for	 coroners	 to	 valorise	 and	 reify	 scientific	‘facts’,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 more	 contemporary	 cultural	 forces	 that	 have	 accentuated	 this	 perception,	 it	 is	arguably	 the	 legal	 system	 itself	 that	 requires	 its	 expert	 evidence	 to	 be	 conceptualised	 in	 terms	 of	objective	 truth.	 Kramar	 (2006)	 argues	 that	 pathologists	 are	 not	 simply	 reading	 biological	 information	when	 assessing	 cause	 of	 death;	 they	 are	 filtering	 that	 information	 through	 personal	 and	 professional	moral	lens	to	reach	their	conclusions.	These	subjective	judgements	are	distilled	into	medical	knowledge:		 which	 is	 taken	 up	 in	 law	 as	 expert	 opinion	 evidence	 to	 become	 legal	 fact.	 Once	 this	evidence	 has	 become	 legal	 fact,	 it	 becomes	 unassailable,	 having	 both	 passed	 medical-scientific	scrutiny	and	been	accepted	as	independent,	disinterested	medical	knowledge	…	(Kramar	2006:	818)			The	 foundational	 logic	 of	 this	 argument	 is	 supported	 by	 Latour	 (2010:	 229)	 who	 states	 that	 both	scientists	and	lawyers	(pathologists	and	coroners)	speak	‘the	truth’,	but	each	according	to	quite	different	criteria:	‘two	distinct	conceptions	of	exactitude	and	talent,	of	faithfulness	and	professionalism,	of	scruple	and	 objectivity’.	 Crucially,	 scientists	 struggle	 to	 understand	 how	 judges	 can	 employ	 the	 term	‘incontrovertible	fact’	to	evidence	that	has	not	been	subject	to	rigorous	critique	and	counter-submission.	Latour	(2010)	asserts	that	in	cases	where	scientific	evidence	is	required	—	as	in	coronial	investigations	—	it	is	law,	rather	than	science,	that	seeks	the	objective	authoritative	fact.	It	is	seen	to	be	the	task	of	the	coroner	 to	 constitute	 a	 domain	 of	 unassailable	 truth	 as	 soon	 as	 possible,	 so	 that	 this	 truth	 can	 be	deployed	 within	 the	 administrative	 and	 judicial	 framework	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Importantly,	 the	 most	important	element	of	the	rule	of	law	is	‘the	judgement’	—	in	this	case,	the	finding	as	to	cause	of	death.			
Conclusion	This	research	has	reached	a	number	of	conclusions,	some	predictable	within	the	context	of	the	coronial	inquiry,	 others	 less	 so.	 First,	 coroners	 and	pathologists	 have	 a	 complex	 and	 often	 difficult	 relationship	within	death	 investigations,	 and	while	 coroners	have	 the	 final	word	 in	determining	cause	of	death,	 the	evidence	of	the	pathologist	carries	considerable	weight,	more	weight	indeed	than	any	other	contributor	to	 the	 proceedings.	 Second,	 while	 the	 pathologists	 present	 their	 evidence	 in	 terms	 of	 opinion	 and	probability,	this	is	interpreted	by	the	coroner	as	objective	fact;	that	is,	within	the	context	of	the	coronial	inquiry,	 the	 coroner	 translates	 the	 ontology	 of	 the	 pathologist’s	 evidence	 into	 detached,	 independent	truth.	Third,	these	newly-minted	‘medical	facts’	are	not	only	understood	by	the	coroner	as	truths,	they	are	administratively	deployed	 as	 such	 to	 reach	a	 legal	decision	as	 to	 cause	of	death.	 Finally,	 and	by	way	of	summary,	 this	 research	 suggests	 that	 the	 chief	 conveyers	 of	 the	 ideology	 of	 scientific	 and	 medical	certainty	are	not	the	pathologists	themselves,	but	rather	the	coroners.	This	is	in	part	because	of	a	broad	acceptance	of	 the	 ‘infallibility’	 ideology	by	coroners,	but	also	because	of	 the	administrative	and	 judicial	requirements	of	the	coronial	system	itself.		
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Abstract	In	R	v	Christopher	Killick	[2011]	EWCA	Crim	1608,	the	Criminal	Division	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	for	England	and	Wales	gave	a	decision	setting	out	the	rights	of	a	crime	victim	to	seek	review	of	 a	Crown	Prosecution	Service	 (CPS)	decision	not	 to	prosecute	 and	 concluded	 that	 victims	have	the	right	to	seek	review	in	such	circumstances.	This	included	a	recommendation	that	the	right	 to	 review	 should	be	made	 the	 subject	 of	 clearer	procedures	 and	guidance.	This	paper	discusses	 article	 10	 of	 the	 Proposal	 for	 a	 Directive	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	
Council,	(2011)	2011/0129	(COD),	18	May	2011	establishing	minimum	standards	on	the	rights,	
support	 and	 protection	 of	 victims	 of	 crime	 (see	 article	 11	 Final	 Directive)	 as	 applied	 in	 the	Killick	case.	The	paper	 further	discusses	the	 implementation	of	Killick	 in	prosecution	policy,	namely	 in	 the	CPS	guideline	on	 the	victims’	 right	 to	review	(Director	of	Public	Prosecutions	for	England	and	Wales	2014).	Opportunities	for	victim	participation	will	be	canvassed	in	light	of	tensions	between	discourses	of	victim	rights	and	the	duty	of	the	Crown	to	prosecute	in	the	public	interest.			
Introduction	The	integration	of	the	victim	into	adversarial	systems	of	 justice	has	tended	to	occur	at	the	periphery	of	criminal	law	and	procedure.	Most	common	law	jurisdictions	began	the	process	of	integration	in	the	1960s	and	1970s,	 in	so	far	as	broad-based	compensation	was	made	available	for	injuries	caused	by	a	range	of	criminal	offences	(see	generally	Meirs	1985).	Support	services	followed,	providing	victims	with	a	range	of	welfare-based	 options	 that	 were	 largely	 supported	 by	 government,	 or	 rights-based,	 not-for-profit	movements,	or	 later	as	 combined	by	agency	agreements.	Access	 to	 counselling,	medical	 treatment,	 and	workplace	support	tended	to	be	provided	by	the	not-for-profits	while	court	and	witness	support	tended	to	be	provided	by	the	state.	The	dynamic	of	who	provided	these	services	changed	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	as	 government	 was	 keen	 to	 utilise	 not-for-profits	 to	 provide	 services	 otherwise	 funded	 by	 the	 state	(Meirs	2007).	The	1985	United	Nations	Declaration	of	Basic	Principles	of	 Justice	 for	Victims	of	Crime	and	
Abuse	of	Power	also	provided	impetus	for	the	staging	of	crime	victims	which	influenced	the	emergence	of	declarations	 or	 charters	 of	 victim	 rights	 on	 a	 local	 level	 (see	 Sumner	 1987).	While	 these	 tended	 to	 be	declaratory	and	not	enforceable,	such	charters	did	lead	to	the	reconsideration	of	the	plight	of	the	victim	and	 placed	 them	 in	 a	 firmer	 public	 policy	 context.	 Indeed,	 by	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 twenty-first	 century,	governments	 were	 addressing	 victims	 as	 the	 priority	 group	 (Doak	 2008;	 Hall	 2009).	 Arguably,	boundaries	 which	 once	 separated	 the	 victim	 from	 substantive	 participation	 in	 adversarial	 systems	 of	justice	are	now	being	eroded	and	dismantled	in	favour	of	rights	and	powers	that	can	be	enforced	against	the	state	or	the	accused,	albeit	in	an	unconventional,	fragmented	and	at	times	controversial	way.		This	paper	examines	the	continuation	of	the	trend	toward	the	provision	of	enforceable	rights	for	victims	of	crime	by	examining	the	ratification	of	the	victim’s	right	to	challenge	and	seek	review	of	a	prosecutor’s	decision	not	to	proceed	with	a	charge.	The	case	of	R	v	Killick	[2011]	EWCA	Crim	1608	provided	the	means	by	 which	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 of	 England	 and	 Wales	 considered	 the	 Proposal	 for	 a	 Directive	 of	 the	
European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council,	 establishing	 minimum	 standards	 on	 the	 rights,	 support	 and	
protection	of	victims	of	crime	(2011)	2011/0129(COD)	(Draft	Directive)	(now	finalised	as	the	Directive	of	
the	European	Parliament	and	of	 the	Council,	 (2012)	2012/29/EU,	25	October	2012	establishing	minimum	
standards	 on	 the	 rights,	 support	 and	 protection	 of	 victims	 of	 crime,	 and	 replacing	 Council	 Framework	




investigate,	 or	 where	 charges	 are	 downgraded	 or	 subject	 to	 a	 plea	 deal,	 R	 v	 Killick	 suggests	 that	 the	consideration	of	human	rights	declarations	and	 instruments	on	 the	domestic	 level	 is	a	key	way	victims	are	 being	 granted	 significant	 access	 to	 justice	 in	 an	 unprecedented	manner.	 The	 ratification	 of	 victim	rights	through	domestic	processes	means	that	such	rights	are	made	compatible	and	consistent	with	local	rules	regarding	criminal	law	and	procedure.	This	maintains	the	foundational	right	of	the	accused	to	a	fair	trial	 and	 ensures	 that	 the	 integration	 of	 victim	 interests	 occurs	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	accused’s	right	to	due	process	and	procedural	fairness.	Complementary	processes	of	private	prosecution	are	 also	 considered	 as	 supporting	 developments	 to	 increase	 the	 victim’s	 right	 to	 pre-trial	 review	processes.		
R	v	Killick	and	the	draft	directive	The	questioning	of	a	decision	of	 the	police	or	prosecution	 to	charge	or	proceed	on	 indictment	has	 long	been	identified	as	a	question	to	be	resolved	in	the	public	interest	alone.	The	personal	views	of	the	victim	are	not	part	of	the	public	interest.	Although	prosecution	guidelines	increasingly	require	victims	to	be	kept	informed	 of,	 or	 even	 consulted	 about,	 charges	 brought	 (including	 charge	 bargaining	 or	 plea	 deals	reached),	the	decision	to	settle	on	a	final	charge	or	to	not	proceed	with	a	charge	has	been	preserved	as	that	of	the	prosecution,	acting	alone.	However,	the	Final	Directive	provides	that	member	states	be	able	to	set	 a	process	 to	 allow	victims	 to	 seek	 review	of	decisions	not	 to	proceed	with	a	prosecution.	This	 falls	against	 a	 background	 of	 the	 consultative	 rights	 of	 the	 victim	 in	 plea	 bargaining	 (Verdun-Jones	 and	Yijerino	2002).		The	Criminal	Division	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	of	England	and	Wales	dealt	with	the	victim’s	right	to	review	under	 the	 Draft	 Directive	 in	 the	 case	 of	 R	 v	 Killick.	 In	 2006,	 two	 men	 suffering	 from	 cerebral	 palsy	informed	police	of	anal	rape	and	sexual	assault	by	the	accused,	Christopher	Killick.	Information	was	also	received	 on	 a	 third	 complaint	 of	 non-consensual	 buggery.	 Due	 to	 their	 disabilities,	 the	 complainants	required	 assistance	 when	 providing	 evidence.	 Killick	 also	 suffered	 from	 cerebral	 palsy,	 though	 to	 an	extent	 considered	 to	 be	 less	 than	 the	 complainants.	 Killick	was	 arrested	 and	 interviewed	 in	 2006.	 He	denied	any	form	of	sexual	activity	with	the	two	complainants,	and	asserted	that	the	anal	intercourse	with	the	third	complainant	was	consensual.	The	Crown	Prosecution	Service	(CPS)	made	the	decision	in	2007	not	 to	prosecute.	The	victims	 then	complained	about	 the	decision	not	 to	proceed	against	Killick,	which	resulted	 in	 an	 internal	 review	pursuant	 to	 the	 CPS	 complaints	 procedure.	 The	 review	determined	 that	Killick	 could	 be	 prosecuted,	 although	 he	 had	 since	 been	 informed	 in	 writing	 that	 he	 would	 not	 be	proceeded	against.	As	 the	complaints	procedure	resulted	 in	a	 favourable	outcome	 for	 the	victims	 there	was	no	need	to	continue	the	matter	to	judicial	review,	although	this	option	would	be	available	had	their	complaint	 been	 denied.	 Killick	 appeared	 in	 the	 Central	 Criminal	 Court	 in	 2010.	 The	 defence	 requested	that	proceedings	ought	to	be	stayed	as	an	abuse	of	process,	but	this	was	rejected	by	the	court.	The	trial	continued	and	Killick	was	convicted	of	buggery	and	sexual	assault	but	acquitted	of	anal	rape.	Killick	was	sentenced	 to	 three	 years’	 imprisonment.	 Killick	 then	 appealed	 his	 conviction	 and	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	(Criminal	 Division)	 took	 the	 opportunity	 to	 review	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 Draft	 European	 Union	Directive	modified	English	criminal	procedure.			Considering	the	Draft	Directive,	 the	Court	of	Appeal	of	England	and	Wales	(Criminal	Division)	held	that	the	 ‘decision	not	 to	prosecute	 is	 in	 reality	 a	 final	 decision	 for	 a	 victim,	 there	must	be	 a	 right	 to	 seek	 a	review	of	such	a	decision,	particularly	as	the	police	have	such	a	right	under	the	charging	guidance’	(R	v	
Killick	[2011]	EWCA	Crim	1608	[48]).	The	Crown	contention	was	that	the	victims	had	no	right	to	request	a	review	of	a	decision	not	to	prosecute,	but	could	utilise	the	existing	CPS	complaints	procedure.1	 In	the	context	 of	 existing	 internal	CPS	procedures,	 this	was	 a	 correct	 statement	of	 the	power	 available	 to	 the	victim	although	the	victim	always	retains	the	power	to	seek	review	of	an	executive	decision	where	made	




contrary	 to	 law.	 However,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 obligation	 to	 consider,	 and	 where	 possible	 ratify,	instruments	of	the	European	Union	(EU),	the	Court	of	Appeal	held	that:		 [w]e	 can	 discern	 no	 reason	 why	 what	 these	 complainants	 were	 doing	 was	 other	 than	exercising	their	right	to	seek	a	review	about	the	prosecutor’s	decision.	That	right	under	the	law	and	procedure	of	England	and	Wales	is	in	essence	the	same	as	the	right	expressed	in	Article	10	of	 the	Draft	European	Union	Directive	on	establishing	minimum	standards	on	 the	 rights,	 support	 and	 protection	 of	 victims	 of	 crime	 dated	 18	 May	 2011	 which	provides:	‘Member	States	shall	ensure	that	victims	have	the	right	to	have	any	decision	not	to	prosecute	reviewed.’	(R	v	Killick	[2011]	EWCA	Crim	1608	[49])		The	only	other	alternative,	other	than	existing	CPS	policy	regarding	complaints,	was	for	the	victims	to	rely	on	 the	 individual’s	 right	 to	seek	 judicial	 review	 in	 the	High	Court.	High	Court	procedures	make	 judicial	review	 of	 a	 decision	 not	 to	 proceed	with	 a	 charge	 difficult,	 with	 judicial	 reluctance	 to	 get	 involved	 in	processes	leading	to	the	charging	of	suspects,	a	process	widely	accepted	as	an	executive	function.	Relief	would	only	be	granted	in	the	most	exceptional	cases	where	the	internal	policies	of	the	executive	(policies	mandating	a	requirement	by	law)	were	not	followed	or	defeated	by	a	clear	abuse	of	process.	Seeking	such	relief	would	be	expensive	and	thus	prohibitive	for	many	victims.			The	Final	Directive	now	sets	out	the	process	by	which	such	tests	ought	to	be	now	made.2	Following	the	release	of	an	 interim	guidance,	 the	Director	of	Public	Prosecutions	 for	England	and	Wales	 released	 the	
Victims	 Right	 to	 Review	 Guidance	 in	 July	 2014	 (Director	 of	 Public	 Prosecutions	 for	 England	 and	Wales	(DPP)	2014).	This	guide	explains	the	circumstances	and	procedures	by	which	victims	may	seek	review	of	a	decision	not	to	prosecute.	The	emergence	of	the	victim’s	right	to	review	is	thus	in	policy	guiding	the	CPS	practice	 of	 complaints	 revision,	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 statutory	 directive	 of	 Parliament.	 The	 CPS	 guidance	makes	clear	those	circumstances	that	now	give	rise	to	the	review	mechanisms:		 The	right	to	request	a	review	arises	where	the	CPS:	(i)	makes	the	decision	not	to	bring	proceedings	(i.e.	at	the	pre-charge	stage);	or	(ii)	 decides	 to	 discontinue	 (or	 withdraw	 in	 the	 Magistrates’	 Court)	 all	 charges	involving	the	victim,	thereby	entirely	ending	all	proceedings	relating	to	them;	(iii)	offers	no	evidence	in	all	proceedings	relating	to	the	victim;	or	(iv)	decides	to	leave	all	charges	in	the	proceedings	to	‘lie	on	file’.	(DPP	2014:	3)		Where	a	decision	not	 to	proceed	with	a	charge	 is	made	by	 the	CPS,	 they	will	 inform	the	victim	of	 their	decision	to	do	so.	This	 information	will	also	specify	whether	the	decision	not	 to	proceed	 is	a	qualifying	decision,	in	that	it	is	a	decision	which,	with	the	victim’s	election,	gives	rise	to	the	review	mechanisms.	The	victim	only	need	indicate	that	they	seek	review	to	initiate	the	review	process.	Once	initiated,	the	CPS	will	conduct	 a	 local	 review.	 This	will	 be	 conducted	 by	 a	 new	 prosecutor	who	will	 be	 assigned	 to	 the	 case.	Where	the	victim’s	dissatisfaction	with	the	original	decision	has	not	been	resolved	at	the	local	level	by	a	new	prosecutor	reviewing	the	original	decision,	 they	may	complain	 further.	This	 further	complaint	will	initiate	 an	 independent	 review	 by	 the	 Appeal	 and	 Review	 Unit	 or	 by	 a	 Chief	 Crown	 Prosecutor,	 as	appropriate.	This	review	will	consider	the	case	de	novo	or	as	new,	and	will	not	use	the	original	decision	as	a	 starting	 point.	 Only	 information	 available	 to	 the	 original	 decision-maker	will	 be	 used	 in	 the	 appeals	




process.	 New	 information	 will	 need	 to	 be	 raised	 with	 the	 police.	 Where	 a	 decision	 not	 to	 charge	 is	overturned,	the	matter	may	be	reinitiated	in	court.	Where	no	evidence	was	offered	to	the	court,	and	the	review	process	realised	that	this	should	not	have	happened,	redress	is	limited	to	an	explanation	and	an	apology.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 court	 has	 already	 discontinued	 proceedings.	 Alternatively,	 the	 original	decision	may	be	upheld	and	the	matter	concluded.	Should	the	victim	continue	to	be	dissatisfied,	the	only	option	open	to	them	is	to	seek	judicial	review	in	court.			
Private	prosecution:	A	complementary	process		Victims	 enjoy	 the	 right	 of	 private	 prosecution	 which,	 although	 rarely	 exercised,	 supports	 the	 victim’s	right	to	participate	in	decision-making	processes.	The	power	of	the	victim	to	initiate	a	private	prosecution	resides	at	common	law	as	the	power	of	the	common	informant.	Technically,	 it	may	be	exercised	by	any	person	 informed	 of	 an	 offence.	 The	 power	 is	 exercised	 by	 informing	 a	 court,	 usually	 a	 court	 of	 first	instance	 such	 as	 a	 Local	 or	 Magistrates’	 Court,	 of	 an	 offence.	 Technically,	 the	 ability	 to	 initiate	 a	prosecution	 can	be	exercised	by	anyone,	despite	 the	 common	misconception	 that	 it	 is	 a	police	or	 state	power	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 all	 others.	 Although	 any	 person	 may	 initiate	 a	 prosecution,	 a	 prosecution	initiated	by	a	non-state	informant	is	usually	subject	to	the	scrutiny	of	a	magistrate	or	court	registrar	prior	to	the	listing	of	the	charge	and	issuance	of	a	summons	or	court	attendance	notice	(see,	for	example,	s	6(1)	





identified	 as	 the	 third	 wave	 of	 victim	 rights	 —	 the	 expression	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 victims	 not	 as	 a	manifestation	of	welfare	policy	on	the	local	level	but	as	rights	available	to	all	persons,	everywhere.	While	

































Marriage	 of	 Transsexual)	 [2001]	 FamCA	1074,	 Justice	Chisolm	 sought	 to	 recast	 the	 forensic	ascription	of	sex	against	a	broader	set	of	criteria,	expanding	the	range	of	sexually	dimorphic	anatomy	used	 to	determine	sex	 for	 the	purposes	of	marriage	 in	Australia	and	 incorporating	observations	 of	 psycho-social	 gender-differentiation	 as	 factors	 relevant	 to	 the	 ultimate	question	for	the	Court	—	‘What	makes	a	man	a	man?’		Yet	 neither	 expansion	 is	 unproblematic.	 This	 article	 explores	 this	 fundamental	 forensic	question	against	 the	background	of	Aznavour’s	 ‘Comme	 ils	dissent’,	 in	which	 the	persona	of	
un(e)	stripteaseuse	travesti	struggles	to	answer	precisely	the	same	question.	It	concludes	that	
Re	 Kevin	 might	 offer	 no	 more	 sophisticated	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 lived	 reality	 of	 trans	 than	Aznavour’s	ecdysiast	fag	—	not	trans,	but	un	travesti:		I	shop	and	cook	and	sew	a	bit	Though	mum	does	too,	I	must	admit	I	do	it	better.	
	
	
Introduction	This	 journey	 through	Re	 Kevin	 (Validity	 of	Marriage	 of	 Transsexual)	 [2001]	 FamCA	 1074	 [Re	 Kevin]	 is	based	on	 three	observations.	The	 first	 is	 that	 in	 the	area	of	 trans	 issues,1	 judicial	decision-making	now	reflects	a	different	approach	to	that	which	dominated	legal	discourse	in	the	1970s,	when	Corbett	v	Corbett	
(otherwise	Ashley)	(1970)	2	WLR	1306	[Corbett]	laid	down	the	definition	of	‘woman’	for	the	purposes	of	marriage.	The	modern	decisions	—	mostly	characterised	by	decisions	of	other	common	law	jursidictions,2	and	 the	 decision	 in	Re	Kevin	—	have	been	more	 readily	 informed	by	 relevant	 psychological	 and	 social	factors	than	their	predecessors.		Secondly,	while	desirable,	the	inclusion	of	a	range	of	theoretical	or	social	observations	as	the	substratum	of	 decision-making	 threatens	 to	 produce	 a	 range	 of	 conflicts	 through	 a	 reliance	 on	 idiosyncratic	 and	




subjective	material.	Moreover,	the	legal	 flirtation	with	the	scientific	—	the	quest	for	objective	reality	—	introduces	tensions	when	the	scientific	resolution	does	not	map	well	to	traditional	legal	solutions.		And	 finally,	 there	 remains	 a	 resistance	 to	 trans	 marriage	 —	 significantly,	 within	 the	 legal	 and	governmental	community	—	which	manifests	in	violence	in	a	Foucualdian	sense:		 The	 judges	 of	 normality	 are	 present	 everywhere.	We	 are	 in	 the	 society	 of	 the	 teacher-judge,	the	doctor-judge,	the	educator-judge,	the	social	worker-judge;	it	is	on	them	that	the	universal	 reign	 of	 the	 normative	 is	 based;	 and	 each	 individual,	 wherever	 he	 may	 find	himself,	subjects	to	it	his	body,	his	gestures,	his	behavior,	his	aptitudes,	his	achievements	(Foucault	1995:	304)		Trans	marriage	remains	conflicted	within	Australian	law:	 in	2013,	the	Victorian	government	reportedly	‘invalidated’	the	marriage	of	a	Melbourne	musician,	Page	Phoenix,	who	had	been	married	on	the	basis	of	his	passport	(reflecting	his	post-transition	gender	as	male),	while	his	birth	certificate	recorded	his	birth	gender,	 female	 (Kellaway	 2014).	 According	 to	 the	 decision	 in	Re	 Kevin,	 affirmed	 on	 appeal	 to	 the	 Full	Court	 of	 the	 Federal	 Court,	 Page	 Phoenix	 should	 be	 free	 to	 marry	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 his	 post-transition	gender.	
	
A	tale	of	three	epistemes Law,	as	it	encounters	the	concept	of	transgender	within	the	concept	of	marriage,	witnesses	not	a	simple	bilateral	conflict	between	crudely	drawn	conservative	and	radical	approaches,	but	a	clash	of	three	views	of	 the	 world.	 In	 the	 courtroom,	 a	 conservative	 and	 monolithic	 Judeo-Christian	 ethos	 opposes	 the	expansive	and	 inclusive	suggestions	of	 the	socio-empathic.	Yet	 lurking	 in	 the	shadows	 is	 the	shadow	of	the	scientist.			By	way,	then,	of	further	introduction,	I	want	first	to	let	another’s	voice	articulate	the	central	question	of	
Re	Kevin:		 My	mum	and	I	we	live	alone	A	grand	apartment	is	our	home	In	Fairhome	Towers	I	have	to	keep	me	company	Two	dogs,	a	cat,	a	parakeet	Some	plants	and	flowers	I	help	my	mother	with	the	chores	I	wash,	she	dries,	I	do	the	floors	We	work	together	I	shop	and	cook	and	sew	a	bit	Though	mum	does	too,	I	must	admit	I	do	it	better.	(Aznavour	1972)3 	This	description	of	simple	domestic	life	prepares	us	for	the	question	posed	by	Aznavour,	‘What	makes	a	man	a	man?’	4		





There	 is	 a	 superficial	 attraction	 in	 letting	 Aznavour	 sing	 the	 central	 question	 of	 Re	 Kevin.	 The	 literal	meaning	of	the	question	is	precisely	that	which	must	engage	the	court’s	mind	—	and	the	question,	in	both	instances,	 is	 framed	outside	 the	comfy	assumptions	of	 forensic	orthodoxy	associated	with	heterosexual	relationships.	It	is	formed,	rather,	in	the	marginalised	sub-cultures	of	les	etranger,	whose	voices	might	(it	might	 be	 thought)	 unite	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 monolithic,	 but	 which	 actually	 manifest	 in	 a	 polyvocal	resistance.		A	second	glance	at	these	two	cultures,	however,	might	cause	us	to	doubt	the	wisdom	of	letting	Aznavour	speak	 (or	 sing)	 for	 Kevin.	What,	 after	 all,	 does	 the	 experience	 of	 Aznavour’s	 ageing,	 camped-up	 drag-queen	 —	 un(e)	 stripteaseuse	 travesti	 whose	 self-image	 is	 revealingly	 (if	 naively	 and	 stereotypically)	conceived	 in	 his	 outperforming	 his	mother	 (with	whom	he	 still	 lives!)	 in	 the	 classically	 female	 role	 of	homemaker.5	How	much	common	cultural	space	do	the	outré	localised	epistemes	of	Aznavour’s	ecdysiast	fag	 share	with	 Kevin’s	 struggle	with	 his	 own,	 apparently	 ineluctable,	 nature?	 Kevin	 had	 eschewed	 the	Barbie	doll	in	favour	of	the	rich	phallic	imagery	of	the	toy	sword	and	the	plastic	gun	(Re	Kevin	[49]).		
Setting	the	(epi)cene 
Re	Kevin	arrives	in	the	Family	Court	because	Kevin	and	Jennifer	have	married.	The	nature	of	Kevin’s	legal	person,	 however,	 was	 problematic.	 In	 NSW,	 he	 was	 formally	 recognised,	 to	 the	 limits	 of	 that	 State’s	jurisdiction,	as	a	man.6	He	holds	a	birth	certificate	recording	that	as	 legal	 fact.	Kevin	is	a	post-operative	transsexual.	 Although	 the	 degree	 of	 surgical	 re-assignment	 is	 relatively	 low,	 the	 extent	 of	 his	 surgical	intervention	is	not	an	issue	before	the	court.7			Kevin	disclosed	to	the	marriage	celebrant	that,	while	his	birth	certificate	reads	‘male’,	it	recorded	not	his	‘birth	 sex’	but	his	post-operative	assigned	sex.	NSW	 law,	while	allowing	 for	 the	 re-issue	of	a	 certificate	harmonised	 with	 post-transition	 gender,	 prescribes	 that	 the	 legal	 use	 of	 the	 certificate	 in	 extra-jurisdictional	transactions	is	limited.	Quite	clearly,	it	does	not	provide	conclusive	legal	proof	of	the	sex	of	its	holder	for	the	purposes	of	the	Marriage	Act	1961	(Cth).			The	 celebrant	nonetheless	performed	a	 ceremony	of	marriage	 complying	 in	 all	 respects	 (save	possibly	one)	with	the	requirements	of	the	Marriage	Act.			The	Marriage	Act	 defines	marriage	 in	 terms	 reflecting	 Lord	Penzance’s	 description	 of	marriage	 as	 ‘the	voluntary	 union	 of	 a	man	 and	 a	woman	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 all	 others,	 voluntarily	 entered	 into	 for	 life’	(Marriage	Act	1961	(Cth)	s5).	‘Man’	and	‘woman’	are	not	defined	in	the	Act	—	hence	the	need,	in	Kevin’s	case,	for	judicial	consideration	of	this	most	basic	characteristic	of	humanity.			The	fundamental	nature	of	marriage,	in	the	Hyde	and	Hyde	(1866)	[L.R.]	1	P	&	D	130	formula,	was	not	in	question	in	Re	Kevin.	The	complications	of	same-sex	marriage	were	not	invoked.	It’s	just	that	‘man’	(and	correspondingly,	‘woman’)	—	though	superficially	uncontentious	and	self-explanatory	in	the	majority	of	situations	—	become	uncategorisable	at	the	margins.			Similarly,	 the	 impact	 of	 ‘incomplete’	 re-assignment	 is	 deliberately	 left	 out	 of	 the	 analysis	 by	 mutual	consent.	 The	 sequence	 of	 re-assignment	 accessed	 by	 Kimberley	 in	 becoming	 Kevin	 included	 surgical	




interventions	which	had	the	effect	of	‘defeminising’	Kimberley.	He	had	undergone	a	radical	hysterectomy,	bilateral	öophorectomy	and	bilateral	mammary	liposuction.	He	had	also	undergone	endocrine	treatment	which	produced	a	‘masculine’	balance	of	sex-related	hormones,	asserting	itself	in	the	form	of	observable	secondary	sexual	characteristics	consistent	with	maleness.	Vocal	changes	and	male	patterns	of	body	and	facial	 hair	 (at	 least)	 stamped	 Kevin’s	 appearance	 to	 the	 world	 as	 a	 man	 (to	 the	 extent	 that,	 and	 in	contradistinction	 to	 the	disposable	 faux-feminine	accoutrements	of	Aznavour’s	 character)	everyday	 life	was	possible,	for	Kevin,	only	by	the	adoption	of	an	uncontradicted	and	undiscardable	masculine	persona.			Conversely,	Aznavour’s	stripper’s	appearance	as	woman	is,	self-confessedly,	a	deception,	revealed	in	the	climax	of	the	dance:		 I	do	a	very	special	show	Where	I	am	nude	from	head	to	toe	After	stripteasing	Each	night	the	men	look	so	surprised	I	change	my	sex	before	their	eyes	Tell	me	if	you	can	What	makes	a	man	a	man.		This	 is	 the	 vaudevillean	 ecdysiasis	—	 the	 discarding	 of	 the	 paraphernalia	 of	 the	 feminine	 is	 revealed	(literally)	as	illusory:	a	magician’s	trick	of	smoke	and	mirrors	(such	is	the	ambience	of	Parisian	clubs)	—	a	
trompe	de	loil	of	couture,	coiffure	and	maquillage.	Now	you	don’t	see	it	—	now	you	do.			
The	domain	of	the	possible	The	deception,	though,	has	temporal	and	functional	limits:	after	the	show	(and	after	the	afterparty):		 My	masquerade	comes	to	an	end	And	I	go	home	to	bed	again	Alone	and	friendless.		Such	performativity	maps	to	Butler’s	‘masquerade’	of	gender	enforced	in	a	‘subtle	and	political’	domain,	subject	 to	 the	 ‘splittings,	 self	 parody,	 self-criticism’	 which,	 through	 their	 hyperbolic	 nature,	 reveal	 the	‘fundamentally	phantasmatic	status’	of	the	illusion	of	gender	(Butler	1990:	146).8	For	Kevin,	however,	the	meta-discursive	commitment	implicit	in	re-assignment	removed	from	the	domain	of	the	possible	a	return	to	 the	quotidian	operations	of	his	pre-intervention	sex	—	there	 is	 (now)	no	masquerade	 to	come	to	an	end.	His	beard,	his	physique,	his	voice	preclude	any	vacillation	before	the	wardrobe	or	the	toilet	door.	As	Chisolm	 J	 observed,	 ‘his	male	 secondary	 characteristics	were	 such	 that	 he	would	 have	 been	 subject	 to	ridicule	if	he	had	attempted	to	appear	in	public	dressed	as	a	woman	.	.	.	[and	he	could	not	have]	attempted	to	use	a	women’s	toilet’	(Re	Kevin	[36]).		Kevin,	however,	had	not	proceeded	with	any	 form	of	 surgical	 ‘masculinisation’.	 though	defeminised,	he	had	not	undergone	constructive	phalloplasty	or	testicular	prostheses.	For	forensically	strategic	reasons,	neither	 side	 had	 raised	 the	 extent	 of	 assignment.	 For	 Kevin,	 the	 argument	 that	 he	 was	 a	 man	 would	seemingly	be	undercut	by	the	absence	of	(even	surgically)	created	male	organs.	For	both,	the	precedential	value	of	a	decision	so	easily	distinguished	on	its	facts	would	be	greatly	diminished.		 At	its	most	basic	then,	Re	Kevin	might	be	conceived	as	an	exercise	in	statutory	interpretation.	The	terms	‘man’	and	‘woman’,	no	longer	an	uncomplicated	binary,	would	be	subjected	to	the	scrutiny	of	law.	Set	in	




opposition	 are	 the	 conservative	 assumptions	 about	 marriage	 and	 sex	 articulated	 both	 expressly	 and	implicitly	 by	 Lord	 Justice	 Ormond	 in	 the	 leading	 case	 on	 the	 question,	 Re	 Corbett,	 and	 a	 more	sophisticated	assessment	of	the	underlying	meaning	of	maleness.		That	conservative	frame	is	focussed	in	a	widely-quoted	passage	from	Corbett.	In	determining	what	makes	a	man	a	man	(or	a	woman	a	woman),	Lord	Justice	Ormrod	considered:		 …	the	criteria	must,	in	my	judgement,	be	biological,	for	even	the	most	extreme	degree	of	transsexualism	 in	 a	male	 or	 the	most	 severe	 hormonal	 imbalance	which	 can	 exist	 in	 a	person	 with	 male	 chromosomes,	 male	 gonads	 and	 male	 genitalia	 cannot	 reproduce	 a	person	who	is	naturally	capable	of	performing	the	essential	role	of	a	woman	in	marriage	(Corbett	1324-1325).		Absent	a	role	which	is	paradoxically	both	essentialist	and	utilitarian,	the	transsexual	(described	by	Lord	Justice	 Ormord	 with	 barely	 concealed	 disgust	 for	 the	 perverse	 anatomical	 interplay	 of	 the	 Corbett	bourdoir	[Cossey	per	Martens	J	644])	is	cast	as	the	new	leper,	re-iterating	the	‘game	of	exclusion’	which,	as	Foucault	 observed,	 had	 been	 played	 out	 over	 two	 to	 three	 hundred	 years	 in	 an	 oddly	 similar	 fashion,	periodically	re-targeted	on	the	poor,	the	vagrant,	the	prisoner,	the	‘alienated’	…	les	etranger	remodelled	to	the	fashion	of	the	age	(Foucault	2006	cf	Butler	2001).			The	reluctance	of	courts	to	traverse	the	‘many	fine	metaphysical	arguments	lurking	about	here	involving	desire	and	being,	 the	essence	of	 life	and	the	power	of	mind	over	physics’	(Littleton	v	Prange	 [225])	has	been	defended	by	reference	to	a	narrow	positivism:			 …	courts	are	wise	not	to	wander	too	far	 into	the	misty	 fields	of	sociological	philosophy.	Matters	of	 the	heart	do	not	always	 fit	neatly	within	 the	narrowly	defined	perimeters	of	statutes,	 or	 even	 existing	 social	 mores.	 Such	 matters	 though	 are	 beyond	 [the]	 court’s	consideration.	(Littleton	v	Prange	[225])		
Bio-logic The	approach	in	Corbett	appears	to	construct	a	continuum	of	deviant	sexuality,	decoupled	from	normally-constructed	masculinity,	 through	mere	hormonal	 imbalance	out	as	 far	as	 ‘the	most	extreme’	degrees	of	transsexualism.	 Alternative	 constructions	 of	 maleness	 —	 indicia	 beyond	 the	 immediately	 definable	triumvirate	 of	 gonads,	 genitals	 and	 chromosomes	 —	 were	 rejected,	 despite	 far	 more	 extensive	taxonomies	 of	 developmental	 variables	 of	 sex	 having	 been	 identified,	 for	 example,	 by	 Money	 in	 1968	(Fletcher	 2006).9	 Most	 particularly,	 psychological	 and	 the	 psycho-social	 phenomena	 were	 condemned	undifferentially	as	more	than	mere	oddity	or	aberration	(although	there	is	an	air	of	the	freak-show):	they	were	 constructed	 as	 mental	 illness	 —	 unable	 to	 transcend	 the	 Freudian	 ‘anatomy	 as	 destiny’	 which	informed	 LJ	 Ormrod’s	 forensic	 distinction	 between	 the	 sexes	 (see	 Freud	 1912).	 Presumably,	 the	transvestite	 (typified	 by	 Aznavour	 as	 a	 mincing	 homosexual	 mimicking	 femininity)	 and	 the	 ‘true-transsexual’	 (whose	 libido	object	 is	a	person	of	 the	opposite	(perceived)	sex)	are	nonetheless	united	 in	law	by	 the	quirk	of	birth	anatomy	and	 their	departure	 from	 the	 (hetero-)	normatively	and	 forensically	orthodox.	Transsexualism	(even	in	its	pre-operative	manifestation)	is	not	a	homosexual	phenomenon,	but	rather	 a	 heterosexuality	 decoupled	 from,	 and	 confounded	 by,	 the	 implications	 of	 gross	 anatomy,	 and	beyond	the	scope	of	the	legal	imagination.			Behind	the	façade	is	the	assumption	of	an	unrelieved	bimodal	state	of	human	sexuality.	Male	and	female	—	concepts	of	impeccable	Scriptural	authenticity	(Genesis:	1:27)	—	are	reflected	in	the	reified	polarities	of	 a	 two-valued	 legal	 taxonomy,	 themselves	manifestations	 of	 Foucault’s	 construction	 of	 the	 co-ercive	




suppression	 of	 the	 complexity	 of	 human	 identity	 by	 modernity	 (see	 Wilkin	 1999),	 or	 the	 (arbitrary)	‘frozen	 frames’	 of	 Hocquenghem’s	 ‘unbroken	 and	 polyvocal	 flux’	 (Herzer	 in	 Eribon	 2004).	 Corbett’s	reliance	 on	 expert	medical	 evidence	 pre-supposes	 (or	 at	 least	 pretends)	 that	 the	 bio-logic	 of	 scientific	taxonomy	parallels	a	sexual	binary	opposition.	Such	a	bio-logic,	within	the	legal	imaginary,	is	constructed	as	 an	 inherently	 stable	 phenomenon,	 as	 opposed	 to,	 for	 example,	 an	 ‘identity	 tenuously	 constituted	 in	time	…	instituted	through	a	stylized	repetition	of	acts’	(Butler	1988:	140).		But	the	medical	evidence	was,	in	one	sense,	of	anything	but	the	binary.	The	scientific	view,	expressed	in	the	evidence	in	Corbett,	was	that	medical	evaluation	was	not	directed	to	 ‘determining’	which	of	the	two	values	an	 individual	was	—	that	 is	 the	 realisation	of	a	 forensic	 classification	harmonised	with	a	binary	biological	determinacy.	Rather,	 it	spoke	to	the	ultra-pragmatic	(and	humanitarian)	assessment	of	which	of	 the	 social	 roles	 associated	 with	 those	 reified	 concepts	 best	 suited	 the	 bio-reality	 of	 an	 individual’s	specific	positioning	in	a	multivalent	biological	schema.	Toilet	doors	may	come	in	only	two	forms;	people	don’t.	In	Foucault’s	terms	(Wilkin	1999),	the	diversity	of	the	human	condition	(and	both	self-	and	medical	reportage)	is	reduced	to	legal	monologue.	The	bipolarity	conveniently	morphs	from	medical	pragmatism	into	the	simplified	black	and	white	legal-logical	space	underpinning	not	just	Corbett,	but	the	sequence	of	subsequent	 cases	 which	 remained	 wedded	 to	 a	 binary	 forensic	 determination	 which	 contradicts	biological	diversity.		
Corbett’s	presupposition	of	 ‘true	sex’	 leads	 to	a	primacy	of	ordinariness	 in	 the	 forensic	restructuring	of	human	 sexual	 identity	 —	 humans	 ordinarily	 emerge	 at	 birth	 as	 uncomplicatedly	 male	 or	 female,	rendering	 the	 ascription	 of	 sexual	 identity	 ‘so	 self-evident	 as	 to	 be	 trivial’	 (Fletcher	 2006:	 536),	 to	 the	extent	 that	 ‘[e]very	schoolchild,	even	of	 tender	years	 is	 confident	 that	he	or	 she	can	 tell	 the	difference’	(Littleton	v	Prange	 [1]).	The	assumption	 is	 that	even	the	extra-ordinary	must	be	consistent	with	binary	organisation,	or	at	least	that	it	can	be	made	(through	an	act	of	analytical	forensic	violence)	to	conform	to	this	 legal	 fiction.	 Kevin	must,	 it	 seems,	 live	 in	 the	 profoundly	 satirical	 world	 of	 Crouch’s	Gendercator,	where:		 [s]ex	 roles	 and	 gender	 expression	 are	 rigidly	 binary	 and	 enforced	 by	 law	 and	 social	custom	 ...	 one	 where	 butch	 women	 and	 sissy	 boys	 are	 no	 longer	 tolerated	—	 gender	variants	are	allowed	to	choose	their	gender,	but	they	must	choose	one	and	follow	its	rigid	constraints.	(Crouch	2007)		Yet	 it	 is	 in	 the	extra-ordinary	 that	 the	validity	 (or	at	 least	 the	 limits)	of	 forensic	ascription	needs	 to	be	tested.			




The	medical	evidence,	published	by	Zhou,	Hofman,	Gooren	et	al	in	Nature	(1995),	pointed	specifically	to	a	site	of	physiological	dimorphic	differentiation	within	the	brain,	deeply	implicated	in	the	phenomenon	of	transsexualism,	identified	as	lying	in	the	bed	nucleus	of	the	stria	terminalis.	The	spectre	of	psychopathy	is	relieved	 by	 the	 acknowledgement	 that	 ‘transsexuals	 [might]	 be	 right	 in	 their	 belief	 that	 their	 sex	was	wrongly	 judged	 at	 the	 moment	 of	 birth’	 (Zhou	 1995:	 69).10	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 sexually	 dimorphic	neurological	structures	which	point	inexorably	(or	at	least	as	cogently	as	karyotype,	gonads	or	genitals)	to	one	of	the	polar	states	of	sex				This	 evidence	 was	 accepted	 by	 Chisolm	 J	 as	 reflecting	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 fourth	 sexually	 dimorphic	structure	 within	 human	 anatomy.	 But,	 if	 the	 three	 determinative	 indicia	 of	 Corbett	 have	 simply	 been	amplified,	then	ultimately	the	balance	of	judicial	decision-making	remains	largely	unaltered.	Corbett’s	trio	resolves	into	a	quartet,	but	that	merely	shifts	the	point	of	ambiguity	to	a	different	site.	A	fourth	element	may	 extend	 the	 potential	 range	 of	 non-congruence	 (so	 that	 an	 individual	 who	 is	 congruent	 across	
Corbett’s	indicia	may	well	be	found	non-congruent	across	all	four),	but	in	itself	does	nothing	to	change	the	underlying	 oppositions.	 A	 new	 physiological	 ‘test’	 emerges,	 re-inforcing	 the	 anatomical	 primacy	 of	
Corbett.			
Of	domestic	chores	and	macho	sports Kevin	 was	 born	 (within	 the	 static	 formula	 of	 Corbett)	 unambiguously	 female.	 At	 birth,	 the	 (then)	Kimberley	 presented	with	 congruent	 observable	 dimorphic	 forms.	 Her	 gonads,	 genitals	 and	 karyotype	pointed	uncomplicatedly	to	the	birth	of	a	non-anomalous	girl.		Between	birth	and	puberty,	however,	the	comfortable	assumptions	of	gender	identity	slipped.	Kimberley,	though	 Corbett-congruent	 and	 observably	 female,	 nevertheless	 began	 to	 demonstrate	 behavioural	‘anomalies’.	Physiology	(or	at	least	the	confined	construct	created	by	Corbett’s	analysis)	failed	to	yield	an	identity	consistent	with	anatomical	destiny.			A	range	of	evidence	was	presented	to	the	court	about	Kimberly’s	behaviour:	a	male	cousin	testified	that	they	 would	 play	 ‘footy,	 soccer	 and	 cricket,	 and	 ride	 BMX	 bikes	 on	 family	 outings’.	 Close	 friends	 and	relatives	gave	consistent	evidence	of	his	predilection	for	the	aggressive	play	of	male	children	(rather	than	the	co-operative	social	play	of	girls)	(Re	[48]-[66]).			Contemporary	 acquaintances	 described	 the	 current	 Kevin	 —	 his	 appearance,	 physique,	 mannerisms,	speech,	 attitudes	 and	 interests	 as	 ‘expressing	 his	 maleness’	 —	 epitomised,	 perhaps,	 by	 a	 friend’s	characterisation	as	 ‘a	typical	Aussie	bloke’.	His	adult	persona	was	lauded	as	a	 ‘fine	husband	and	father’,	even	to	the	point	of	the	judgement	of	his	mother-in-law:	there	was	‘no	other	man,	anywhere,	who	I	would	prefer	to	have	as	my	daughter’s	husband’.		But	it	is	this	body	of	evidence	which	lies	at	the	source	of	the	another	tension	—	which	creates	a	paradox	(if	 not	 at	 the	 individual	 level,	 but	 at	 the	 level	 of	 sexual	politics.)	The	 characterisation	of	 individuals	by	reference	to	sexual	stereotypes	—	the	heteronormative	ruggedness	of	masculinity	as	counterpoint	to	the	gentleness	of	the	feminine	—	has	long	been	abandoned	as	a	valid	basis	for	inference	from	behaviour	to	identity	 (Cover	2004).	Homosexuals	do	not	 inevitably	conform	to	 the	stereotypical	 traits	of	Aznavour’s	ecdysiast	 fag,	 nor	 lesbians	 to	 the	 boilersuited	 butch	 of	 TV	 drama.	 The	 idiosyncratic	 manifestations	 of	gender	—	 the	 actual	masquerade	 of	 Aznavour,	 or	 the	masquerade	 imposed	 by	 the	 legal	 imaginary	 on	Kevin,	 invite	 a	 bilateral	 form	 of	 the	 question	 posed	 by	 Butler:	 does	 'masquerade	 conceal	 a	 femininity	




(/masculinity)	 that	might	 be	 seen	 as	 genuine	 or	 authentic,	 or	 [is]	masquerade	…	 the	means	 by	which	femininity	(/masculiniity)	and	the	contests	over	its	“authenticity”	are	produced?’	(Butler	1990:	159).		
Couture,	coiffure	and	macquillage	It	 is,	 perhaps,	 on	 the	basis	 of	 performativity	 that	Kevin	 is	most	pointedly	 to	be	distinguished	 from	 the	vaudevillian	 transvestite	 stripper:	 Aznavour’s	 entertainer	 is	 (quintessentially)	 performer.	 His	 stage	persona	persists	as	stereotype	after	any	after-party	performance:		 We	love	to	pull	apart	someone	And	spread	some	gossip	just	for	fun	Or	start	a	rumour		Kevin,	 by	 contrast,	 wears	 no	mask	—	 no	wig.	 Kevin	 is	 the	 embodiment	 of	 Prosser’s	 ‘transsexual	 who	seek[s]	very	pointedly	to	be	non-performative,	to	be	constantive,	quite	simply	to	be’	(Prosser	1998:	32).		Yet,	 it	 is	 precisely	 these	 heteronormative	 behavioural	 tropes	 which	 form	 the	 counter-technological	riposte	to	the	forensic	ascription	of	anatomical	and	chromosomal	determinism	which	must	be	overcome	if	Kevin	is	to	marry.	And	in	doing	so,	they	become	as	entrenched	in	forensic	discourse	as	Ormrod	LJ’s	bio-logic.			Justice	Chisolm’s	‘absurd’	pre-occupation	with	Kevin’s	childhood	behaviours	realises,	and	re-imagines	out	of	 the	 domain	 of	 the	 homosexual	 into	 that	 of	 the	 transsexual,	 Eribon’s	 characterisation	 of	 nineteenth	century	analyses	of	the	‘uranist’	as	a	‘a	personage,	a	past,	a	case	history	and	a	childhood,	a	character-type,	a	 form	of	 life’	 (Eribon	2004:	47).	 It	 is	also,	 to	continue	with	Foucault,	a	 ‘morphology	with	an	 indiscreet	anatomy’	 (Foucault	 1990:	 43),	 where	 law’s	 discomfort	 with	 the	 transsexual	 literalises	 Foucault’s	ascription	of	a	 ‘mysterious	physiology’,	outside	 the	visual	or	 conceptual	horizon	of	 the	 legal	 imaginary.	But	 it	 equally	 re-imagines	 —	 if	 not	 re-invigorates	 —	 the	 perversely	 prescient	 construction	 of	 the	
homosexual	in	Ulrich’s	model	of	the	‘hermaphroditism	of	the	soul’,	mutatis	mutandis	the	‘woman’s	soul	in	a	man’s	body’	(Cairns	1996:	582).		











































Abstract	Human	trafficking	has	a	devastating	impact	on	victims.	Because	of	physical	and	psychological	harm,	victims	need	special	 care	 from	community	and	government	agencies	 to	 support	 their	recovery.	Once	 the	 immediate	 health	 and	welfare	 needs	 of	 the	 trafficked	 person	 have	 been	met,	some	victims	will	require	further	assistance	to	truly	reintegrate	into	their	communities.	In	Vietnam,	 a	 self-help	group	model	has	been	 successfully	used	 to	 assist	 victims.	Utilising	 a	unique	peer	group	model	with	support	from	service	providers,	trafficked	persons	can	provide	mutual	psychosocial	support,	access	services,	and	develop	income	sources	by	collaborating	on	income	generating	activities.	This	paper	draws	on	literature,	legal	documents	and	interviews	with	 government	 staff	 in	 anti-trafficking	 programs	 to:	 overview	 human	 trafficking	 in	 the	region,	 review	 the	 Vietnamese	 legal	 framework	 for	 defining	 trafficking	 victims	 and	 victim	support,	 explore	 the	 benefits	 of	 self-help	 group	 activities,	 and	 propose	 practical	recommendations	for	the	development	of	group	activities.			
Introduction	Vietnam	 is	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Association	 of	 South	 East	 Asian	 nations	 (ASEAN)	 where	 the	 issue	 of	trafficking	in	persons	has	been	on	the	agenda	since	the	early	1990s.	The	number	of	publications	about	the	nature	 and	 diversity	 of	 trafficking	 in	 persons	 in	 South	 East	 Asia	 has	 risen	 rapidly	 over	 the	 past	 two	decades	(David	2009:	95;	Piper	2005:	203-204).	In	this	region,	women,	men,	girls,	and	boys	are	trafficked	and	 exploited	 in	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 industries	 and	 settings.	 Moreover,	 information	 about	 other	 forms	 of	trafficking,	 such	 as	 trafficking	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 organ	 removal	 are	 now	 being	 investigated	 (David,	Gallagher,	Holmes	et	al	2011:	1).	However,	limited	information	about	practices	in	the	criminal	justice	and	victim	 support	 sectors	 leads	 to	 difficulties	 in	 assessing	 impact	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 responses	 (David	2009:	96-97).		In	Vietnam,	the	statistics	indicate	that	human	trafficking	is	now	an	established	practice.	There	were	4026	cases	and	8641	victims	of	human	trafficking	identified	between	2005	and	2014,	with	the	number	of	cases	increasing	steadily	over	this	period	(see	Table	1).	Vietnamese	victims	are	trafficked	for	sexual	and	labour	exploitation	 across	 the	 globe,	 including	 to	 Taiwan,	Malaysia,	 South	Korea,	 Laos,	 China,	 Thailand,	 Saudi	Arabia,	Libya,	Indonesia,	and	the	United	Kingdom	(Hoang	2013:	169-170).	Some	Vietnamese	women	are	recruited	through	international	marriages	(between	Vietnamese	women/girls	and	foreigners)	to	move	to	China,	Taiwan,	Hong	Kong,	Macau,	and	South	Korea.	These	fraudulent	and	exploitative	marriages	are	also	linked	 to	 trafficking	 in	women	and	prostitution	with	 around	10	per	 cent	 of	women	 in	 these	marriages	sold	and	subsequently	subjected	to	conditions	of	 forced	labour	(including	as	domestic	servants),	 forced	prostitution,	or	both	(Hoang	2013:	171;	Shelley	2010:	165).		
Table	1:	Number	of	human	trafficking	cases	and	victims	(Vietnamese	Ministry	of	Public	Security	
year-end	summation	reports	(2005-2014))	
	 2005	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 Total	
Cases	 209	 328	 369	 375	 395	 429	 458	 487	 507	 469	 4026	




It	is	reported	that	Vietnamese	men	and	women	incur	some	of	the	highest	debts	among	Asian	expatriate	workers.	One	of	the	main	reasons	for	this	is	that	they	migrate	by	using	state-affiliated	and	private	labour	export	companies	for	work	opportunities.	In	such	situations	they	can	be	coerced	into	signing	contracts	in	languages	they	cannot	read	and/or	charged	fees	illegally.	These	situations	contribute	to	increased	risk	of	debt	bondage	and	forced	labour	(US	Department	of	State	2013:	392-395).			Interpol	 Vietnam	 reports	 that	 the	 vast	 majority	 (60	 per	 cent)	 of	 the	 cases	 of	 trafficking	 occur	 at	 the	Vietnam-China	 border	 primarily	 in	 these	 provinces:	 Quang	Ninh,	 Lang	 Son,	 Cao	 Bang,	 Lao	 Cai,	 and	Ha	Giang.	A	further	10	per	cent	occur	at	the	Vietnam-Cambodia	border,	mainly	in	the	provinces	of	Tay	Ninh,	An	Giang,	Dong	Thap,	Hau	Giang,	Kien	Giang.	A	smaller	6	per	cent	of	the	cases	occur	at	the	Vietnam-Laos	border,	 mainly	 in	 provinces	 of	 Thanh	 Hoa,	 Nghe	 An,	 Ha	 Tinh,	 Quang	 Tri	 (Interpol	 Vietnam	 2013).	However,	these	reported	instances	of	trafficking	do	not	depict	the	whole	picture	of	human	trafficking	in	Vietnam	 because	 of	 the	 absence	 of	 systematic	 and	 complete	 data	 (Vu	 2006:	 33-34).	 Moreover,	 the	effectiveness	 of	 strategies	 to	 prevent	 this	 kind	 of	 crime	 remain	 limited	 (Trees,	 Vu	 and	 Tran	 2012;	 Vu	2007).		As	a	consequence	of	the	alarming	increase	in	trafficking	cases,	hundreds	of	victims	are	also	returned	to	Vietnamese	society	annually.	Based	on	the	number	of	victims	identified,	there	is	a	need	to	improve	victim	protection	regimes	and	develop	victim	support	programs	in	Vietnam.	The	following	sections	will	clarify	the	Vietnamese	legal	framework	and	the	self-help	group	model	for	supporting	victims.		
Trafficking	victims	definition	under	Vietnamese	law	Before	2011,	there	was	no	comprehensive	trafficking	law	in	Vietnam	and	Vietnam’s	Penal	Code	was	the	only	 law	 that	 criminalised	 acts	 (Kneebone	 and	 Debeljak	 2012:	 151).	 The	Vietnamese	 Penal	 Code	 1999	includes	two	main	articles	which	provide	for	the	criminalisation	of	trafficking	offences.	They	are	Article	119	 –	 ‘Trafficking	 in	 women’	 and	 Article	 120	 –	 ‘Trading,	 fraudulently	 exchanging	 or	 appropriating	children’	 (Vietnamese	 National	 Assembly	 1999).	 The	 terms	 ‘trafficking’,	 ‘trading’,	 ‘fraudulently	exchanging’	 and	 ‘appropriating’	 were	 not	 defined	 in	 the	 Vietnamese	 Penal	 Code	 but	 in	 explanatory	memoranda,	law	enforcement	documents,	or	related	regulations	(Kneebone	and	Debeljak	2012:	151-152;	Vietnamese	National	Assembly	1999).			The	term	victim	of	trafficking	is	not	defined	in	any	provision	of	the	Vietnamese	Penal	Code	 (Vietnamese	National	 Assembly	 1999)	 but	 rather	 in	 the	Government	Decision	 17/2007/QD-TTg	 on	 Promulgating	 the	
Regulations	 on	 Reception	 of	 and	 Community	 Reintegration	 Support	 for	 Trafficked	 Women	 and	 Children	
Returning	Home	from	Foreign	Countries.	Here,	victims	are	defined	in	this	regulation	as:		[…]	 women,	 children	 threatened	 by	 a	 person	 or	 a	 group	 of	 people	 resorting	 to	 force,	threatening	 to	 employ	 force	 or	 other	 types	 of	 force,	 kidnapping,	 deceiving	 or	misusing	their	 power	 or	 position,	 the	 vulnerable	 condition	 to	 traffic	 (deliver,	 receive	 money	 or	another	materialistic	benefit)	to	take	them	abroad	on	the	purpose	of	human	exploitation	(forced	 sex	 or	 other	 types	 of	 sexual	 exploitation,	 labour	 or	 forced	 slavery	 service	 or	working	under	slavery	condition	or	taking	their	body	parts).1	(Article	4)			It	has	been	said	that	trafficking	under	Vietnamese	law	focuses	on	‘trade,	profit	and	illegality’.	This	illegal	
trade	means	 a	 transfer	 of	 a	 person	 from	person/people	 to	 another	 person/people	 for	money	 or	 other	material	profits	(Department	of	Criminal	and	Administrative	Laws	2004:	12).	Moreover,	anti-trafficking	practice	has	mainly	focused	on	the	trafficking	of	women	and	children	(Hoang	2013:	211).			




In	 the	 Amended	 and	 Supplemented	 Penal	 Code	 2009,	 a	 change	 was	 made	 from	 ‘trafficking	 in	 women’	(Article	 119	 in	 the	 of	Penal	 Code	 1999)	 to	 ‘trafficking	 in	 humans’,	 and	 ‘removal	 of	 organs’	was	 added.	These	changes	have	brought	Vietnam	closer	to	achieving	compliance	with	the	international	definition	of	trafficking	(The	Vietnamese	National	Assembly	2009).	However,	 the	understanding	of	 trafficking	 is	still	narrow	in	comparison	with	the	Trafficking	Protocol,	and	some	practices,	such	as	forced	labour	or	labour	exploitation,	were	not	added	(Tucker,	Kammel,	Lehman	et	al	2009:	458).		In	 2011,	 a	 new	 law	 entitled	 Law	 on	 Prevention	 and	 Suppression	 against	 Human	 Trafficking	 (Anti	
Trafficking	 Law	 2011)	 appears	 to	 officially	 define	 trafficked	 persons	 as	 victims	 and	 covers	 both	international	and	internal	trafficking	(Kneebone	and	Debeljak	2012:	153).	Trafficking	is	defined	in	Article	3	of	the	law	by	the	following	‘prohibited	acts’,	namely:		 1. The	trafficking	in	persons	as	stipulated	in	Article	119	and	Article	120	of	the	Penal	Code.		2. The	transfer	or	receipt	of	persons	for	sexual	exploitation,	forced	labour,	the	removal	of	organs,	or	for	other	inhuman	purposes.		3. The	recruitment,	 transportation,	harbouring	of	persons	 for	sexual	exploitation,	 forced	labour,	the	removal	of	organs	or	for	other	inhuman	purposes,	or	for	the	commission	of	the	acts	as	stipulated	in	paragraphs	1	and	2	of	this	Article.		It	should	be	noted	that	the	‘prohibited	acts’	under	this	legal	document	is	not	consistent	with	the	‘means’	element	of	Trafficking	Protocol.	There	are	only	some	‘means’	factors	described	in	the	definition	of	some	types	of	exploitation,	including:	‘coercion’	in	‘sexual	exploitation’;	‘force’	in	‘sexual	slavery’;	and	‘the	use	of	force’	or	‘the	threat	of	use	of	force’	or	‘other	means	to	coerce	persons’	in	‘forced	labour’.	The	meaning	of	‘the	 abuse	of	 power	or	 of	 a	 position	of	 vulnerability’,	which	 is	 seen	 as	 very	 common	means	 in	Greater	Mekong	 Sub-region,	 is	 not	 detailed	 in	 this	 anti-trafficking	 law	 (Hoang	 2013:	 192,	 216;	 Kneebone	 and	Debeljak	2012:	152).	Furthermore,	the	law	lacks	a	strong	commitment	to	suppress	trafficking	for	forced	labour	as	well	as	a	commitment	to	not	punish	trafficking	victims	for	illegal	activities	they	may	enter	into,	such	as	 illegal	 residence	 in	 countries	of	 transit	 or	destination	 (Hoang	2013:	212-217).	Additionally,	 no	guidance	is	provided	in	this	document	on	whether	the	Anti-Trafficking	Law	2011	supplements	or	replaces	the	criminal	code	provisions	or	regulations	(Kneebone	and	Debeljak	2012:	153).		To	 summarise,	 Vietnamese	 anti-trafficking	 policies	 make	 a	 positive	 step	 towards	 compliance	 with	international	standards	and	will	provide	Vietnam	with	powerful	means	of	supporting	human	trafficking	victims.	Recent	significant	changes,	 including	the	improvement	of	definitions	of	human	trafficking,	have	further	strengthened	the	federal	Vietnamese	position	(Tucker,	Kammel,	Lehman	et	al	2009:	461-462).	
	
Victim	support	under	Vietnamese	law	The	 purpose	 of	 victim	 support	 is	 to	 help	 trafficking	 victims	 recover	 from	 physical	 and	 psychological	problems,	 provide	 legal	 assistance,	 protect	 them	 from	 further	 harms,	 assist	 them	 in	 their	 return	 and	social	 reintegration,	 and	 protect	 them	 from	 being	 re-trafficked	 (Cambodia-Vietnam	 Agreement	 2005,	Article	13;	Trafficking	Protocol,	Article	6).	This	section	will	review	the	policies	of	victim	reintegration	and	protection.		Reintegration	support	is	an	important	requirement	for	trafficked	persons	under	international	law	(Hoang	2013:	249).	Under	Vietnamese	anti-trafficking	policies,	 the	purposes	of	 these	 resources	are	 to	provide:	essential	 needs	 and	 travelling	 expenses;	 medical	 and	 psychological	 support;	 legal	 aid;	 short-term	allowances;	educational	and	vocational	training;	and	loans,	which	can	help	victims	return	and	reintegrate	into	their	families	and	communities	(Vietnamese	National	Assembly	2011:	Chapter	V,	Article	33	to	Article	38).	 The	 support	 for	 essential	 needs	 and	 travelling	 expenses,	which	 are	 determined	 in	Anti-Trafficking	




2011:	Chapter	V,	Article	33).	The	medical	and	psychological	support	 is	provided	through	social	welfare	institutions	or	victim	support	institutions.	This	include	‘health	care	and/or	medical	treatment	expenses’	and	 support	 to	 help	 victims	 ‘have	 their	 psychology	 stabilized’	 (Vietnamese	 National	 Assembly	 2011:	Chapter	V,	Article	34	and	35).	Additionally,	 victims	of	 trafficking	 in	Vietnam	are	entitled	 to	 legal	aid	 to	‘apply	 for	permanent	residence	registration,	civil	status	registration,	entitlement	to	supportive	regimes,	to	claim	compensation,	and	to	participate	in	litigation	and	other	legal	procedures	in	connection	with	the	human	trafficking	cases’	(Vietnamese	National	Assembly	2011:	Chapter	V,	Article	36).	Trafficking	victims	who	 are	Vietnamese	 citizens	 or	 stateless	 persons	 permanently	 residing	 in	Vietnam	may	be	 eligible	 for	educational	 and	 vocational	 training	 (including	 tuition	 fees	 and	 expenses	 for	 the	 purchase	 of	 textbooks	and	school	items	for	the	first	school	year)	if	they	are	 ‘minors	in	poor	household	families’,	or	short-term	allowances	 or	 loans	 for	 ‘overcoming	 difficulties’,	 ‘if	 they	 are	 poor	 household	 family	 members’	(Vietnamese	National	Assembly	2011:	Chapter	V,	Article	37	and	38).	From	these	policies,	 it	 is	clear	that	Vietnamese	 trafficking	 victims	 are	 entitled	 to	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 support	 for	 their	 reintegration	 process.	Another	 significant	 development	 is	 the	 expansion	 of	 victim	 services	 from	 women	 and	 children	 to	 all	trafficked	persons,	which	is	more	in	line	with	international	requirements.			However,	 many	 of	 these	 types	 of	 support	 are	 only	 in-principle.	 There	 is	 a	 lack	 legal	 guidance	 for	implementation	 from	 government	 agencies	 (Hoang	 2013:	 267).	 One	 example	 is	 legal	 aid.	 Trafficking	victims	were	not	defined	as	free-of-charge	candidates	in	the	Vietnamese	Law	on	legal	aid	in	2006	or	the	guidance	 published	 in	 2007	 (Vietnamese	 National	 Assembly	 2006:	 Article	 10).	 This	 policy	 was	 only	amended	 in	 2013	 to	 include	 situations	 of	 trafficking.	 Legal	 aid	 still	 cannot	 be	 undertaken	 effectively	because	of	 insensitive	 support	measures.	 Self-returnees	who	 are	 often	not	 identified	 as	 victims	 cannot	receive	 free	 legal	 aid	 support.	 Therefore,	 there	 are	 challenges	 in	 their	 application	 to	 be	 identified	 as	victims	 and	 as	 eligible	 for	 government	 support.	 As	 found	 in	 a	 2013	 study,	 only	 a	 small	 portion	 of	trafficked	 returnees	 (around	 22	 per	 cent)	 received	 legal	 support	 from	 the	 government,	 including	obtaining	 permanent	 residency	 registration,	 identity	 cards,	 and	 birth	 certificates	 for	 their	 children	(Hoang	2013:	259,	267).	Moreover,	some	policies	are	not	tailored	to	the	needs	of	the	trafficking	victims	in	Vietnam.	 For	 example,	 only	 victims	 in	 ‘poor	 household	 family’	 can	 access	 educational	 and	 vocational	support	 or	 bank	 loans.	 The	 other	 types	 of	 victims	 and	 trafficked	 self-returnees	without	 governmental	identification	documents	cannot	access	those	supports;	this	can	lead	to	a	lack	of	protection	against	being	re-victimised	(Hoang	2013:	294).	Lack	of	medical	and	health	care	equipment,	vocational	training	centres,	and	 funding	 also	means	 that	 the	majority	 of	 returnees	 go	 straight	 back	 to	 their	 communities	 without	support	 from	 the	 government.	 For	 example,	 comprehensive	 services	 are	 not	 available	 at	 shelters	 so	victims	 prefer	 to	 return	 home	 (Surtees	 2013:	 97-193).	 Therefore,	 some	 of	 the	 anti-trafficking	 policies	appear	comprehensive	on	paper	but	fall	short	in	practice.		




voluntary.	The	self-help	group	model	also	includes	support	through	a	reintegration	plan	and	financial	assistance	(Trees,	Vu	and	Tran	2012:	31).			It	can	be	seen	that	the	original	purpose	of	the	model	is	to	provide	support	for	trafficked	women,	not	men	or	children.	However,	the	identification	of	trafficked	men	leads	to	the	need	to	establish	self-help	group	for	these	 victims.	 Currently,	 there	 are	 nine	 self-help	 groups	 (one	 for	 men)	 in	 three	 provinces	 with	 102	women	and	10	men	participating	(MOLISA	2014:	3).	The	following	section	will	discuss	research	method,	and	 self-help	 activities	 and	 their	 benefits	 based	 upon	 interviews	 with	 governmental	 staff	 and	 official	reports.		
Research	method	The	 data	 was	 gathered	 through	 semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 individuals	 selected	 from	 key	Vietnamese	agencies	involved	in	the	plan	to	support	human	trafficking	victims.	Qualitative	methods	are	suited	 to	 collecting	 rich,	 quality	 information	 on	 sensitive	 topics	 with	 people	 whose	 ‘voices’	 are	 rarely	heard	 (Liamputtong	 and	 Ezzy	 2006:	 81).	 The	 semi-structured	 interviews	 facilitate	 the	 research	 in	capturing	 deep	 and	 comprehensive	 experiences	 of	 staff	 who	 have	 participated	 in	 the	 supportive	measures.	 The	 interviews	 were	 guided	 by	 a	 set	 of	 general	 questions	 or	 themes,	 and	 were	 not	 rigidly	structured.	Within	 these	 interviews,	 open-ended	 questions	 were	 asked	 as	 they	 allow	 the	 respondents	freedom	in	their	responses	and	this	provides	a	richness	of	data	(Bryman	2008;	Arksey	and	Knight	1999).		There	are	two	key	agencies	participating	in	the	support	of	human	trafficking	victims.	They	are	Ministry	of	Labour,	War	invalids	and	Social	Affairs,	and	The	Vietnam	Women’s	Union.	In	each	agency,	four	staff	were	interviewed,	including	two	operational	staff	who	directly	deliver	the	projects,	one	liaison	staff	member	in	charge	of	reports,	and	one	leader	who	supervises	agency	activities.	In	addition,	two	retired	staff	from	two	agencies	were	also	 invited	 to	participate	 in	 interviews.	The	reason	 for	 interviewing	retired	staff	 is	 that	they	are	no	longer	tied	down	by	the	working	environment	and	may	feel	freer	to	state	their	opinion;	they	arguably	may	provide	more	intensive	and	unbiased	information.		









Suggestions	for	improvement	The	respondents	in	this	study	made	suggestions	about	ways	to	further	enhance	the	effectiveness	of	group	activities.	 Group	 organisers	 and	 members	 should	 be	 given	 further	 training	 in	 counselling.	 Staff	 that	monitor	and	provide	support	for	the	monthly	meetings	do	not	have	much	professional	experience	in	this	type	of	support.	Therefore,	the	effectiveness	of	the	model	can	be	limited.	As	one	facilitator	explained:		 I	 am	 holding	 many	 positions	 and	 working	 with	 self-help	 group	 is	 not	 my	 main	responsibility.	Understanding	trafficked	victims	and	persuading	them	are	not	always	easy	jobs.	I	love	this	job	and	I	am	trying	to	help	them.	That	why	I	need	more	training	courses	to	improve	my	counselling	skills.		Another	staff	member	recommended:		 DSEP	 should	 seek	 staff	 that	 have	 knowledge	 about	 victim	 support	 and	 avoid	 changing	them	 frequently.	 Group	 organisers	 should	 be	 met	 annually	 to	 discuss	 and	 share	experiences.	 Support	 skills	 of	 psychology	 and	 counselling	 also	 should	 be	 trained	 in	 the	meetings	so	the	staff	can	do	their	jobs	more	effectively.		More	importantly,	group	members	lack	skills	and	education	in	counselling	(MOLISA	2014:	7).	This	effects	the	discussion	and	support	provide.	Therefore,	both	staff	and	victims	could	attend	more	training	courses	geared	to	their	level	of	expertise.	This	could	potentially	improve	the	quality	and	impact	of	the	groups,	as	an	interviewee	explained:		 Most	 trafficking	 victims	 are	 poor,	 have	 poor	 education	 and	 experience	 unemployment.	Therefore,	they	do	not	know	how	to	earn	money	from	financial	support	and	how	to	help	other	victims.	 If	 they	can	be	 trained	 those	skills,	group	discussion	will	be	 intensive	and	effective.			In	addition,	funds	for	reintegration	plans	should	be	allocated	from	not	only	international	but	also	national	budgets.	IOM	funds	which	currently	support	the	group	may	be	terminated	in	near	future	(MOLISA	2014:	13).	The	groups	 should	be	more	 independent	and	not	 rely	on	one	external	 funding	body	 to	ensure	 the	future	 continuation	 of	 their	 activities.	 In	 the	meantime,	 available	 funds	 should	 be	 leveraged	 to	 benefit	more	victims.	An	interviewee	recommended:		 The	 model	 depends	 on	 external	 funding.	 In	 my	 opinion,	 both	 internal	 and	 external	funding	 should	 be	 sought	 for	 the	 next	 periods.	 It	 is	 very	 important	 to	 remain	 group	activities.	Private	companies	and	individuals	can	contribute	to	the	project	funding.			





















Tilottama	 Raychaudhuri,	 School	 of	 Public	 Laws	 and	 Governance,	 The	 West	 Bengal	 National	University	of	Juridical	Sciences,	India		Conference	subtheme:	Sexual	assault	and	harassment			
Abstract	Sexual	harassment	 in	 the	workplace	 is	part	of	 the	struggle	 faced	by	 Indian	women	 today	 in	trying	 to	 challenge	 their	 traditional	 identities.	With	 crimes	 against	women	 like	 rape	 on	 the	rise	 (Philip	 2014),	 sexual	 harassment	 is	 still	 considered	 too	 trivial	 to	 be	 an	 ‘Indian’	 issue.	Shockingly,	in	a	recent	Australian	case,	a	court	in	Tasmania	accepted	that	due	to	the	influence	of	Bollywood	movies,	 it	 is	part	of	 the	common	Indian	male	psyche	 to	believe	 that	obsessive	pursuit	of	a	woman	 is	 tantamount	 to	wooing	her	 (Pearlman	2015).	 It	 is	not	very	surprising	that	India,	until	recently,	had	no	law	on	sexual	harassment	despite	a	Supreme	Court	decision	in	1997	regarding	the	gang	rape	of	a	woman	due	to	the	failure	of	officials	to	 investigate	her	initial	 complaints	 of	 harassment	 (Vishaka	 v	 State	 of	 Rajasthan	 (1997)	 6	 SCC	 241).	 This	legislative	 vacuum	 has	 now	 been	 filled	 by	 the	 Sexual	 Harassment	 of	 Women	 at	 Workplace	
(Prevention,	Prohibition	and	Redressal)	Act	2013,	 a	 law	 largely	 transplanted	 from	the	United	States.	However,	like	sexual	harassment	laws	of	the	West,1	a	feature	of	the	new	legislation	is	that	 sexual	 harassment	 has	 to	 be	 ‘unwelcome’	 and	 non-consensual.	 It	 is	 important	 to	acknowledge	 that	 India’s	 views	 on	 women’s	 freedoms	 are	 not	 as	 progressive	 as	 Western	nations,	 and	 the	 judiciary	 is	 structurally	 rooted	 in	 a	 similar	 cultural	 framework.	 Given	 this	background,	 is	 it	 realistic	 to	 expect	 the	 judiciary	 to	 interpret	 ‘unwelcome’	 conduct	 from	 a	modern,	 progressive	perspective	of	 gender	 rights?	This	paper	discusses	 the	new	 legislation	and	assesses	its	likely	impact	on	the	social	and	legal	system	in	India.			
Introduction	Sexual	 harassment	 jeopardises	 the	 safety	 of	 women	 and	 men	 in	 the	 workplace,	 imposes	 costs	 on	organisations,	threatens	gender	equality	and	reduces	the	quality	of	work	life.	From	the	1970s,	the	subject	of	sexual	harassment	gained	prominence	as	part	of	the	feminist	movement	(MacKinnon	1979).2	Although	sexual	 harassment	 of	 men	 occurs,	 studies	 reveal	 that	 sexual	 harassment	 is	 primarily	 directed	 against	women,	 who	 frequently	 occupy	 a	 less	 influential	 place	 in	 the	 labour	market	 (Mccann	 2005).	 Globally,	sexual	harassment	is	viewed	as	both	a	form	of	gender	discrimination,	as	well	as	a	form	of	violence	against	women.	Since	1995,	both	industrialised	and	developing	countries	have	enacted	specific	legislation	against	sexual	 harassment	 (Mccann	 2005).	 Employers	 and	 employee	 groups	 in	 these	 countries	 have	 also	developed	 programs	 to	 impart	 awareness	 on	 laws	 relating	 to	 sexual	 harassment	 (Mccann	 2005).	However,	 both	 the	 principles	 of	 the	 law	 and	 the	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 envisaged	 to	 enable	 its	application	 have	 been	 principally	 transplanted	 from	 the	West	 to	 countries	 with	 significantly	 different	cultural	perceptions	regarding	acceptable	behaviour	towards	women.3	This	inherent	structural	mismatch	can	materially	erode	the	efficacy	and	impact	of	such	laws	in	countries	like	India.		Notions	 of	 behaviour	 amounting	 to	 sexual	 harassment	 are	 greatly	 influenced	 by	 societal	 and	 cultural	prejudices,	 and	 gender	 bias.	 In	 India,	 there	 remains	 large	 scale	 gender	 inequality	 in	most	 places,	 and	women	 are	 commonly	 perceived	 as	 the	 weaker	 sex.	 This	 patriarchal	 set	 up	 renders	 women	 in	 India	exceedingly	vulnerable	to	sexual	offences	(see	generally,	Malhotra,	Vanneman	and	Kishor	1995).	Women	in	 India	 are	 not	 a	 homogeneous	 social	 group.	 Caste,	 class,	 religious,	 education	 and	 community	 biases	




result	in	different	forms	of	aggression	against	women	and	violence	stemming	from	tradition,	culture	and	religion	 include	 widow	 burning,	 dowry	 deaths,	 female	 infanticide	 and	 honour	 killing.	 In	 some	communities	 in	 India,	 sexual	 violence	 is	 regarded	 to	 be	 an	 important	 element	 in	 disciplining	 and	punishing	women	(Rajesh	2010).	For	instance,	Khap	Panchayats	(community	organisations	composed	of	all-male	village	councils,	unaffiliated	with	formally	elected	government)	act	as	kangaroo	courts	and	order	sexual	abuse	of	women	as	punishment	for	their	actions	and	those	of	their	families.4		In	urban	India	too,	the	underlying	prejudices	manifest	in	similar	ways,	with	the	character	of	the	woman	victim	being	called	into	question	in	cases	of	sexual	assault.	An	example	of	this	is	a	brutal	rape	case	that	occurred	in	an	up-market	locality	of	a	state	capital	in	2012.	The	Chief	Minister	of	the	state	referred	to	the	gang	rape	as	a	‘manufactured	incident’	and	politicians	dismissed	the	victim	as	a	sex	worker,	claiming	that	it	was	not	rape	but	a	deal	gone	sour.	Public	perception	was	that	the victim, an Anglo-Indian woman, who had	consumed	alcohol	at	a	discotheque	late	in	the	night,	had	asked	for	it.	This	case	was	compared	to	other	rape	cases	as	a	typical	illustration	of	the ‘good victim’ versus the ‘bad victim’.5 	In	 the	 backdrop	 of	 patriarchal	 mindsets	 where	 a	 victim’s	 character,	 religion,	 community	 and	 caste	determine	 social	 perceptions	 of	 whether	 sexual	 violence	 is	 an	 offence	 —	 notwithstanding	 the	 legal	definitions	—	 sexual	 harassment	 in	 the	workplace	 is	 still	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 trivial	 issue,	 sometimes	 a	necessary	hazard	encountered	by	women	who	wish	to	challenge	their	traditional	identities	and	enter	the	male-dominated	workplace.			
Evolution	of	sexual	harassment	law	in	India	Awareness	of	issues	regarding	sexual	harassment	of	women	started	in	India	almost	35	years	ago,	as	part	of	 the	 feminist	movement.	Several	women’s	rights	organisations	started	staging	protests	against	sexual	harassment,	 rampant	 in	 sectors	 like	 hospitals,	 airlines,	 educational	 institutions	 and	 government	departments.	The	initial	response	to	this	movement	was	lukewarm	(Patel	2005).	At	this	time,	while	there	were	 criminal	 law	 provisions	 against	 sexual	 harassment,	 the	 existing	 legislation	 was	 inadequate	 and	regressive,	and	reflective	of	the	inherent	prejudices	regarding	gender	equality.	For	example,	Sections	509	and	354	of	the	Penal	Code	(India)	criminalised	acts	which	insulted	and	outraged	the	‘modesty’	of	a	woman	(No	45	of	1860	[Penal	Code]).6	The	word	modesty	had	puritan	connotations	and	courts	in	India	grappled	for	many	years	 trying	 to	define	 the	 term.	 In	 any	 case,	 these	provisions	offered	 little	protection	 against	sexual	harassment	and	were	a	far	cry	from	promoting	gender	equality	(Barak-Erez	and	Kothari	2011).		The	campaign	against	sexual	harassment	of	women	gained	momentum	in	the	1990s	after	the	gang	rape	of	a	 social	 worker	 who	 was	 an	 employee	 of	 the	 state	 government	 of	 Rajasthan.	 The	 victim,	 who	 was	protesting	against	child	marriage,	had	complained	to	the	local	authorities	about	the	harassment	she	was	facing	 from	men	belonging	 to	 the	upper	caste.	The	authorities	 chose	 to	 ignore	her	 initial	 complaints	of	harassment,	which	 culminated	 in	 her	 rape.	 A	 petition	was	 then	 filed	 by	 a	women’s	 rights	 organisation	before	the	Supreme	Court	of	India	arguing	that	working	women	in	India	were	particularly	susceptible	to	sexual	harassment	due	to	the	dearth	of	legal	measures	for	their	protection.	The	petitioners	requested	the	Supreme	Court	issue	specific	guidelines	against	sexual	harassment	of	women	in	the	workplace	(Vishaka	v	




State	of	Rajasthan	(1997)	6	SCC	241	[Vishaka]).	The	Supreme	Court,	relying	on	the	Constitution	of	India	and	the	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	Against	Women	(GA	res	34/180,	34	UN	 GAOR,	 SuppNo	 46	 at	 193,	 UN	 Doc	 A/34/46;	 1249	 UNTS	 13;	 19	 ILM	 33	 (1980)),	 issued	 detailed	guidelines	 (hereinafter	 referred	 to	as	 the	Vishaka	guidelines)	describing	both	quid-pro-quo	and	hostile	environment	 as	 forms	 of	 sexual	 harassment.	 The	 Court	 prescribed	 a	 host	 of	measures	 to	 be	 taken	 by	employers	 to	 deal	 with	 complaints	 of	 sexual	 harassment,	 including	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 an	 internal	complaints	 committee.	 The	 Court	 also	 asserted	 that	 ‘The	 Central/State	 Governments	 are	 requested	 to	consider	adopting	suitable	measures	including	legislation	to	ensure	that	the	guidelines	laid	down	by	this	order	 are	 also	 observed	 by	 the	 employers	 in	 private	 sector’	 (Vishaka	 1997	 254;	 See	 also,	 Nussbaum	2001).		Unfortunately,	 the	impact	of	this	 landmark	judgment	was	limited,	the	guidelines	not	being	enshrined	in	legislation.	The	Vishaka	guidelines	were	reiterated	in	a	few	cases	like	Apparel	Export	Promotion	Council	v	
AK	Chopra	(1999)	1	SCC	759	and	Medha	Kotwal	Lele	v	Union	of	India	(2013)	1	SCC	297	[Lele	v	Union].	In	the	case	of	Medha	Kotwal,	 the	Supreme	Court	 specifically	criticised	 the	non-observation	of	 the	Vishaka	guidelines	 (Lele	 v	 Union	 2013:	 para	 1).	 Further,	 studies	 conducted	 by	 non-government	 organisations	(NGOs)	revealed	that	the	implementation	of	the	Supreme	Court	guidelines	remained	limited,	years	after	the	Vishaka	 judgment	 (Chaudhuri	 2008).	 In	many	 cases,	 internal	 complaints	 committees	 had	 not	 even	been	established	by	employers.	In	cases	where	committees	were	established,	they	existed	only	on	paper.	Some	 large	 multinational	 companies	 claimed	 that	 sexual	 harassment	 policies	 were	 unnecessary	 and	suggested	that	courts	themselves	were	reluctant	to	apply	the	Vishaka	guidelines	to	the	judiciary,	claiming	that	the	independence	of	the	latter	would	be	affected	(Chaudhuri	2008).		In	 2012,	 a	 horrifying	 gang	 rape	 of	 a	 23-year-old	 paramedic	 student	 in	 the	 national	 capital	 created	shockwaves	throughout	India.	The	sheer	brutality	of	the	attack	evoked	public	outrage	and	necessitated	an	urgent	relook	at	 laws	pertaining	to	sexual	violence	against	women	in	India.	A	three-member	committee	(hereinafter	referred	to	as	the	Verma	Committee)	headed	by	the	former	Chief	Justice	of	India,	 Justice	JS	Verma	was	established	to	review	India’s	sex	crime	laws.	The	Verma	Committee	submitted	its	report	in	a	record	 time	 of	 29	 days	 and	 sexual	 violence	 in	 all	 forms,	 including	 sexual	 harassment	 of	 women,	 was	sought	to	be	made	illegal.	Apart	from	legal	changes,	the	committee	also	condemned	patriarchal	attitudes	in	 general	 and	 recommended	 a	 crackdown	 on	 institutions	 like	 Khap	 Panchayats	 which	 legitimised	violence	against	women	(see	generally,	Bhowmick	2013).	Pursuant	to	the	Verma	Committee	Report,	the	
Penal	 Code	 was	 amended	 in	 2013	 to	 make	 inter	 alia,	 sexual	 harassment,	 stalking	 and	 voyeurism	punishable	offences	(The	Criminal	Law	(Amendment)	Act	2013	§§	354A,	354D,	354C).	Along	with	changes	in	the	criminal	law,	a	civil	law	by	the	name	of	The	Sexual	Harassment	of	Women	at	Workplace	(Prevention,	
Prohibition	 and	 Redressal)	 Act	 (hereinafter	 referred	 to	 as	 the	Act)	 was	 enacted	 in	 2013	 specifically	 to	protect	women	from	sexual	harassment	in	the	workplace.	
	
The	salient	features	of	the	new	Act	The	new	legislation	on	sexual	harassment	primarily	codifies	the	Vishaka	guidelines	issued	earlier	by	the	Supreme	Court.	As	is	evident	from	its	very	name,	the	legislation	is	not	gender	neutral	and	only	protects	women	who	are	victims	of	sexual	harassment.	The	ambit	of	the	Act	is	wide	and	it	applies	to	the	organised	and	 the	 unorganised	 sector	 though	 there	 are	 doubts	 as	 to	 how	 effective	 the	 law	 will	 be	 vis-a-vis	 the	unorganised	 sector,7	which	 is	 largely	built	on	 familial	 relations,	 contract	 and	home	based	 labour	 (NUJS	
Law	Review	2013).	The	term	‘workplace’	is	broadly	defined	and	includes	transportation	provided	by	the	employer	 for	 travel	during	 the	course	of	employment	 (Act§	2	 (o)).	Under	 the	Act,	 sexual	harassment	 is	defined	as	any	unwelcome,	sexually	coloured	behaviour,	which	can	be	either	physical,	or	verbal,	or	both.	The	Act	covers	both	quid-pro-quo	and	hostile	environment	harassment.	It	describes	situations	that,	when	coupled	 with	 unwelcome	 behaviour,	 will	 amount	 to	 sexual	 harassment.	 These	 relate	 to	 an	 implied	 or	




explicit	 promise	 of	 preferential/detrimental	 treatment	 in	 employment,	 threat	 about	 present	 or	 future	employment,	interference	with	work	and	offensive,	humiliating	or	intimidating	treatment	(Act	§	2	(n)).		In	conformity	with	the	Vishaka	guidelines,	the	Act	provides	for	the	setting	up	of	an	Internal	Complaints	Committee	(ICC)	by	every	employer,	to	deal	with	complaints	of	sexual	harassment	at	the	workplace.	The	ICC	 is	 to	 be	 headed	 by	 a	 senior	 woman	 employee	 and	 have	 a	 minimum	 of	 four	 members,	 including	representatives	from	the	employers,	the	employees	and	a	neutral,	external	member	(Act	§	4).	However,	the	Sexual	Harassment	of	Women	at	Workplace	(Prevention,	Prohibition	and	Redressal)	Rules	2013	(Rules)	to	the	Act	state	that	the	quorum	for	the	ICC	is	three	members,	which	in	effect	means	that	the	committee	may	take	decisions	even	in	the	absence	of	the	external	member	(Rules	Rule	7(7)).	In	case	an	organisation	has	 less	 than	 10	 employees,	 or	where	 charges	 of	 harassment	 have	 been	 levelled	 against	 the	 employer	himself,	 the	 Act	 mandates	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 Local	 Complaints	 Committee	 (LCC)	 (Act	 §	 6(1)).	 The	chairperson	of	the	LCC	should	be	a	woman	involved	in	social	work,	or	issues	relating	to	women.	The	rest	of	the	LCC	comprises	a	woman	representative	from	the	area	under	the	jurisdiction	of	LCC	and	two	other	members,	of	whom	one	has	 to	be	a	woman	associated	with	an	NGO,	or	organisations	 involved	 in	social	work	(Act	§	7(1)).		A	 victim	 of	 sexual	 harassment	 should	 make	 a	 written	 complaint	 to	 the	 ICC/LCC	 ideally	 within	 three	months	from	the	date	of	the	incident,	or	last	incident,	of	sexual	harassment	(Act	§	9).	Before	starting	the	formal	inquiry,	the	ICC/LCC	can,	at	the	request	of	the	victim,	initiate	a	process	of	conciliation	between	her	and	the	respondent	(Act	§	10(1)).	This	provision	has	been	disapproved	by	many	as	undermining	gender	equality.	 The	 Verma	 Committee	 has	 observed	 that	 ‘conciliation	 in	 cases	 of	 sexual	 harassment	 is	antithetical	to	the	intended	result,	inasmuch	as	the	concept	of	conciliation	pre-supposes	the	existence	of	a	valid	 complaint’	 (Verma	 2013:	 135-136).	 In	 the	 event	 that	 there	 is	 no	 conciliation,	 the	 ICC/LCC	 is	required	to	proceed	with	the	enquiry.	The	enquiry	has	to	be	completed	within	90	days	and	the	ICC/LCC	is	required	to	prepare	a	report	stating	its	findings	within	10	days	from	the	completion	of	the	inquiry	(Act	§	13).		The	 Act	 provides	 for	 protection	 of	 the	 privacy	 of	 the	 victim	 and	 specifically	 excludes	 obtaining	information	about	 the	 inquiry	proceedings	under	the	Right	 to	 Information	Act	2005	(Act	§	16).	Further,	during	the	enquiry	the	victim	or	the	respondent	can	be	transferred	to	other	departments,	or	the	victim	can	be	sanctioned	leave	for	up	to	three	months	(Act	§	12(1)).8	If	the	respondent	is	found	guilty,	the	act	of	sexual	harassment	is	treated	as	misconduct	in	accordance	with	the	service	rules	or	the	rules	prescribed	under	the	Act	and	his	wages/salary	may	be	deducted	to	pay	compensation	to	the	aggrieved	woman	(Act	§	13(3)(i)).	The	Act	also	provides	safeguards	against	malicious	complaints	and	the	punishment	prescribed	for	false	or	malicious	complaints	are	similar	to	those	for	sexual	harassment	(Act	§	14(1);	Rules	10).		
Impact	of	the	law	Shortly	after	enactment	of	the	new	legislation,	India	witnessed	a	spate	of	high	profile	cases	against	retired	Supreme	Court	 judges,	directors	of	research	 institutes	and	NGOs,	and	editors	of	magazines.	Most	of	 the	cases	received	tremendous	publicity	but	await	final	verdicts.9	Although	the	new	legislation	is	a	welcome	step	towards	protection	of	women,	 it	suffers	 from	two	major	 limitations.	The	 first	substantive	problem	lies	 with	 the	 definition	 of	 sexual	 harassment.	 Sexual	 harassment	 is	 defined	 as	 an	 unwelcome	 act	 or	behaviour;	however,	 the	 law	does	not	 set	any	standard	 for	determining	 ‘unwelcomeness’.	This	 is	much	needed,	as	conduct	amounting	to	sexual	harassment	cannot	be	adjudicated	by	the	objective	touchstone	of	reasonableness	alone	(Das	Gupta	2016).	In	a	land	of	diverse	cultures,	behaviour	viewed	as	unwelcome	by	a	woman	 from	a	particular	background	may	not	be	perceived	as	unwelcome	by	another.	Again,	 from	a	patriarchal	 perspective,	 a	 sexually	 coloured	 remark	may	 be	 construed	 as	 a	 benign	 compliment,	 while	pursuit	of	a	woman	may	be	construed	as	wooing	her.		Scholars	have	argued	that	popular	Indian	movies	(Bollywood	films)	nurture	this	patriarchal	perspective	by	 glorifying,	 in	 cinema,	 violence	 against	 women	 and	 glamorising	 acts	 of	 harassment	 such	 as	 stalking	(Ramasubramanium	and	Oliver	2003).	Bollywood	 cinema	 is	 a	huge	 industry	 and	has	 a	broad	audience	




worldwide.	 Thus,	 if	 popular	 Indian	 cinema	 conveys	 the	 idea	 that	 sexual	 aggression	 is	 expected	 in	romantic	 relationships,	 the	 same	 tends	 to	 become	 internalised	 within	 the	 limits	 of	 acceptable	 Indian	social	 behaviour.	 Interestingly,	 the	 impact	 of	 popular	 Indian	 cinema	 on	 male	 psyche	 finds	 place	 in	judgments	of	other	countries	as	well.	For	instance,	in	January	2015,	an	Australian	court	accepted	that	the	cultural	background	of	a	32-year-old	Indian	man	was	a	factor	that	induced	him	to	stalk	two	women.	The	defendant	argued	that	he	was	heavily	 influenced	by	Bollywood	movies	which	made	him	to	believe	 that	‘doggedly	 pursuing	women	will	 eventually	 cause	 them	 to	 relent’	 (Pearlman	2015).	 The	 judge	 accepted	that	 due	 to	 his	 unique	 cultural	 conditioning,	 the	 defendant	 did	 not	 appreciate	 that	 his	 conduct	 was	criminal	(Pearlman	2015).10		To	understand	the	yardstick	of	 ‘unwelcomeness’,	 it	 is	 important	to	view	the	legislation	from	the	eyes	of	the	 victim,	 rather	 than	 the	 aggressor.	 Women	 usually	 blame	 themselves,	 or	 feel	 guilty,	 about	 sexual	overtures	 that	 come	 their	 way.	 This	 makes	 it	 difficult	 for	 them	 to	 speak	 out	 publicly	 against	 sexual	harassment	 in	 the	 first	place.	 In	 a	 recent	 case	of	 sexual	harassment	 in	 India,	 the	victim	 (a	 lawyer)	had	given	an	account	of	her	feelings	in	a	blog:		 I	 dodged	 police	 barricades	 and	 fatigue	 to	 go	 to	 the	 assistance	 of	 a	 highly	 reputed	 …	Supreme	Court	 judge	…	 for	my	supposed	diligence,	 I	was	 rewarded	with	 sexual	 assault	(not	 physically	 injurious,	 but	 nevertheless	 violating)	 from	 a	man	 old	 enough	 to	 be	my	grandfather.	I	won’t	go	into	the	gory	details,	but	suffice	it	to	say	that	long	after	I’d	left	the	room,	the	memory	remained,	 in	fact,	still	remains,	with	me.	So	what	bothered	me	about	this	incident?	As	a	conditioned	member	of	(Indian)	society,	I	had	quickly	‘gotten	over’	the	incident.	 But	 was	 that	 what	 worried	 me:	 that	 I	 had	 accepted	 what	 was	 essentially	 an	‘unacceptable’	situation.	The	more	I	thought	about	it,	the	more	I	realized	that	the	crux	of	my	unease	 lay	 in	my	 inability	 to	 find	a	 frame	 in	which	 to	 talk,	 or	 even	think,	 about	my	experience.	(James	2013a)		
 After	writing	 the	 blog,	 the	 victim	 faced	 severe	 flak	 for	 speaking	 out	 publicly	 against	 a	 Supreme	 Court	judge.	This	compelled	her	to	write	an	explanation	to	clarify	that	she	had	not	acted	irresponsibly	and	had	merely	written	the	blog	to	‘warn	young	law	students	that	status	and	position	should	not	be	confused	for	standards	of	morality	and	ethics’	(James	2013b),	thus	considerably	diluting	her	earlier	writing.			In	view	of	the	problems	mentioned	above	regarding	defining	‘unwelcome’	conduct,	the	Verma	Committee	had	suggested	that,	along	with	all	other	factors,	‘in	determining	whether	the	behaviour	or	act	complained	of	 is	 unwelcome,	 one	 of	 the	 factors	 to	 be	 given	 due	 weight	 shall	 be	 the	 subjective	 perception	 of	 the	complainant’	 (Verma	 2013:	 30).	 The	 incorporation	 of	 this	 suggestion	 would	 have	 ensured	 a	 blend	 of	objective	and	subjective	standards	while	determining	sexual	harassment	and	offered	better	protection	to	women	 from	 different	 cultures	 and	 backgrounds.	 Unfortunately,	 this	 has	 not	 been	 incorporated	 in	 the	new	law.		The	second	problem	with	the	law	is	procedural	and	lies	with	the	creation	of	the	ICC.	The	Supreme	Court	had	already	provided	for	the	creation	of	an	internal	redressal	system.	However,	empirical	evidence	shows	that	creation	of	an	 internal	complaints	committee	 is	not	enough	unless	employers	are	sensitised.	While	mandating	the	creation	of	the	ICC,	the	law	is	surprisingly	silent	regarding	the	procedure	to	be	followed	by	employers	while	appointing	members	of	 the	 ICC.	Cases	 reported	 since	 the	enactment	of	 the	 law	reveal	that	 complaints	 have	 mostly	 been	 filed	 by	 junior	 women	 against	 men	 in	 senior	 positions.	 As	 the	constitution	of	the	ICC	is	 left	to	the	employer,	there	is	high	possibility	that	ICC	members	are	favourably	




disposed	towards	senior	employees	for	professional	reasons.11	The	Verma	Committee	had	voiced	similar	apprehensions	 by	 observing	 that	 in	 house	 filing	 of	 complaints	 may	 induce	 suppression	 of	 legitimate	complaints	(Verma	2013:	131).	The	redressal	mechanism	envisaged	under	the	Act	turns	a	blind	eye	to	the	internal	 politics	 and	 power	 dynamics	 of	 every	 organisation,	 where	 the	 employer	 may	 have	 a	 vested	interest	in	protecting	the	more	powerful	and	influential	aggressor.	Given	the	nascent	stage	of	the	law,	a	neutral,	independent	tribunal	would	have	been	a	more	appropriate	forum	to	effectively	deal	with	cases	of	sexual	harassment.	
	






































Abstract	Current	theoretical	explanations	for	young	women’s	violence	examine	physical	violence	as	a	masculine	behaviour.	This	means	that	young	women	are	constructed	as	rejecting	elements	of	their	 femininity	 in	 favour	 of	 masculine	 behaviours	 in	 order	 to	 perform	 violence	 in	 an	acceptable	 way,	 which	 results	 in	 them	 being	 constructed	 as	 violent	 femmes,	 new	 lads	 or	ladettes.	 Alternatively,	 theoretical	 explanations	 construct	 young	 women	 as	 adhering	 to	 a	feminine	 gender	 performance	 when	 avoiding	 physical	 violence,	 or	 engaging	 what	 are	traditionally	 considered	 to	 be	 feminine	 characteristics	 of	 aggression.	 This	 paper	 critiques	existing	theoretical	approaches	applied	to	young	women’s	violence,	by	drawing	on	empirical	research	 that	 examined	 young	 women’s	 physical	 altercations	 proliferated	 through	 social	media.	Preliminary	 research	 findings	 illustrate	how	continuing	 to	 construct	young	women’s	violence	 through	 a	 gendered	 paradigm	 offers	 inadequate	 explanations	 for	 what	 young	women’s	 violence	 actually	 entails.	 It	 concludes	 by	 suggesting	 how	 young	women’s	 violence	may	be	more	adequately	explained	using	a	theoretical	framework	of	embodying	gender	that	moves	away	from	gender	dichotomies	and	constructs	violence	as	a	series	of	bodily	practices.				
Introduction	Young	 women’s	 violence	 is	 not	 a	 new	 phenomenon.	 However,	 since	 young	 women’s	 engagement	 in	violence	 was	 first	 acknowledged	 by	 criminological	 scholarship,	 it	 has	 been	 explained	 through	 a	masculinist	paradigm.	This	means	that	physical	violence	is	constructed	as	a	behaviour	that	forms	part	of	accepted	masculine	performances	of	gender	and	is	intertwined	with	hegemonic	masculinity.	Young	men	can	 perform	 violence	 as	 a	 way	 of	 establishing	 their	 masculine	 identity,	 yet	 conversely	 such	 physical	violence	 is	 depicted	 as	 an	 unacceptable	 behaviour	 for	 young	 women.	 This	 paper	 draws	 on	 empirical	research	consisting	of	structured	observation	and	thematic	analysis	of	60	online	videos	featuring	physical	altercations	 between	 young	 women	 uploaded	 to	 five	 social	 media	 platforms.	 The	 research	 aimed	 to	critique	current	theoretical	explanations	for	young	women’s	violence.	Analysis	of	both	the	content	of	the	online	 videos,	 themselves,	 as	well	 as	 the	 comments	 posted	 by	 the	 online	 viewers	 allows	 this	 paper	 to	begin	 to	 show	 how	 existing	 theoretical	 works	 do	 not	 offer	 adequate	 explanations	 for	 what	 young	women’s	violence	actually	entails.	This	paper	does	this	first	by	illustrating	how	young	women’s	violence	is	 contextualised	 in	 existing	 criminological	 literature.	 Second,	 it	 outlines	 the	 approach	 taken	 by	 both	traditional	 and	 feminist	 theoretical	 frameworks.	 Third,	 it	 sets	 out	 the	methodological	 framework	 that	underpins	the	research	data.	Fourth,	the	research	data	is	used	to	critique	existing	theoretical	approaches	and	demonstrate	how	they	may	offer	limited	explanations	for	young	women’s	violence.	Finally,	this	paper	begins	to	show	how	a	new	theoretical	framework	of	embodying	gender	is	needed	to	more	fully	account	for	 young	 women’s	 violence	 away	 from	 this	 dichotomous	 gendered	 construction.	 It	 suggests	 that	 this	could	be	done	by	reconceptualising	violence	as	a	series	of	bodily	practices.		
	
Gendered	explanations	for	young	women’s	violence		Criminological	scholarship	examines	young	women’s	violence	in	a	gendered	way	by	intertwining	physical	violence	 with	 the	 current	 construct	 of	 hegemonic	 masculinity	 (Chesney-Lind	 1997;	 Chesney-Lind	 and	Shelden	 1992).	 Hegemonic	 masculinity	 is	 a	 socially	 fluid	 concept	 that	 dictates	 the	 scope	 of	 accepted	masculine	 performance	 that	 all	 men	 should	 engage	 in	 to	 establish	 their	 masculine	 gender	 identity	(Tomsen	1998,	2008).	Men	are	able	 to	use	violence	to	demonstrate	their	engagement	 in	 this	masculine	ideal,	 which	 requires	 men	 to	 display	 behaviours	 such	 as	 being	 dominant,	 assertive,	 and	 aggressive	
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(Connell	 2005;	 Connell	 and	Messerschmidt	 2005).	 However,	 young	men’s	 violence	 is	 also	 constructed	from	a	gender	neutral	position	in	that	men’s	violence	is	not	considered	to	be	a	gendered	issue,	and	it	 is	taken	 for	 granted	 that	 violence	 is	 a	 masculine	 behaviour	 (Campbell	 1993;	 Gilbert	 2002).	 As	 a	 result,	literature	 examining	 young	 men’s	 violence	 focuses	 on	 their	 engagement	 in	 violence	 itself,	 which	 has	caused	men’s	engagement	in	violence	to	go	unquestioned	(Salter	and	Tomsen	2012;	Tomsen	2008).			Constructing	 violence	 in	 this	 way	 has	 negatively	 impacted	 on	 how	 young	 women’s	 violence	 is	conceptualised.	Intertwining	young	men’s	violence	with	hegemonic	masculinity	means	that	violence	has	yet	 to	 be	 conceptualised	 as	 part	 of	 an	 accepted	 hegemonic	 feminine	 gender	 performance.	 Currently	hegemonic	 femininity	 requires	 young	women	 to	 be	 quiet,	 passive	 and	 demure	 (Jones	 2008;	 Jones	 and	Flores	 2012;	 Wesley	 2006).	 As	 a	 result,	 no	 theories	 of	 feminine	 violence	 have	 moved	 beyond	conceptualising	 violent	 young	 women	 in	 masculine	 terms	 (Connell	 1999;	 Connell	 and	 Messerschmidt	2005;	Lorber	1994).	This	has	contributed	to	young	women’s	engagement	in	violence	being	perceived	as	uncharacteristic	or	aberrant,	and	for	violent	young	women	to	be	constructed	as	violent	femmes,	new	lads	or	ladettes	(Batchelor	2011;	Miller	2001;	Sharpe	2012).	As	a	result,	those	young	women	who	engage	in	violence	are	seen	as	worse	than	their	male	counterparts.	This	is	because	not	only	are	young	women	being	physically	violent,	but	they	are	also	rejecting	behaviours	associated	with	socially	accepted	performances	of	femininity	in	order	to	do	so	(Batchelor	2011;	Carrington	2013;	Miller	2001).			
Masculine	constructions	of	violence	and	criminological	theories		Constructing	young	women’s	violence	 in	masculine	terms	is	reinforced	by	both	traditional	and	feminist	criminological	theories.	Traditional	theories	were	written	by	men,	to	apply	to	the	experiences	of	men	and,	therefore,	 provide	 limited	 or	 distorted	 views	 of	 the	 experiences	 of	women	 (Chesney-Lind	 and	 Shelden	1992).	 This	was	 because	 statistically	 young	men	 commit	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 criminal	 offences,	which	rendered	 young	 women’s	 engagement	 in	 crime	 and	 violence	 not	 significant	 enough	 to	 warrant	consideration	by	 traditional	 theories	 (Boots	and	Wareham	2012).	 In	addition	 to	only	providing	 limited	consideration	for	women’s	experiences,	traditional	criminologies	were	constructed	as	gender	neutral.	It	was	assumed	traditional	theories	were	equally	applicable	to	men’s	and	women’s	offending	behaviours	—	despite	 providing	 very	 limited	 consideration	 for	 women’s	 experiences	 (Chesney-Lind,	 Morash	 and	Stevens	2008;	Chesney-Lind	and	Shelden	1992;).	Additionally,	traditional	criminologies	considered	crime	to	 be	 an	 abnormal	 behaviour	 for	 women.	 This	 can	 be	 clearly	 illustrated	 by	 drawing	 on	 the	 works	 of	Lombroso	(see	Baez	2010)	who	focussed	on	the	biological	nature	of	crime	and	deviance.	While	his	work	provided	some	limited	consideration	for	criminal	women,	he	argued	that	women	who	engaged	in	crime	were	‘underdeveloped	men’	and	emphasised	the	fact	that	women	who	engaged	in	crime	were	abnormal	(Baez	 2010:	 564).	 Lombroso	 theorised	 that	 ‘normal’	 women	 focussed	 on	 looking	 after	 children	 and	respecting	 their	 husbands,	while	 criminal	women	were:	 sexually	 and	morally	 deviant,	 lacked	modesty,	brazen,	 and	 lived	 an	 irregular	 life	 (Baez	 2010:	 564).	 These	 examples	 demonstrate	 how	 women’s	engagement	 in	 crime	 and	 violence	 has	 traditionally	 been	 constructed	 through	 a	masculine	 lens,	 and	 is	considered	an	anomalous	behaviour	for	women	(Abramson	and	Modzelewski	2011).			The	 assumption	 that	 traditional	 criminologies	 were	 applicable	 to	 female	 criminality	 was	 criticised	 by	emerging	 feminist	 criminologies	 which	 developed	 around	 the	 time	 of	 women’s	 liberation	 (Daly	 and	Chesney-Lind	1988).	This	marked	the	first	time	that	the	uniquely	gendered	experiences	of	women	were	considered	separately	from	the	experiences	of	men	(Daly	and	Chesney-Lind	1988).	However,	 in	spite	of	this,	 feminist	 theories	 continue	 to	 examine	 young	 women’s	 engagement	 in	 violence	 through	 gender	dichotomies	and	construct	young	women’s	violence	as	an	anomalous	or	aberrant	behaviour.	This	can	be	best	 illustrated	 by	 examining	 four	 feminist	 theories.	 These	 are:	 the	 sexualisation	 thesis,	 the	 sisters	 in	crime	thesis,	structural	opportunity	theories,	and	the	ladette	thesis.	While	each	of	these	theories	moves	beyond	 the	 approach	 taken	 by	 traditional	 criminologies,	 all	 four	 continue	 to	 adhere	 to	 gendered	constructions	of	violence	and	examine	young	women’s	violence	using	masculine	terms.			
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The	sexualisation	 thesis	does	not	 specifically	 look	at	young	women’s	engagement	 in	violence,	 as	 it	was	written	 to	explain	why	official	 crime	statistics	 show	 that	young	women	offend	at	a	much	 lesser	 rate	 in	comparison	 to	 their	male	 counterparts	 (Carrington	 2013;	 Chesney-Lind	 1997).	 This	 theory	 developed	prior	to	the	separation	of	the	child	welfare	and	juvenile	justice	systems	and	theorised	that	young	women	were	more	 likely	 to	 be	policed	 through	welfare	 systems.	This	meant	 the	 focus	was	 on	 young	women’s	welfare	needs	even	when	they	had	committed	a	criminal	offence	(Carrington	2013;	Chesney-Lind	1997).	The	sexualisation	thesis	shows	how	young	women	were	held	to	a	different	set	of	behavioural	standards	in	comparison	to	young	men.	This	resulted	 in	young	women	being	processed	through	welfare	systems	for	failing	to	adhere	to	accepted	performances	of	femininity	by	doing	things	like:	engaging	in	violence;	being	sexually	 promiscuous;	 being	 uncontrollable;	 or	 for	 running	 away,	 even	 when	 they	 had	 committed	 a	criminal	offence.	As	these	were	welfare	offences,	this	resulted	in	young	women’s	transgressions	failing	to	appear	in	official	crime	data.	Further,	these	offences	were	rarely,	if	ever	applied	to	young	men,	who	were	policed	 through	criminal	 justice	 systems	when	 they	committed	a	 criminal	offence	 (Chesney-Lind	1997;	Chesney-Lind	 and	 Shelden	 1992).	 However,	 most	 importantly,	 the	 sexualisation	 thesis	 illustrates	 how	young	men’s	engagement	 in	 these	behaviours	was	not	 considered	a	welfare	 issue,	but	 rather	 seen	as	a	normal	or	natural	part	of	being	masculine	(Carrington	1993,	1996).	Young	women	engaging	in	violence,	on	 the	 other	 hand,	 was	 an	 issue	 that	 required	 state	 intervention	 as	 young	 women	 were	 seen	 as	transgressing	feminine	gender	norms	to	engage	in	violent	behaviour	(Carrington	1993,	1996).			In	contrast,	 the	sisters	 in	crime	 thesis	 (Adler	1975),	 structural	opportunity	 theories	 (Simon	1975),	and	the	ladette	thesis	(Carrington	2013;	Sharpe	2012)	all	specifically	relate	to	young	women’s	engagement	in	violence.	The	sisters	in	crime	thesis	and	structural	opportunity	theories	were	written	around	the	time	of	women’s	 liberation	 and	 both	 theorised	 that	 as	 women	 gained	 increased	 social	 and	 structural	opportunities	that	were	more	equal	to	their	male	counterparts,	their	engagement	in	crime	and	violence	would	 also	 become	more	 equal	 (Adler	 1975;	 Simon	 1975).	 However,	 in	making	 this	 argument	 each	 of	these	 theories	 fail	 to	move	beyond	 the	gendered	 constructions	of	 violence;	 their	 central	premise	being	that	the	increased	social	and	structural	opportunities	that	were	afforded	to	women	by	women’s	liberation	(including	engagement	in	crime	and	violence)	was	due	to	the	masculinisation	of	feminine	behaviour.	That	is,	women	were	being	afforded	the	opportunity	to	reject	traditional	feminine	gender	norms	and	engage	in	behaviour	 traditionally	 defined	 as	masculine,	which	 caused	 their	 engagement	 in	 crime	 and	 violence	 to	increase	(Batchelor	2011;	Chesney-Lind	1997;	Daly	and	Chesney-Lind	1988).	As	a	result,	 these	theories	continue	to	construct	violence	in	masculine	terms	and	consider	young	women’s	engagement	in	violence	to	be	uncharacteristic	and	unfeminine.			The	ladette	thesis	(Carrington	2013;	Sharpe	2012)	takes	this	approach	one	step	further	and	argues	that	young	women	are	now	actively	choosing	to	reject	traditional	feminine	behaviours	in	favour	of	masculine	ones	 which	 has	 resulted	 in	 them	 being	 defined,	 or	 defining	 themselves,	 as	 new	 lads	 or	 ladettes	(Carrington	2013;	Sharpe	2012).	The	ladette	thesis	also	emphasised	the	increased	public	attention	being	given	to	the	 issue	of	young	women’s	violence.	This	has	resulted	in	the	 ladette	thesis	being	described	as	the	new	sexualisation	thesis,	as	it	illustrates	how	the	focus	has	shifted	away	from	young	women’s	sexual	or	 moral	 transgressions,	 and	 towards	 their	 engagement	 in	 physical	 violence	 (Carrington	 1993).	 The	ladette	thesis	shows	how	the	issue	of	young	women	transgressing	heteronormative	gender	norms	is	still	the	subject	of	social	panic,	as	young	women	are	depicted	as	actively	rejecting	traditional	feminine	gender	behaviours	 to	engage	 in	violence	—	as	currently	women	cannot	be	simultaneously	constructed	as	both	violent	and	 feminine	 (Batchelor	2011;	Carrington	2013;	Sharpe	2012).	Each	of	 these	 theories	 illustrate	that	 while	 the	 introduction	 of	 feminist	 criminologies	 enabled	 criminological	 theories	 to	 allow	 for	 the	consideration	of	the	experiences	of	women,	young	women’s	engagement	in	physical	violence	has	yet	to	be	conceptualised	 away	 from	 masculine	 gender	 ideals.	 Empirical	 research	 has	 begun	 to	 illustrate	 how	continuing	 to	 examine	 young	 women’s	 violence	 in	 this	 manner	 has	 resulted	 in	 this	 issue	 being	inadequately	understood.			
Ashleigh	Larkin	
Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	3rd	International	Conference,	2015	 88		
Methodological	framework	This	 paper	 draws	 on	 the	 results	 of	 an	 empirical	 research	 project	 that	 aimed	 to	 examine:	 what	 young	women’s	 violence	 proliferated	 over	 social	 media	 looked	 like,	 which	 performances	 of	 violence	 were	encouraged	 and	 rewarded	 in	 the	 online	 context,	 and	 how	 young	 women	 performed	 gender	 when	engaging	in	physically	violent	behaviour.	In	order	to	do	this,	structured	observation	and	thematic	analysis	of	60	fight	videos,	which	had	been	uploaded	to	five	social	media	platforms	between	January	2012	and	July	2013,	was	conducted	(Larkin	and	Dwyer	2016).	Fight	sites	or	social	media	platforms	were	defined	as	web	based	applications	that	produce	user-generated	content,	shared	by	communities	based	on	mutual	interest	(Bluett-Boyd,	Fileborn,	Quadara	et	al	2013:	88).	Both	the	fight	sites	and	videos	used	in	this	project	were	selected	using	a	purposive	sampling	method	(Champion	2006;	Hagen	2010).	The	fight	sites	were	selected	on	the	basis	that	they	allowed	the	online	viewers	to	post	comments	to	each	specific	fight	video	and	more	than	10	fight	videos	had	been	uploaded	to	each	of	the	sites	during	the	selected	timeframe.	The	timeframe	was	chosen	to	ensure	the	most	up	to	date	videos	formed	part	of	the	sample.			The	 fight	 videos	 themselves	 were	 selected	 according	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 key	 words	 in	 the	 titles	 or	comments,	such	as:	chicks,	chick-fight,	street	fight,	brutal,	extreme	fight,	and	insane	girl	fight.	The	content	of	the	videos,	as	well	as	the	comments	posted	to	each	video	by	online	viewers,	were	analysed	as	research	data.	The	content	of	each	fight	video	was	analysed	according	to	predetermined	characteristics	on	a	coding	schedule,	which	involved	the	collection	of	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	variables.	These	included:	the	number	and	ratio	of	the	fight	participants,	what	the	fight	participants	were	wearing,	and	where	the	fight	took	 place	 (Given	 2008;	 Martinko	 and	 Gardner	 1985,	 1990).	 The	 verbal	 comments	 made	 in	 the	 fight	video,	 as	well	 as	 the	 comments	posted	 to	 each	 fight	 video	by	 the	online	viewers	 comprised	qualitative	data	collected.	Both	the	qualitative	and	quantitative	data	were	sorted	 into	key	themes	and	thematically	analysed.	 This	 approach	 allowed	 this	 project	 to	 draw	 detailed	 conclusions	 regarding	 what	 young	women’s	 violence	 looks	 like	 and	 how	 young	 women	 performed	 gender	 when	 engaging	 in	 violence	proliferated	 online.	 More	 importantly,	 this	 research	 has	 begun	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 the	 existing	theoretical	frameworks	are	inadequate	for	considering	what	young	women’s	violence	actually	entails.			
Critique	of	existing	theoretical	approaches	In	 contrast	 to	 arguments	made	 in	 literature	 and	 criminological	 theories,	 young	women	 in	 the	 sampled	fight	videos	were	not	rejecting	a	feminine	performance	of	gender	in	favour	of	a	masculine	one	in	order	to	engage	in	violence	underpinned	by	masculine	characteristics	of	aggression,	such	as	punching,	kicking,	or	wrestling	(Batchelor	2011;	Jones	2009;	Mullins	and	Miller	2008).	Nor	were	young	women	adhering	to	a	traditional	feminine	gender	performance	and	either	avoiding	physical	violence	altogether,	or	engaging	in	feminine	characteristics	of	aggression,	such	as	relational	aggression,	scratching,	or	slapping	(Jones	2008;	Jones	 and	 Flores	 2012;	 Miller	 2002).	 These	 characteristics	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 typically	 feminine,	especially	relational	aggression	as	it	centres	around	verbal	abuse	and	manipulation	(Henriksen	and	Miller	2012).	Engaging	in	a	feminine	performance	of	gender	means	that	the	young	women	continued	to	present	themselves	 in	 a	 stereotypically	 feminine	way	by	wearing	 feminine	 clothing,	 such	as	dresses,	 skirts	 and	jewellery,	and	incorporated	elements	of	relational	aggression	into	their	physical	altercations	(Larkin	and	Dwyer	 2016).	 This	 can	 be	 contrasted	with	 engaging	 in	 a	masculine	 gender	 performance	where	 young	women	 try	 to	 disguise	 their	 femininity	 and	 present	 themselves	 in	 a	 stereotypically	masculine	 way	 or	consider	themselves	to	be	masculine	when	engaging	in	violence	(Miller	2001,	2002).			The	young	women	in	the	videos	studied	appeared	to	blur	gender	dichotomies,	and	continued	to	present	themselves	 in	 a	 stereotypically	 feminine	 way,	 while	 engaging	 in	 physical	 violence	 that	 is	 traditionally	seen	as	brutal	and	masculine	acts	of	aggression	(Larkin	and	Dwyer	2016).	Further	to	this,	there	was	an	expectation	by	the	fight	participants,	audience	to	the	altercation	and	the	online	viewers	that	the	physical	altercations	 be	 carried	 out	 in	 this	manner.	 This	was	 illustrated	 in	 a	 number	 of	ways.	 For	 example,	 the	online	viewers	would	post	comments	 to	encourage	 the	use	of	brutal	and	masculine	 fighting	 techniques	and	post	comments	saying:	‘that	girl	knows[s]	how	to	fight	…’;	‘Damn	…	She	destroyed	her	face’;	‘Why	are	
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these	females	so	strong	now	…	they	hit	like	dudes	now’	(Larkin	and	Dwyer	2016).	Similar	comments	were	also	made	by	the	audience	to	the	altercation	who	would	yell	things	like:	‘Hit	her!’,	‘Beat	her	ass!’,	‘Get	her	to	 the	ground!’,	while	 the	 altercation	was	occurring	 (Larkin	 and	Dwyer	2016).	The	need	 for	 the	young	women	to	engage	in	brutal	and	masculine	characteristics	of	aggression	while	also	maintaining	a	feminine	performance	 of	 gender	was	most	 succinctly	 demonstrated	 by	 a	 comment	 posted	 by	 one	 online	 viewer	who	stated:	 ‘word	of	advice	while	 fighting:	 look	 like	a	 lady,	 fight	 like	a	man’	 (Larkin	and	Dwyer	2016).	This	 preliminary	 data	 begins	 to	 illustrate	 how	 young	 women	 are	 not	 rejecting	 feminine	 gender	behaviours	in	favour	of	masculine	behaviours	in	order	to	engage	in	violence	in	an	acceptable	way,	which	demonstrates	the	limited	understandings	for	young	women’s	violence	offered	by	existing	theories.			
Concluding	thoughts	This	paper	has	drawn	on	empirical	research	that	examined	the	proliferation	of	young	women’s	violence	over	 social	 media	 to	 challenge	 the	 explanations	 of	 young	 women’s	 violence	 by	 both	 traditional	 and	feminist	 criminological	 theories.	 The	 basis	 for	 this	 critique	 is	 that	 existing	 theoretical	 frameworks	continue	to	intertwine	accepted	performances	of	violence	around	accepted	performances	of	masculinity.	Currently,	the	only	way	that	young	women	might	perform	violence	according	to	mainstream	perspectives	is	to	be	constructed	as	a	masculine	‘lad’	as	violence	continues	to	be	depicted	as	an	aberrant	behaviour	for	young	women.	However,	 the	proliferation	of	violence	over	 social	media	has	provided	 insight	 into	what	young	women’s	physical	altercations	actually	look	like.	This	research	has	demonstrated	that,	in	contrast	to	 existing	 theories,	 young	 women	 may	 not	 be	 rejecting	 feminine	 gender	 behaviours	 in	 favour	 of	masculine	behaviours	 in	order	 to	perform	violence	 in	an	acceptable	way.	As	a	result,	 there	 is	a	need	to	develop	a	new	conceptual	 framework	of	embodying	gender	 that	 constructs	violence	away	 from	gender	dichotomies	and	reconceptualises	these	interactions.			What	might	 a	 reconceptualisation	 of	 young	women’s	 violence	 look	 like?	How	might	we	 rethink	 young	women	who	fight	so	they	are	no	longer	sensationalised	as	the	new	‘lads’?	One	way	this	might	be	done	is	to	think	about	violence	as	a	practice	involving	young	people’s	bodies,	made	up	of	a	set	of	micro	practices	that	are	not	necessarily	gendered.	Taking	this	approach	makes	it	possible	to	think	about	violence	outside	of	gender	dichotomies	as	performing	gender	becomes	just	one	factor	that	may	contribute	to	how	bodies	perform	 violence.	 This	 allows	 violence	 to	 be	 reconceptualised	 as	 a	 behaviour	 that	 the	 body	 performs,	rather	 than	 being	 constructed	 as	 an	 inherently	 masculine	 gendered	 practice.	 Not	 only	 might	reconceptualising	 violence	 away	 from	 masculine	 gender	 behaviours	 allow	 criminological	 theories	 to	provide	more	adequate	consideration	for	what	young	women’s	violence	actually	entails,	it	may	also	allow	for	this	issue	to	be	more	adequately	understood,	responded	to	and	prevented.			
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Abstract	The	concept	of	resilience,	while	still	evolving,	offers	the	possibility	of	addressing	the	needs	of	young	 offenders	 outside	 of	 custody.	 England	 and	 Wales	 has	 the	 highest	 rate	 of	 child	imprisonment	in	Europe	and	one	of	the	lowest	ages	of	criminal	responsibility	at	10	years	of	age	(Howard	League	for	Penal	Reform	2008).	Young	people	who	populate	the	criminal	justice	system	 come	 from	 the	 most	 disadvantaged	 in	 society	 and	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 many	 are	victims	 before	 they	 become	 offenders	 (Jacobson,	 Bhardwa,	 Gyateng	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Therefore,	these	young	people	have	a	number	of	unmet	needs	which	cannot	be	addressed	in	custody	and,	although	community	sentences	offer	a	better	opportunity	to	at	least	address	their	needs,	what	is	 required	 is	 a	more	 holistic	 approach.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	ways	 to	 realise	 resilience	 in	 the	young	person’s	 community	 could	provide	 the	best	way	 to	address	 their	 criminal	behaviour.	Acknowledging	 their	 hidden	 resilience	 and	 focusing	 upon	 their	 strengths,	 rather	 than	 their	deficits,	 offers	 the	 best	 way	 of	 realising	 the	 resilience	 of	 young	 people	 involved	 with	 the	criminal	 justice	 system.	According	 to	Ungar	 (2011),	 resilience	 is	observed	when	 individuals	engage	in	behaviours	that	help	them	to	navigate	their	way	to	resources	they	need	to	flourish.	Adequate	resources	require	 increased	social	 justice	 through	the	more	equitable	distribution	of	resources	allowing	for	people’s	social	ecologies	to	meet	those	needs.	Community	sentences	in	a	growth-fostering	environment	offer	the	best	way	forward.				
Introduction	Youth	justice	has	been	dominated	by	the	risk	factor	paradigm	for	the	last	two	decades.	The	identification	and	management	of	 risk	 in	 the	name	of	public	protection	obscures	more	 than	 it	 reveals.	 It	 emphasises	individual	 responsibility,	 and	 the	 locus	 for	 change	 is	 always	 the	 individual	 to	 be	 dealt	with	 by	 various	interventions	which	fail	to	acknowledge	the	role	of	wider	social	processes.	A	Prison	Reform	Trust	(PRT),	report	entitled	Punishing	Disadvantage:	A	Profile	of	Children	in	Custody	(Jacobson,	Bhardwa,	Gyateng	et	al.	2010),	 found	 that	 children	 and	 young	 people	 in	 custody	 are	 the	 products	 of	 multiple	 forms	 of	disadvantage:			 It	 is	widely	recognised	within	the	criminological	research	literature	…	that	offending	by	children	 is	 strongly	 associated	 with	 forms	 of	 disadvantage.	 These	 ‘risk	 factors’	 for	offending	 include	disadvantages	 relating	 to	 family	 life;	 the	wider	 social	 environment	 in	which	 children	 live;	 socio-economic	 status;	 experiences	 of	 and	 responses	 to	 education,	and	emotional	and	psychological	needs	and	dispositions.	(Jacobson,	Bhardwa,	Gyateng	et	al.	2010:	48)		Putting	 children	and	young	people	 in	 custody	exacerbates	 this	disadvantage.	 Seeing	young	people	who	commit	 crimes	as	a	menace	 to	be	 controlled	 justifies	 the	assessments	of	 risks	and	 the	 interventions	 to	address	them.	However,	it	only	provides	a	partial	picture	of	the	young	person	as	the	processes	by	which	risks	 are	 assessed	 primarily	 focus	 on	 psychosocial	 domains	 and	 largely	 ignores	wider	 socio-structural	factors.	These	processes	also	de-individualise	responses	to	young	people	as	they	allocate	individuals	to	a	generic	 risk	 category	 that	may	 lead,	 in	 some	 cases,	 to	 disproportionate	 or	 inappropriate	 interventions	(Case	and	Haines	2006).	Young	people	who	commit	crime	present	with	a	number	of	complex	needs	which	cannot	be	met	 in	custody.	The	youth	 justice	system	 is	adult-centred	and	concerned	with	managing	and	controlling	the	young	people	in	their	care.	There	is	an	emphasis	on	problems	and	young	people	are	seen	through	 a	 negative	 lens.	 They	 are	 also	 marginalised	 in	 their	 own	 rehabilitation	 as	 they	 are	 primarily	perceived	as	risks	to	be	managed	as	opposed	to	collaborators	in	their	own	reform.		
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The	 very	 act	 of	 oversimplifying	 potentially	 complex	 dynamic	 phenomena	 into	 readily	quantifiable	and	targetable	risk	‘factors’	is	an	exercise	in	crude	reductionism,	the	results	of	which	 cannot	hope	 to	 accurately	 represent	 the	 lived	 realities	 of	 young	people.	 (Case	and	Haines	2006:	103)		The	 research	on	 resilience	points	 to	 a	more	participatory,	 forward-looking	 youth	 justice	 system	which	engages	the	young	person	whilst	recognising	their	strengths	and	competencies,	and	works	with	them	to	foster	 positive	 growth	 and	 pro-social	 choices	 going	 forward.	 Currently,	 young	 people	 and	 their	communities	are	seen	as	the	source	of	their	own	problems	and	the	wider	socio-structural	environments,	which	produce	and	reproduce	numerous	oppressions,	are	largely	ignored.	Young	people	are	not	separate	from	 their	 environment	 and	 living	with	 poverty,	 violence	 and	 unemployment	 can	 shape	 and	 limit	 the	opportunities	available	to	them.	Their	experiences	materialise	 in	numerous	ways,	 including	depression,	truancy,	substance	misuse	and	anti-social,	criminal	behaviour.	Viewed	from	an	institutional	perspective,	these	 behaviours	 are	 perceived	 as	 negative,	 sometimes	 meaningless,	 but	 for	 the	 young	 person	 they	represent	resilience	in	the	face	of	significant	adversity.	Such	behaviours	also	represent	diversity	and	do	not	fit	easily	into	pre-prescribed	categories.	When	resources	are	scarce,	children	and	young	people	may	turn	 to	 problem	 behaviours	 to	 find	 a	 powerful	 way	 to	 assert	 a	 preferred	 identity	 as	 a	 survivor	 (see	Boyden	and	Mann	2005;	Ungar	2005).		
Realising	resilience		The	 concept	 of	 resilience,	 whilst	 still	 evolving,	 offers	 the	 possibility	 of	 addressing	 the	 needs	 of	 young	offenders	outside	of	custody.	Resilience	is	defined	as:		 In	the	context	of	exposure	to	significant	adversity,	whether	psychological,	environmental,	or	 both,	 resilience	 is	 both	 the	 capacity	 of	 individuals	 to	 navigate	 their	 way	 to	 health	sustaining	resources,	 including	opportunities	 to	experience	 feelings	of	well-being,	and	a	condition	 of	 the	 individual’s	 family,	 community	 and	 culture	 to	 provide	 these	 health	resources	and	experiences	in	culturally	meaningful	ways.	(Ungar	2008:	225)		A	more	holistic	approach	emphasises	the	primacy	of	the	physical	and	social	ecology	in	fostering	resilience	(Ungar	 2004a,	 2004b,	 2008,	 2011,	 2012).	 While	 Ungar	 recognises	 the	 role	 of	 individual	 abilities,	 he	disagrees	that	some	individuals	are	in	and	of	themselves,	resilient.	Resilience,	he	believes,	 is	not	a	fixed	trait	of	the	individual	as	personality	is	malleable	and	influenced	by	the	ability	of	the	physical	and	social	ecology	to	support	and	facilitate	health	sustaining	resources	to	young	people	who	experience	significant	adversity.	 Secondly,	Ungar	 believes	 that	 it	 is	 the	 dynamic	 interaction	 between	 the	 individual	 and	 their	environment	 that	 is	 pivotal	 as	 personal	 agency	 and	 motivation	 are	 necessary	 to	 navigate	 towards	culturally	meaningful	resources.			Therefore,	 the	 literature	 on	 resilience	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 social	 ecology	 in	 facilitating	access	 to	 health	 sustaining	 resources	which	 young	 people	 can	 then	 navigate	 towards	 to	 foster	 growth	(Ungar	2008).	The	social	ecology	in	Ungar’s	(2012)	sense	refers	to	a	series	of	interlocking	systems	which	influence	young	people	in	both	direct	and	indirect	ways.	He	further	argues	that	we	must	move	beyond	the	micro	systems	of	home	and	school	to	include	the	macro	system,	which	is	the	actual	culture	of	the	young	person	(Ungar	2008).		Disadvantaged	young	people	who	experience	significant	adversity,	such	as	abuse	and	neglect	over	time,	and/or	those	who	reside	 in	 toxic	and	dangerous	environments	suffer	significant	adversity	and	multiple	disadvantage.	The	subject-centred	approach	places	the	responsibility	for	resilience	on	the	victim	(young	person),	a	position	criticised	by	Rutter	(2005).	Ungar	deliberately	de-centres	the	child	in	order	to	remove	blame	from	them	for	failing	to	develop	positively	in	such	hostile	environments	and	instead	holds	that	the	environments	 in	which	 they	 live,	 and	 not	 the	 individual	 young	 person,	 should	 be	 the	 focus	 for	 change	
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(Ungar	 2011).	 He	 deliberately	 attempts	 to	 dispel	 the	 myth	 of	 the	 ‘invulnerable	 child’,	 the	 child	 who	bounces	back	despite	the	odds	and	identifies	the	physical	and	social	ecology	in	which	the	child	resides	as	both	 cause	 and	 solution.	 The	 behaviour	 of	 young	 people	 in	 such	 toxic	 environments	 is	 made	understandable	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 functionality;	 anti-social/criminal	 behaviour	 reflects	 the	 nature	 of	 the	environment	 and	 the	 choices	 reflect	 the	 constraints,	 controls	 and	oppression	within	 that	 environment.	Therefore,	 a	 shift	 in	 focus	 is	 required	as	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 resilience	 is	 less	an	 individual	 trait	 and	more	a	quality	of	the	child’s	physical	and	social	ecology,	‘so	de-centering	the	child	in	the	argument	shows	that	 the	 locus	of	 change	 lies	 in	 the	processes	by	which	environments	provide	 resources	 for	use	by	 the	child’	(Ungar	2011:	6).		Hidden	 resilience	 refers	 to	 those	 skills	 and	 abilities	 developed	 by	 children	 to	 cope	 within	 the	environment	in	which	they	find	themselves,	and	which	Ungar	(2004b)	believes	can	be	built	upon	through	providing	 meaningful	 resources	 in	 the	 environment.	 When	 the	 physical	 and	 social	 ecology	 provides	access	to	available	and	culturally	meaningful	resources,	children	will	navigate	towards	those	resources,	negotiating	for	what	they	need	to	flourish.	This	involves	personal	agency	and	motivation,	and	motivation	can	be	encouraged	by	community	support	 for	the	use	of	 those	resources.	Therefore,	 there	 is	a	dynamic	interaction	 between	 the	 young	 people	 and	 their	 environment	 which	 can	 facilitate	 positive	 growth.	Understanding	 hidden	 resilience	 as	 a	 cultural	 artefact	 expressed	 in	 a	 particular	 context	 can	 inform	interventions	that	are	less	likely	to	be	resisted	(Ungar	2005).		A	social	ecological	understanding	of	resilience	draws	upon	Bronfenbrenner’s	(1979)	ecological	systems	theory	as	a	way	to	understand	how	the	interactions	between	individuals	and	their	environments	impact	individual	 development.	Ungar	 (2008)	 argues	 that	 resilience	 is	more	 likely	 to	 occur	when	 services	 are	provided	in	ways	that	make	it	more	likely	that	every	child	and	young	person	will	do	well	in	ways	that	are	contextually	 relevant.	 According	 to	 Gilligan	 (1999),	 there	 are	 three	 building	 blocks	 that	 underpin	resilience:	a	secure	base	which	provides	a	child	with	a	sense	of	belonging	and	a	sense	of	security;	good	self-esteem,	an	internal	sense	of	self-worth	and	competence	and	self-efficacy;	and	the	self-belief	in	one’s	own	 personal	 strengths.	 All	 of	 this,	 Ungar	 argues,	 can	 be	 provided	 through	 social	 support	 in	 the	environment	as	resilience	is	not	a	static	trait	of	the	individual,	but	the	result	of	interactions	between	the	individual	and	their	environment:		 But	resilience,	the	capacity	to	overcome	adversity,	is	not	just	a	measure	of	how	well	some	children	behave	in	ways	we	approve	of.	The	paradox	is	that	resilience	is	equally	present	in	 young	 people	 whom	 we	 have	 labelled	 as	 dangerous,	 delinquent,	 deviant	 and/or	disordered.	Resilient	youth	take	advantage	of	whatever	opportunities	and	resources	that	are	available	—	even	those	we	consider	negative	or	destructive.	That	negative	behaviour	shown	in	troubled	young	people	can	actually	signal	a	pathway	to	hidden	resilience	that	is,	just	like	the	one	chosen	by	their	well-behaved	peers,	simply	focused	on	the	need	to	create	powerful	and	influential	identities	for	themselves.	(Ungar	2005:	1)		
Resilience	and	the	youth	justice	system	Robinson	 (2015)	 argues	 that	 embedding	 Ungar’s	 theory	 of	 resilience	 within	 the	 youth	 justice	 system	offers	 the	 possibility	 of	 fostering	 positive	 growth	 and	 pro-social	 outcomes.	 Like	 Ungar	 (2004b),	 she	believes	that	young	people	who	come	to	the	attention	of	the	youth	justice	system	are	resilient	but,	due	to	the	 way	 that	 young	 offenders	 are	 processed	 and	 assessed,	 this	 resilience	 is	 not	 recognised.	 Their	resilience	may	manifest	 in	 dysfunctional	ways,	 but	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	 they	 are	 not	 resilient.	 She	(Robinson	 2015)	 further	 believes	 that	 this	 resilience	 can	 be	 harnessed	 and	 redirected	 via	 a	 focus	 on	strengths	and	competencies	within	a	more	cooperative,	collaborative	and	participatory	way	of	working.	To	achieve	this	there	needs	to	be	a	recognition	and	acceptance	by	youth	 justice	practitioners	that	what	are	currently	perceived	as	dysfunctional	and	risky	behaviours	actually	represent	resilience	and,	although	the	 adaptation	 may	 not	 be	 law	 abiding,	 it	 can	 demonstrate	 adaptive	 coping	 in	 impoverished	 and	
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disadvantaged	 communities.	 Robinson	 (2015)	 further	 agrees	 with	 Ungar	 (2004b)	 that	 all	 people,	including	young	people,	are	driven	to	form	an	identity	which	needs	to	be	forged	from	the	experiences	and	opportunities	available	to	them,	and	maladaptive	ways	of	coping	represent	an	effort	to	forge	an	identity	giving	the	young	person	some	agency	and	control	over	their	own	lives.	Therefore,	the	starting	point	for	facilitating	a	changed	relationship	with	young	people	is	to	listen	to	them	and	attempt	to	understand	the	young	person’s	behaviour	and	choices	in	terms	of	the	meaning	it	has	for	them.	From	this	platform,	gains	can	 be	 made	 by	 reframing	 the	 negative	 ways	 in	 which	 young	 people	 are	 perceived	 —	 moving	 from	delinquent,	 defiant,	 challenging,	 and	 a	 focus	 on	 deficits,	 to	 a	 reframing	 of	 behaviours	 in	more	 positive	language,	such	as	coping,	surviving,	thriving	(Robinson	2015).		This	more	holistic	approach	recognises	the	strengths	the	young	person	possesses	and	also	acknowledges	the	role	of	wider	social	processes,	and	how	they	constrain	and	limit	the	opportunities	for	young	people.	Resilience	 aids	 the	potential	 to	 realise	 the	 strengths	 and	 capacities	 of	 young	people	both	 in	 the	 youth	justice	 system	 and	 in	 services	 to	 young	 people	 in	 general.	 However,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 panacea	 and	 it	 has	weaknesses.	 The	 functionality	 of	 young	 people’s	 behaviour	 may	 be	 better	 understood	 through	 an	understanding	 of	 hidden	 resilience;	 however,	 offending	 behaviour	 at	 the	most	 fundamental	 level	 still	focuses	on	the	individual	who	has	to	change	and	this	has	echoes	of	the	current	individualistic	approach	of	the	risk	factor	prevention	paradigm	in	youth	offending.	It	also	diverts	attention	away	from	the	power	and	responsibility	of	the	state	to	address	unjust	social	and	economic	policies.		It	 is	 for	 this	reason	that	resilience	can	be	defined	as	 the	 individual’s	ability	 to	navigate	 to	resources,	as	well	as	the	capacity	of	the	individual’s	environment	to	provide	resources	that	protect	the	young	person	in	ways	 that	 are	meaningful	 (Ungar	 2008).	Unless	 the	 young	person	 is	 empowered	 to	 negotiate	 for	what	they	need,	the	resources	that	are	provided	are	unlikely	to	be	used	(Bottrell	2009).	Engaging	with	young	people	 in	processes	that	 let	 them	be	empowered	and	heard	 in	the	design	of	 their	care	plans	 is	 likely	to	ensure	a	maximum	benefit.			Youth	 justice	 itself	 needs	 to	 be	 put	 in	 context,	 and	 young	 people’s	 social	 capital	 needs	 require	 the	provision	of	goods	and	services	to	young	people	through	their	physical	and	social	ecologies.	This	can	only	happen	when	 the	 production	 and	 reproduction	 of	wider	 social	 and	 economic	 injustices	 are	 addressed.	Attention	must	be	paid	to	the	impact	of	racism,	the	influence	of	poverty,	and	the	effects	of	violence	and	unemployment	in	communities;	specifically,	how	young	people	navigate	these.	A	thorough	examination	of	the	 larger	 economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	 forces	 that	 affect	 the	 actions,	 choices	 and	behaviours	of	 young	people	is	also	required.	Bottrell,	in	her	study	of	girls	(age	13-24)	living	on	the	Glebe,	a	housing	estate	in	Sydney	 Australia,	 found	 that	 ‘The	 classic	 conceptualization	 of	 resilience	 as	 positive	 adaptation	 despite	adversity	is	evident	in	the	girls’	negotiation	of	their	circumstances	and	achievement	of	positive	outcomes’	(Bottrell	2009:	326).	The	estate	is	characterised	by	and	perceived	as	a	problem	area,	as	one	girl	says,	‘Oh,	you	live	in	Glebe,	you’re	a	thug’.	(Bottrell	2009:	496).	The	aim	of	the	research	was	to	understand	young	people’s	perspectives	on	schooling	and	truancy.	She	found	that	truancy	represented	positive	adaptation	under	adversity;	the	school	did	not	welcome	young	people	from	the	Glebe.	They	felt	looked	down	on	and	many	truanted	school	in	order	to	find	a	sense	of	belonging	and	acceptance	not	available	there.	The	youth	centre	provided	what	 the	 school	 did	not;	 not	 only	 a	 sense	of	 belonging	 and	 acceptance,	 but	 a	 sense	of	identity	and	a	feeling	of	power	over	the	ability	to	construct	their	own	identity	and	not	have	it	thrust	upon	them	in	negative	terms	by	those	from	outside.	This	behaviour	also	reflects	the	failure	of	the	school	to	act	as	 a	 bridging	 institution	—	 to	 provide	 opportunities	 for	 the	 acquisition	 of	 social	 capital	 as	 opposed	 to	closing	down	opportunities	through	alienation.		This	study	provides	a	very	good	example	of	resilience	at	work,	but	also	of	the	limitations	of	resilience	to	bridge	social	injustice:			
Maureen	Maxwell	
Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	3rd	International	Conference,	2015	 95		
When	 both	 adversity	 and	 resilience	 are	 conceptualised	 as	 social	 and	 relational	constructions,	the	strengthening	of	disadvantaged	communities	may	be	as	dependent	on	recognising	 and	 shifting	 relations	 of	 privilege	 as	 it	 is	 on	 building	 strengths	 of	 the	marginalised.	(Bottrell	2008:24)			
Conclusion	The	youth	justice	system	in	England	and	Wales	processed	almost	100	000	children	and	young	people	in	the	year	2012/13	 (Youth	 Justice	Board	2014).	This	 is	 testament	 to	 the	wider	 social	 injustices	 to	which	most	 of	 these	 young	 people	 have	 been	 subjected.	 Young	 people’s	 criminal	 behaviour	 is	 a	 form	 of	communication	and	an	indication	of	‘hidden	resilience’,	both	of	which	presents	an	opportunity	to	engage	with	 them	 in	 their	 own	 rehabilitation.	 This	 necessitates	 a	 different	 perspective	 towards	 young	 people	who	come	into	conflict	with	the	law	—	a	perspective	that	frames	these	young	people	not	as	a	risk	to	be	managed	and	controlled	into	conformity,	but	as	valued	individuals	possessing	not	only	hopes	and	dreams,	but	unrealised	potential	and	unrealised	skills	and	competencies.	Only	then	when	young	people	feel	they	have	a	voice,	are	listened	to,	and	what	they	say	is	heard	and	considered	important	can	real	progress	be	made.	However,	to	fully	foster	resilience	the	wider	physical	and	social	ecology	must	furnish	young	people	with	 the	 resources	 that	 they	need	 to	build	a	 solid	 sense	of	 identity	and	 to	 realise	 their	potential	 in	 the	fullest	sense.	And	for	that	we	need	more	change	at	the	level	of	government	—	more	socially-just	policies,	which	foster	inclusion	rather	than	exclusion.	The	PRT	report,	Punishing	Disadvantage	(2010),	highlighted	how	many	young	offenders	are	given	custodial	sentences	for	non-violent	offences.	The	money	currently	spent	 on	 prison	 sentences	 could	 be	 re-routed	 to	 helping	 foster	 resilience	 through	 community	punishments.	And	finally,	to	really	realise	the	hidden	resilience	of	young	offenders,	we	as	a	society	need	to	change	our	perspective	of	them	and	our	politics.		
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